Concept
Deference in Foreign Affairs
Treaty and foreign affairs powers
Deference in Foreign Affairs
In immigration and foreign affairs, courts accord substantial deference to the political branches and generally apply at most rational basis review to constitutional challenges. Trump v. Hawaii is the Court’s leading modern statement of that rule. Under rational basis review, government action survives if it is plausibly related to a legitimate purpose. The Court applied that standard to uphold a presidential proclamation restricting the entry of nationals from several countries, most of them majority-Muslim, against a challenge under the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment’s bar on government establishment of religion. The proclamation stated a proper national-security purpose and bore a rational relation to it, so it stood even though statements by the President suggested anti-Muslim animus.1
Earlier sections of this chapter asked what Congress had authorized, accepted, or forbidden. Trump v. Hawaii begins after Congress had answered that question in the President’s favor by delegating broad power over entry, so the dispute concerned how the President used the power. The challengers attacked twice. The statutory attack asked whether the Immigration and Nationality Act gave the President the power he exercised. The constitutional attack asked whether the exercise, even if authorized, violated the Establishment Clause. Deference operates at both layers, in different forms: at the statutory layer it governs how a court reads a broad delegation, and at the constitutional layer it lowers the level of scrutiny.
Two features of the subject explain that deference. First, judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises separation-of-powers concerns, because it intrudes on the President’s constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs.2 That concern belongs to a doctrine that governs relations among all three branches, not merely between the two political ones.3 Second, the judgments at stake are predictive, and a court cannot substitute its own assessment for the Executive’s predictions about the effectiveness and wisdom of an entry restriction.4 Deference changes how a court reviews an exercise of power. It does not create the power, which in Trump v. Hawaii came from Congress’s statute. The first subsection takes up the statutory attack and the second the constitutional one.
Broad Statutory Delegations
Section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) places nearly every decision about entry in the President’s own judgment: “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”5 In Trump v. Hawaii, a district court enjoined enforcement of the proclamation’s entry restrictions nationwide, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.6 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the President had lawfully exercised the broad discretion §1182(f) grants him.7
The proclamation followed a worldwide, multi-agency review. The President first ordered the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to evaluate every country’s compliance with an information and risk-assessment baseline. He then issued a proclamation with extensive findings that deficiencies in the practices of select foreign governments, several of them state sponsors of terrorism, deprive the Government of sufficient information to assess the risks their nationals pose. On that basis he found it in the national interest to restrict the entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information, both to protect national security and public safety and to induce their home countries to improve.8
Before reaching the merits, the Court noted that the Government did not argue that consular nonreviewability goes to the Court’s jurisdiction and did not point to any INA provision that expressly strips jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims. The Court therefore assumed without deciding that the statutory claims are reviewable, notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or any other statutory nonreviewability issue.9 An assumption is not a holding. The case does not establish that such claims may be heard, and it does not say that entry decisions escape review. The Court read each statutory limit and found each one satisfied.
The text of §1182(f) explains the result. By its plain language, the provision grants the President broad discretion to suspend entry.10 It assigns him each choice: whether to act, which aliens or class of aliens to cover, for how long, and under what restrictions. The Court called the delegation comprehensive, and it found only one condition: the sole prerequisite is that the President “find[ ]” that the covered aliens’ entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”11 A statute built this way makes the finding the trigger and leaves its content to the President, so a court has little standard against which to measure it. Article I vests all legislative power in Congress,12 so a delegation this open is Congress’s own choice to share its authority over entry, and the court’s task is to read the text Congress chose. Because Congress delegated the authority, the proclamation falls in Jackson’s first category, discussed earlier in this chapter, where presidential authority is at its maximum.
The challengers found the President’s findings unpersuasive. They argued that the proclamation offers no persuasive reason why nationality alone makes the covered foreign nationals a security risk, and they discounted its vetting concern because it lets many aliens from the designated countries enter on nonimmigrant visas.13 The Court refused the demand for a searching inquiry. Such an inquiry is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and with the deference traditionally accorded the President in this sphere, and whether the President’s chosen method of addressing perceived risks is wise policy is irrelevant to the scope of his authority under §1182(f). The Court added that, even assuming some form of review is appropriate, the attack on the sufficiency of the findings fails. The twelve-page proclamation, which thoroughly describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations behind the restrictions, is more detailed than any prior order issued under §1182(f).14
The reason for this deference appears in the proclamation itself. It states that it does not disclose every ground for its country-specific restrictions, because describing all of them publicly would cause serious damage to national security and many of the descriptions are classified.15 A court asked to test the persuasiveness of such a finding would be second-guessing a forecast about foreign governments that it cannot fully see.
