Concept
Shared War Powers
As commander in chief
The Commander in Chief Power
Shared War Powers
The Constitution divides war-related authority between Congress and the President and gives neither branch the whole of it. Article II makes the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."1 The Commander in Chief Clause thus appoints the President as supreme commander of the military,2 and its reach over the state militias is limited, by its own words, to the time when they are called into federal service. The clause says who leads the armed forces once they exist. It does not say who decides that the nation will fight, who creates the forces, or who pays for them.
Those questions belong mainly to Congress. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the powers to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to spend for the common defense, while Article II gives the President the power to conduct war as commander in chief.3 The design is one of shared authority: the President holds day-to-day managerial control of the military, and Congress holds the powers that create, fund, and regulate it.4 Article I also imposes a negative limit that applies to every war-related power, the guarantee that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety requires it.5
The text is sparse, and judicial guidance is thinner here than in most areas of constitutional law, because the Supreme Court has frequently declared that issues of foreign policy are nonjusticiable political questions for the executive and the legislature to resolve.6 Two controversies follow from that silence. The first is how far the President may use military force without congressional authorization. The second is how far the President alone, or the President and Congress together, may prescribe summary military procedures to detain, try, and convict persons captured in military operations.7 This unit takes up the first controversy in two steps, and the second returns in the sections on military trials and enemy combatants.
Declaring Versus Conducting War
The shorthand for the division is that Congress declares war and the President conducts it.8 The phrase turns a question about a presidential act into a question about which side of a line the act falls on. A President who declared war without congressional approval would be exercising a power that Article I assigns to Congress, and the act could be challenged as a usurpation of that power.9 The rest of this subsection fills in what lies on each side of the line and why the line is drawn there.
Congress's side consists of the decision to fight and the creation and governance of the forces that fight. Four clauses of Article I carry most of that work.
- Clause 11 gives Congress the power to declare war, which places the decision to fight in the legislature.10
- Clause 12 gives the power to raise and support armies, which supplies the troops and the money behind them.11
- Clause 13 gives the power to provide and maintain a navy, which does the same for the sea services.12
- Clause 14 gives the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, which is why the President cannot singlehandedly amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice.13
Congress's war power does not lapse when the shooting stops. In Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. the Court sustained a housing statute enacted after the 1946 proclamation ending hostilities in World War II, because the war effort had contributed heavily to the housing shortage and Congress "has the power even after the cessation of hostilities to act to control the forces that a short supply of the needed article created."14
John Hart Ely read the assignment of the declaration power to Congress as a deliberate brake. It was designed to ensure that the decision to go to war would not be made lightly or quickly, or without public support adequate to sustain a full prosecution of the war. In his words, "no single individual should be able to take the nation into war and thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people."15 The Convention's change to the text points the same way from the other side. An early draft would have given Congress the power to "make war," but the delegates substituted "declare war" so as to "leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."16
Article I also limits how long Congress can commit the nation's money to an army: no appropriation to raise and support armies may run longer than two years.17 The President therefore holds only a limited war chest, and a war that outlasts its appropriation continues only if a Congress chosen after the war began votes more funds. Continued fighting thus always rests on current legislative consent.
Two fears shaped the clauses on armies and militia. Many delegates dreaded a national standing army as an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate States, while others recognized the danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers as the primary means of providing for the common defense. The compromise authorized Congress both to raise and support a national Army and to organize "the Militia."18 Article II then makes the President commander of the militia only when it has been called into federal service, which is the same compromise seen from the executive side.
The President's side begins with command. Article II's designation of the President as Commander in Chief vests in that office day-to-day managerial control over the military's activities, including broad authority to order troop deployments, to develop battle plans, and to manage operational matters.19 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were deeply persuaded of the importance of a strong Executive, and Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 70 that energy in the executive is essential to protecting the community from foreign attacks.20 Command is the part of the war power that most needs a single decision-maker who can act quickly. That energy is bounded by the other half of the design, because the forces the President commands exist by Congress's act and operate on money Congress appropriates.
The two sets of powers meet at one seam. Congress creates, funds, and regulates the military, and the President commands it. Article I establishes that Congress controls the structure, organization, and broad-brush policies of the military departments, so the President cannot singlehandedly amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, eliminate the Air Force, or double the Army's annual budget.21 Each of those acts changes what the military is or what it costs, and that is the subject Article I hands to Congress.
Joint naval exercises show command authority at work in a setting that looks like foreign affairs. When a President wants to hold exercises with an allied navy, the Commander in Chief Clause supplies an independent power to arrange them, so an executive agreement suffices and no treaty is needed, with its requirement of advice and consent from two-thirds of the Senators present.22 Where the Constitution assigns a power to the President, exercising it without the Senate takes no authority from the Senate and enlarges no part of the executive's domain.
Students most often go wrong by reading the title Commander in Chief as a general warrant over anything that touches the military. The title gives command of forces that already exist, while creating, abolishing, funding, or governing them and deciding that the nation is at war all remain with Congress. The opposite mistake credits Congress's clauses with power over day-to-day operations. Sorting an act into the right column takes one question: does it concern the existence, size, funding, or rules of the military, or the direction of the forces that exist? Whether command also covers a first use of force without any declaration is the problem the next subsection addresses.
