Concept
Federal Supremacy and State Taxes
Other powers
Federal Supremacy and State Taxes
A State may not tax the operations of an instrument that Congress uses to carry its powers into execution. That is the second holding of McCulloch, and it rests on the first. The Court had already treated Congress's power to create, and therefore to continue, the Bank as beyond question.1 That holding had also met Maryland's argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause, though in terms a grant of power, is really restrictive of Congress's choice of means.2 What remained was the Bank's claim to be exempt from a State's power to tax its operations. No provision of the Constitution speaks to the case. The claim instead rested on a principle that so pervades the Constitution, is so interwoven with its web and blended with its texture, that it cannot be separated from the document without rending it into shreds.3
The instrument at issue was the Second Bank of the United States, and its history shows what was at stake. A national bank had already drawn opposition from the state banks it competed with for business, and Congress initially failed to renew its charter by a single vote in both chambers. The War of 1812 then underscored the wisdom of a national bank, as did the questionable practices of the state banks on which the government had relied to borrow money and pay debts. In 1816 Congress issued a new twenty-year charter.4 The tax question arose against that background of friction between the national bank and its state-chartered rivals.
Marshall built the answer on three corollaries of the supremacy principle, each resting on the one before:
- A power to create implies a power to preserve.
- A power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to and incompatible with the powers to create and to preserve.
- Where this repugnancy exists, the authority that is supreme must control and not yield to the one over which it is supreme.5
The first corollary carries Congress's power to create the Bank forward into a power to keep it alive. The second names the danger: a State's power of taxing the Bank may be exercised so as to destroy it, a point the Court called too obvious to be denied.6 The danger lies in the power itself, so the rule does not wait for proof that a particular tax has proved fatal. The third corollary settles the clash in favor of the supreme side.
Maryland answered that taxation is an absolute power, limited only by the prohibitions the Constitution expressly prescribes and, like every sovereign power, trusted to the discretion of those who use it.7 The Court replied that, in construing the Constitution, no unstated principle can be admitted that would defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and to modify every power vested in subordinate governments so as to exempt its own operations from their influence. That effect need not be stated in terms, because it is so involved in the declaration of supremacy that stating it would make it no more certain.8
The most useful part of the opinion explains why the usual trust in a taxing legislature fails here. The security against abusive state taxation ordinarily lies in the legislature's relationship to the people it taxes. The means employed by the government of the Union have no such security. They were not given by the people of a particular State, or by the constituents of the legislature that claims the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States, for the benefit of all, and in theory should be subject only to the government that belongs to all.9 A state tax on those means therefore lands on people who have no vote in the taxing legislature, so the restraint that justifies trusting a legislature is missing exactly where the tax falls.
A State might reply that Congress, too, holds a taxing power. The relationship is not symmetrical. The difference is the one that always exists between the action of the whole on a part and the action of a part on the whole, between the laws of a government declared supreme and those of a government that, when it opposes those laws, is not supreme.10
The same point can be put as a question of sovereignty. The right to tax is an incident of sovereignty and extends exactly as far as the sovereignty to which it is incident. Everything within a State's sovereign power is open to its taxation, and whatever lies beyond that power is exempt. A State's sovereignty reaches everything that exists by its own authority or is introduced by its permission. It does not reach the means Congress employs to execute powers conferred by the people of the United States. Those powers were not given by the people of a single State but by the people of the United States, to a government whose laws made in pursuance of the Constitution are declared supreme, and the people of one State cannot confer a sovereignty that extends over them.11
The principle also has no natural stopping point. If the States may tax one instrument the government employs, they may tax any other: the mail, the mint, patent rights, the papers of the custom-house, judicial process, indeed every means the government uses, to an excess that would defeat the ends of government. The American people did not design their government to depend on the States.12 Maryland's side tried to stop at property and disclaimed any right to reach the other objects. The Court asked on what principle the line could rest. Those who drew it gave no reason, and their own theory denies it, since they contended that the States' taxing power has no limit but the one in Article I, section 10, and is supreme as to everything else. If that were true, the distinction between property and other taxable subjects would be merely arbitrary and could never be sustained.13
The Court concluded that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control" the operations of the constitutional laws Congress enacts to carry its powers into execution, which it called the unavoidable consequence of the supremacy the Constitution declares. A tax on the operations of the Bank is a tax on the operation of an instrument the government of the Union employs to carry its powers into execution, and such a tax must be unconstitutional.14 The words "or otherwise" show that the rule is not about taxes alone. Modern doctrine treats immunity as a specialized form of preemption in which the conflict takes the form of a tax or regulation aimed at federal activity. Whether the conflict is labeled preemption or immunity, the result is the same: if a true conflict exists, state law must yield to the superior federal authority.15
The Court also declined to measure how much taxation is too much. It said it was not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use of the power and what degree amounts to its abuse. The attempt to tax the means the Union employs is itself the abuse, because it usurps a power the people of a single State cannot give.16 A trivial tax on the operations and a crushing one fall alike.
The holding has edges that the Court drew itself. It does not deprive the States of any resource they originally possessed. It does not reach a tax on the Bank's real property imposed in common with other real property in the State, or a tax on the interest that citizens of Maryland hold in the Bank in common with other property of the same description.17 The line makes sense on the Court's own reasoning. A tax at the ordinary rate on land, or on residents' shares, treats the Bank's property and its owners like everyone else's and leaves the Bank's operations alone. What the Court condemned was a tax on those operations. A stem that gives a State two taxes on a federal instrument is asking which one reaches operations and which reaches ordinary property.
Congress, and not only the courts, now shapes this field. The scope of federal immunities increasingly depends on Congress, a dependence that was already visible when the specific McCulloch issue resurfaced in the Court a century and a half later.18 Congress has the Supremacy Clause power to designate functions of the federal government that may not be subjected to state taxes, and it also has the power to consent to state taxes.19 Later decisions, including Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, work out where the line falls for particular taxpayers and taxes. A modern problem therefore starts with the McCulloch rule, then asks what the tax falls on and whether Congress has spoken.