Concept
Background of McCulloch
Other powers
Background of McCulloch
Maryland aimed a tax at the Bank of the United States. The measure reached every bank operating in the state that the state had not chartered, but it was intended to discriminate against the national Bank and its Maryland branch, and the state sued the Bank and its cashier, James McCulloch, to collect. The opinion that resulted, McCulloch v. Maryland, is one of the most significant Chief Justice Marshall ever wrote.
Two statutes frame the dispute. On April 10, 1816, Congress passed an act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. On February 11, 1818, Maryland’s General Assembly answered with an act imposing a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the state not chartered by the legislature.1 Under the Maryland act, a bank that had set up a branch without state authority could issue notes only in specified denominations and only on stamped paper furnished by the state treasurer and paid for on delivery. It could escape that requirement by paying the state $15,000 a year in advance.2 The parties agreed that the Bank had no authority from Maryland to establish its Baltimore branch other than the fact that Maryland had adopted the Constitution and belonged to the Union.3 With no state charter behind the branch, the act reached it: circulating a note without the Maryland stamp drew a penalty, and the penalty could be avoided by paying the annual tax.4
John James, suing for himself and for Maryland, brought an action of debt in the County Court of Baltimore County against James William McCulloch to recover penalties under the statute. Judgment went against McCulloch on a statement of facts agreed and submitted to the court, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, and the case reached the Supreme Court by writ of error.5 Because the facts were agreed, the dispute was one of law alone, and the parties fixed the stakes in advance. If the Court held for the plaintiffs, judgment would be entered for $2,500 and costs; if not, judgment of nonsuit would be entered with costs to the defendant.6
The question submitted was whether the Maryland act was repugnant to the Constitution or to the act of Congress incorporating the Bank.7 It resolved into two. The first, in Marshall’s words, is whether Congress has power to incorporate a bank.8 The second arises only if the answer is yes: whether Maryland may tax a branch of the Bank within its borders.9 The opinion follows that order. It first determines that chartering the Bank lay within the constitutionally vested power of the federal government, and it then finds that, because the Bank was constitutionally chartered, Maryland’s tax upon it was unconstitutional. The syllabus records both holdings: Congress has power to incorporate a bank, and the state in which a branch is established cannot, without violating the Constitution, tax that branch.10
The first question was old by 1819. At the Constitutional Convention, delegates who favored Madison’s proposal for a congressional power to grant charters feared that a vote would either defeat it or approve it and jeopardize ratification. The only vote taken was on a narrower motion, suggested by Mason, to limit the power to canal companies. That motion failed, which also doomed further action on the proposal.11 The question returned in the debate over the first national bank. Unpersuaded by Madison, his House colleagues passed the bank bill by a vote of 39 to 20 after it had passed the Senate unanimously.12
That debate gave the argument its two poles. Hamilton contended that a proper construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause permitted any law “incidental, useful, or conducive to” the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers, and he found that a bank “has a relation, more or less direct, to the power of collecting taxes, to that of borrowing money, to that of regulating trade between the States, and to those of raising and maintaining fleets and armies.” Jefferson answered that Congress could not charter a bank, because the enumerated powers did not authorize chartering corporations in express terms and the clause permitted only those laws “without which the [specific grants] of power would be nugatory.” Any broader reading, he warned, would soon “swallow up all the delegated powers.”13 Both men reasoned from delegated powers. They disagreed about how close a connection the clause demands between a means and an enumerated end.
That disagreement was still alive when Marshall wrote. Maryland’s counsel argued that the clause, though in terms a grant of power, was in effect restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers.14 On the word itself, Marshall observed that in common use and in approved authors necessary frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, useful, or essential to another. It has no fixed character peculiar to itself and admits of all degrees of comparison.15 The sections that follow develop both points.
The Bank itself had a turbulent history. The first Bank met opposition from state banks, with which it competed for business, and Congress initially failed to renew it, by a single vote in both chambers, because anti-national forces were strong. The War of 1812 then underscored the wisdom of a national bank, as did the questionable practices of the state banks on which the federal government had relied to borrow money and pay debts. In 1816 Congress issued a new twenty-year charter, and the Second National Bank was born.16 By 1819 the Bank issue was heated. Indiana and Illinois prohibited banks not chartered by the state, while Maryland, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio taxed “foreign” bank operations. The Baltimore branch was especially controversial, because its cashier, James McCulloch, and his accomplices were suspected of systematically looting the Bank through unsecured loans and unreported overdrafts.17 The case therefore reached the Court as a test of the Bank’s constitutionality and, if the Bank were valid, of a state’s authority to tax its branches.18
Marshall’s preliminary observations on the first question treated it as one that was not entirely new. He added that he did not make them under the impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found irreconcilable with the Constitution.19 The merits then begin with a premise about who made the national government. Marshall met the argument that the Union’s powers are delegated by sovereign states and must be exercised in subordination to them. The government, he answered, proceeds directly from the people and is “ordained and established” in their name. The assent of the states in their sovereign capacity is implied in calling a Convention and so submitting the instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it, and their act was final. It required no affirmance by the state governments and could not be negatived by them. Once adopted, the Constitution was of complete obligation and bound the state sovereignties.20
From that premise follows a government that is limited yet supreme. Its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, “any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” It is also a government of enumerated powers that can exercise only the powers granted, a principle Marshall called universally admitted. The question how far the granted powers extend, he added, “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.”21
The two propositions meet in this case. If the Act of 1816 was made in pursuance of the Constitution, it is supreme, and Maryland’s tax cannot be enforced against the Bank it created. The syllabus records both that the act incorporating the Bank is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution and that the state cannot tax the branch.22 Supremacy attaches only to laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, so everything depends on whether chartering the Bank lay within Congress’s granted powers. A federal statute without that footing gets no such protection.
The opinion takes its two questions in order, and so does this chapter. The next sections address Congress’s power to charter the Bank and the meaning of necessary, and a later section returns to Maryland’s tax and the bar on state taxation of a federal instrumentality.