Committing Forces Abroad
Article I makes Congress the default decision-maker on whether the nation moves from peace to war, and the Convention built one exception into that default: the President may repel a sudden attack.24 The Supreme Court applied that understanding in the Prize Cases, which upheld the President's blockade of the Southern states during the Civil War even though Congress had issued no declaration of war.25 The Court explained that "[b]y the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war," but "[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."26
The exception follows from timing. An invasion does not wait for a vote, and a nation that must assemble a legislature before it responds may lose before it acts. The Court's wording also marks the exception's boundary: a President who meets force with force is answering a war that someone else began, so the President has not made the choice the declaration power reserves to Congress, which is the choice to take the nation into war. Modern practice states the rule as unilateral authority, drawn from the Commander in Chief Clause, to use defensive force in response to a sudden attack.27 That rule is the fixed point in this field, and its judicial support is thin. The Prize Cases is the only Supreme Court decision to address presidential war-making without a declaration, and it arose in the unique setting of the Civil War.28 Beyond responding to attacks on the United States, the Court has provided little guidance about presidential power to use armed force, and Presidents have filled the gap.29
With increasing frequency, Presidents sent the armed forces into hostilities solely on their own initiative, even where there was no pretext of defending against a sudden attack. A 1967 Senate Foreign Relations Committee study found that the use of the armed forces against sovereign nations without authorization by Congress became common practice in the twentieth century.30 Repetition of that kind does not transfer the power to the President, because a separation-of-powers violation is not cured by the injured branch's acquiescence, although a longstanding practice may still help a court locate the boundary between the branches.31 The text assigns the decision to Congress and practice has run the other way, so the contested ground is easiest to see through three recurring situations: defending an ally, striking a target that has not attacked the United States, and acting under a statute that authorizes force.
Defending an ally shows where the sudden-attack rule stops.
32 The Constitution leaves open whether the idea of defense stretches far enough to cover military action on behalf of allies, and a treaty commitment does not obviously settle the point, because the declaration power sits in Congress.33 Treaties raise a related question in the other direction, which is who may end them. When President Carter recognized the People's Republic of China in 1978, he announced that he was terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the question arose whether the President could do that unilaterally or needed the consent of the Senate and perhaps the House.34
Offensive strikes present a sharper version of the problem, because the sudden-attack rationale is defensive. Even if a President holds inherent power to defend the nation against sudden attack, it is a further question whether the Presidency holds an inherent power to wage offensive strikes.35 The debate over unilateral airstrikes on Syria in 2018 shows how the sides divide. Some scholars have criticized the unilateral use of force without congressional authorization as "premised on an astonishingly broad conception of the president's Article II powers" and as a violation of international law.36 Ely's account of the declaration power supplies the structural objection, and he advocated a strong judicial role to rein in the executive and thereby "induce" Congress "to discharge its constitutional responsibilities."37
Congress itself has changed how it approves force. In the post-World War II era it has often adopted force authorization statutes, which permit the President to engage in specified military activities without formally declaring war on another nation.38 Action within the terms of such a statute rests on congressional approval and therefore stands on the strongest footing under the three-category framework taught in a later section. The disputes concern breadth. Modern Presidents have read some broadly worded authorizations, other legal instruments, and the Commander in Chief Clause itself to support wide-ranging military action, and Congress has often done little to push back.39 Where an authorization is real, the question is how far its words reach, and where none exists, the President must rest on Article II alone.
In 1973, over President Nixon's veto, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution to supply the rules the constitutional text leaves out.40 The statute declares Congress's view that the President's constitutional powers to introduce forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, are exercised only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.41 Its procedure aims to avoid leaving Congress a choice between funding an intervention it never approved and cutting off funding to an army in the field, which can be a politically suicidal act.42 It has three working parts:
- The President must consult Congress before introducing forces into hostilities in every possible instance, and must report to Congress, generally within 48 hours, when forces enter hostilities, enter situations where hostilities are clearly indicated as imminent, or enter a foreign nation's territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat.43
- Unless Congress declares war, specifically authorizes the use of forces, or extends the period, the President must end their use, generally within 60 days.44
- Congress may direct removal of the forces at any time by concurrent resolution, a measure not subject to a presidential veto.45
Taken together, these terms tolerate a temporary period of unilateral military engagement, bounded by Congress's power to order a stand-down at any moment and by the requirement of affirmative approval to continue past the window.46 The Resolution's force, however, is uncertain. Congress's removal power by concurrent resolution, a two-house veto, became especially doubtful after INS v. Chadha struck down the legislative veto.47 There is no definitive resolution of the constitutionality of the Resolution's requirements or of their effectiveness.48
Courts add little to the picture because they seldom hear these disputes. They have dismissed the vast majority of constitutional challenges to presidential uses of force as nonjusticiable under principles of standing, ripeness, or the political-question doctrine.49 A President who defied a clear limit set by Congress would invoke executive power against an express legislative restriction, which in Justice Jackson's framework yields minimal presidential powers and which the next sections take up.50 Because the real boundary between the branches is set far more by political pressure than by judicial decision, the case law in the sections that follow concerns what a President may do with forces already engaged and with persons seized in war, and says little about how a President may start a fight.
Students often carry the sudden-attack rule into every case where the President names a defensive purpose, but the rule reaches attacks on the United States and its forces, and the ally cases sit outside it. A second error treats the 48-hour report as if it supplied authority. The report informs Congress and starts the clock, yet the Resolution itself says that introduction of forces is proper only pursuant to a declaration, specific authorization, or an emergency created by attack.51