Concept
The McCulloch Test
Other powers
The McCulloch Test
Marshall compressed his whole approach to Congress's choice of means into one sentence: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."1 The sentence closes a short argument. Marshall first admits that the government's powers are limited and that its limits are not to be transcended. He then insists that a sound construction of the Constitution leaves the national legislature discretion over means, so that it can perform its high duties "in the manner most beneficial to the people."2
The earlier sections settled what "necessary" means and why the clause enlarges Congress's authority. This sentence supplies the working formula a court applies to a given statute. The formula asks three questions in order. Does the statute pursue a legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution? Is the means appropriate and plainly adapted to that end? Does the Constitution prohibit the means, or condemn it as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the document? Each question guards against a different failure. The first keeps Congress from reaching objects the Constitution does not entrust to it. The second rejects a statute that carries a granted power's label but does nothing to advance it. The third keeps the clause from overriding the rest of the Constitution.
The order matters. A court cannot judge whether a means fits an end until it knows the end, and the question of prohibition arises only for a law that already serves a granted power. An exam answer therefore names the enumerated power first, tests the fit second, and looks for prohibitions last.
A Legitimate End
The formula begins with the end: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution."3 An end is the objective Congress pursues through a statute, and it is legitimate when the statute carries into execution a power the Constitution gives. The clause itself says as much. It authorizes laws "for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department thereof."4 Marshall described the clause as an addition to the enumeration of powers, a grant of power "in terms" that Maryland's counsel argued was restrictive in effect.5 The end must therefore trace to an enumerated power such as taxing, borrowing, commerce, or war, or to another power vested in the federal government. Article I, Section 1 sets the same limit by vesting in Congress only the legislative powers "herein granted."6 The list in Section 8 is the map for this step.
McCulloch shows the requirement satisfied, because Marshall defended the Bank by pointing to the ends it served. "Bank" and "incorporation" appear nowhere in the list of powers, but the Constitution grants powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare and conduct war, and to raise and support armies. A government entrusted with such ample powers must also be entrusted with ample means to execute them.7 The Bank was a convenient, useful, and essential instrument in the government's fiscal operations, a point Marshall treated as no longer open to dispute.8
The same opinion marks the failing pole. If Congress, "under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government," Marshall wrote, it would become the Court's "painful duty" to say "that such an act was not the law of the land."9 A pretext is a stated reason that covers a different real one. The statute invokes a granted power in its title or recital, but what it accomplishes lies outside every grant.
United States v. Butler states the same limit for the taxing power. Taxation, which is expressly granted, may be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also expressly granted. "But resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is obviously inadmissible."10 A power's legitimacy as a means does not extend to every end it might be turned toward.
Policing the end is narrower than it sounds. Marshall limited the judicial role in the same passage: where a law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect an object entrusted to the government, inquiring into the degree of its necessity would carry the Court onto legislative ground.11 The court asks what the law is really calculated to do, not whether it matches Congress's best plan. Modern cases ask whether the statute is "a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power," and they give Congress "large discretion" in choosing it. A statute that passes that test is no pretext. The pretext limit does its work where the statute serves no enumerated power at all.
Gonzales v. Raich shows the structure at work. As one opinion there framed it, the commerce power "extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it." Congress had prohibited almost all intrastate activities related to Schedule I substances, both economic and noneconomic, and its authority to do so depended only on whether the prohibitions were appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating those substances from interstate commerce. That simple possession is noneconomic was immaterial to whether it could be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.12
The end requirement carries weight because the rest of the test is generous. "Necessary" reaches means that are convenient or useful, and the Court has been very deferential to Congress's judgment that a regulation is necessary.13 The discipline on Congress therefore cannot come from the means; it has to come from the end. That discipline preserves a choice the Framers made. They refused to give the federal government a general police power over the health, safety, and morals of the national community, and they rejected a proposal to let Congress legislate "in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union." Instead they listed seventeen purposes in Article I, Section 8, placed several further powers elsewhere in the Constitution, and supplemented the list with the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution. The point is that Congress can do very much, but not everything it might wish to do.14
Appropriate Means
Once the end is legitimate, the second part of the formula tests the instrument: the means must be "appropriate" and "plainly adapted to that end."16 The first part settled which enumerated power a statute serves. This part asks how well the statute's chosen means fits that power. The Bank fit. Marshall treated its usefulness as beyond dispute, a convenient, useful, and essential instrument of the government's fiscal operations. Everyone concerned with the nation's finances had said so, including statesmen of the first class who had once opposed it.17
A court may ask two different questions about any means Congress selects, and this part of the test depends on keeping them apart. The first asks whether the means serves the end, that is, whether the law is really calculated to effect an object entrusted to the government. A court answers that question, and Marshall reserved to the Court the duty of declaring void a law that Congress passes under the pretext of executing its powers to reach objects not entrusted to it.18 The second question asks whether the means is the best, the cheapest, or the only way to reach the end, and a court does not answer that one. Where a law is not prohibited and is really calculated to effect an object entrusted to the government, inquiring into the degree of its necessity would be "to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground," and the Court "disclaims all pretensions to such a power."19 The syllabus states the result: the degree of necessity is "a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance."20
The line follows from Marshall's purpose in leaving Congress the choice of means. He wanted the national legislature to have the discretion that would let it "perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people."21 A court that ranked means by their degree of necessity would take that discretion for itself.
The Bank litigation shows what the second question excludes. The argument that State banks could do the same work failed twice over. To make the national government resort to means it cannot control, "which another government may furnish or withhold," would render its course precarious, and that dependence is incompatible with the language of the Constitution. Even if it were otherwise, "the choice of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the election."22 Berman v. Parker applied the same allocation to a redevelopment program Congress had authorized. The Court observed that the public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government, "or so the Congress might conclude." It could not say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.23
Modern decisions compress the inquiry into one question. In Comstock the Court asked whether the statute "constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power," and it gave Congress "large discretion" in choosing the means. The Court added that the relevant inquiry is simply whether the means chosen are "reasonably adapted" to the attainment of a legitimate end.24 "Rational relation" is the current wording for "plainly adapted." Both ask whether the means connects to an enumerated power, and neither asks whether the means was indispensable. The facts of Comstock appear later in this chapter, where the clause's use in protecting federal programs is taught; here the case supplies only the standard. The Court describes itself as "very deferential" to Congress's determination that a regulation is necessary, and it has upheld laws that are "convenient, or useful" or "conducive" to the authority's beneficial exercise.25 Davis reiterated that "necessary" in the clause does not mean "absolutely necessary."26
Deference on means has limits. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Comstock argued for a more stringent version of rational-basis review under this clause than applies under the Due Process Clause, comparing it to the more "exacting" form applied under the Commerce Clause.27 Structural limits on proper means come up below, in the third part of the test. And the first question never goes away, because the means must connect to some enumerated end.
A challenger who attacks a statute by pointing to a cheaper, safer, or more effective option is arguing about the degree of necessity, and that argument loses against any means rationally related to an enumerated end. Two arguments can succeed: the connection to an enumerated end is missing, so the law is a pretext, or a prohibition or structural limit applies, which the next subsection develops.
No Constitutional Prohibition
Article I, Section 9 consists largely of flat prohibitions on Congress. Congress may pass no bill of attainder or ex post facto law, lay no tax or duty on articles exported from any state, and lay no capitation or other direct tax except in proportion to the census. It may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require it.29 Some of these commands state their own exceptions, as the habeas clause does, so the text of each fixes how far it reaches. The prohibitions matter here because the last clause of the formula admits only means that are "not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution."30
The third part is necessary because the first two are generous. The clause lets Congress choose any appropriate means for a legitimate end, "necessary" reaches whatever is convenient or useful, and courts do not weigh the degree of a law's necessity. Generosity that wide needs a boundary, because almost any constitutional limit looks like an obstacle to some useful means. Marshall drew the boundary in the passage that sustained the Bank. If Congress adopted measures prohibited by the Constitution, the Court would have the "painful duty" to say that such an act was not the law of the land.31 The clause widens Congress's choice among permitted means; it grants no exemption from the rest of the document. The third part is where every other provision re-enters the analysis. A statute can serve a granted end through an appropriate means and still fail because some provision forbids that means.
Buckley v. Valeo shows that a prohibition need not be express to bind the clause. Congress may not vest in itself, or in its officers, "the authority to appoint officers of the United States when the Appointments Clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing so."32 The question there was who may make the appointments, not whether Congress may act at all. A prohibition that arises by clear implication from another provision limits the clause as firmly as the flat words of Section 9 do.
The postal example shows why deference to Congress does not settle this part of the analysis. The Court describes itself as very deferential to Congress's determination that a regulation is necessary, and that deference governs the choice among means the Constitution permits.33 A student who reasons that a useful means decides the case has run only two parts of the formula. The same holds for the revenue powers: a duty on goods exported from a state fails under Section 9 however much revenue it would raise and however closely it serves the taxing power.
A prohibition also need not name the forbidden act. The Constitution says how legislative power is exercised. It vests that power in a Congress of two Houses,34 and Article I, Section 7 sends measures that need both Houses' agreement to the President. These provisions limit means as surely as Section 9 does, because they govern the route a measure must travel and say nothing about its subject. INS v. Chadha is the standard example. The Court allowed that the legislative veto might be a useful political invention, and it held that policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" "are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised."35 The prohibition closes one route and leaves Congress's goal within reach. Congress keeps abundant means of controlling its agencies, among them durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, and it controls them first of all through the legislation that creates them.36
"Letter and spirit" reaches past clauses that forbid a particular act. The letter is the text; the spirit takes in structural limits that no single clause states, which a later section on proper means and structure develops. The Court has said that laws undermining the structure of government the Constitution establishes are not "consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution" and so are not "proper" means for carrying enumerated powers into execution.37 A related boundary appears when Congress acts under the enforcement clauses, which a later section takes up. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment lets Congress adopt measures to enforce the Amendment's guarantees but "grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." A statute authorizing racially segregated schools would not enforce the Equal Protection Clause.38