Two further textual objections failed. Section 1182(f) authorizes suspension “for such period as he shall deem necessary,” so the President may link the duration of a restriction, implicitly or explicitly, to resolution of the triggering condition.16 And the proclamation identifies a “class of aliens,” because the word comfortably encompasses a group of people linked by nationality.17 The challengers’ broader view was that §1182(f) confers only a residual power to halt temporarily the entry of a discrete group of aliens engaged in harmful conduct. The Court answered with the plain language of the statute.18
The challengers also invoked a second provision, §1152(a)(1)(A), which provides that, “except as specifically provided in” the INA, “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”19 The Court held that this provision does not limit §1182(f). Once §1182 sets the boundaries of admissibility, §1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on nationality and other traits. Had Congress meant the provision to constrain the President’s power to decide who may enter, it could have chosen language directed to that end. Common sense and historical practice confirm the reading. Presidents have repeatedly suspended entry on the basis of nationality, and on the plaintiffs’ reading the President could not suspend entry from particular foreign states in response to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war.20
More generally, the challengers identified no conflict between the proclamation and the immigration scheme in the INA that would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the Nation’s vetting system. The existing grounds of inadmissibility and the narrow Visa Waiver Program do not address the failure of certain high-risk countries to provide a minimum baseline of reliable information, and neither the legislative history of §1182(f) nor historical practice justifies departing from the clear text.21
Each action in that box departs from the proclamation in Trump v. Hawaii at a point where the Court found the statute satisfied. The proclamation rested on the required finding, backed by a multi-agency review, and it operated on entry, the subject §1182(f) controls. The first action omits the finding. The second shifts from entry to visa allocation, where §1152(a)(1)(A) speaks directly.22
Rational Basis for Constitutional Claims
The statute authorized the proclamation, so the plaintiffs’ remaining attack was constitutional, and there the Court stated the standard that governs most challenges to immigration and foreign-affairs decisions. The plaintiffs argued that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause because it rested on hostility toward Muslims. At the heart of their case was a series of statements by the President and his advisers, made both during the campaign and after the President took office.26 The Court framed the question narrowly. The issue was not whether to denounce those statements but what significance they carry in reviewing a presidential directive that is neutral on its face and addresses a matter within the core of executive responsibility.27
Review is narrow here because courts treat decisions about the entry of foreign nationals as largely the province of the political branches. Such decisions may implicate “relations with foreign powers” or involve “classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,” so they are “frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive.”28
The baseline for review comes from Kleindienst v. Mandel, where citizens asserted constitutional interests against the exclusion of a foreign national. The Court limited its review to whether the Executive gave a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason, and it held that when the Executive exercises its delegated power to exclude on that basis, courts will neither look behind the exercise of discretion nor test it by balancing its justification against the citizens’ asserted interests.29 Later decisions applied the same approach to broad policies. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Court applied Mandel to a “broad congressional policy” giving immigration preferences to mothers of illegitimate children. Although the statute drew a categorical classification by sex and legitimacy, the Court held that “it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications” of immigration policies. Lower courts have likewise applied Mandel to broad executive action, including a post-September 11 national security entry-exit registration system.30 The standard has particular force where immigration overlaps with national security.31
A conventional application of Mandel would have ended the case at the face of the proclamation, which was neutral and offered a security rationale. The majority did not stop there. The Government itself suggested that the inquiry might extend beyond facial neutrality, so the Court assumed that it may look behind the face of the proclamation to the extent of applying rational basis review, and it declined to define the precise contours of the Mandel inquiry.32 Rational basis review asks whether the entry policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective of protecting the country and improving vetting. Under it the Court may consider the plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but it will uphold the policy so long as the policy can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.33 The statements therefore count as evidence, and they lose because an independent justification explains the policy without them. To write that Mandel’s facially-legitimate test controlled overstates the holding, and to write that the statements were legally irrelevant misreads it from the other side.
The majority also rejected the dissent’s proposal to review immigration policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military actions under the de novo “reasonable observer” inquiry applied in cases about holiday displays and graduation ceremonies. The Court stated that a circumscribed inquiry applies to any constitutional claim concerning the entry of foreign nationals, and that the dissent could cite no authority for a more free-ranging inquiry in the national-security and foreign-affairs context.34 The dissent’s premise was that facial neutrality is not determinative in Establishment Clause cases.35 The majority held that an entry restriction rests on a security judgment about foreign governments and so receives the narrower review.
Applying rational basis review, the Court looked for the defect that has made the test bite. On the few occasions when the Court has struck down a policy under rational basis scrutiny, as in Romer v. Evans, a common thread has been that the laws were “divorced from any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.” The proclamation had no such flaw. It was expressly premised on legitimate purposes and said nothing about religion. Its restrictions on Muslim-majority nations reached only countries previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national-security risks, and it reflected a worldwide review by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies.36 Three further features supported the security justification. Since the restrictions began, three Muslim-majority countries (Iraq, Sudan, and Chad) had been removed from the list, the proclamation exempted several categories of foreign nationals, and it created a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals.37 Each feature points to a policy that responds to security conditions, since a measure aimed only at a faith would have little reason to shrink as countries improved or to leave a path to entry. The plaintiffs’ remaining complaint went to the policy’s effectiveness and wisdom, and the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters.38
The same test therefore yields both outcomes. Rational basis review keeps some force in this setting, because the Court may weigh evidence of animus and a policy that can be understood only as resting on unconstitutional grounds does not stand. What carried the actual proclamation was its independent justification: a multi-agency review, a record of prior designations, exemptions, a waiver path, and countries removed from the list.
Two dissents offered rival views. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that Mandel and Din each involved the exclusion of a single foreign national, while this order affected millions on a categorical basis. She added that neither case set a framework for Establishment Clause purpose claims, where facial neutrality is not determinative, and that even if they applied, the plaintiffs had made an affirmative showing of bad faith, including the President’s instruction to his subordinates to find a “lega[l]” way to enact a Muslim ban.39 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented separately and focused on the waiver system, pointing to evidence suggesting that the Government might not be applying it as written.40 The dispute with the majority is over which standard governs, since the same statements fed both analyses. Under rational basis review an independent security justification can outweigh them, while under the reasonable-observer inquiry the dissent favored they carry far more weight. The majority’s view is the law.
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in full and added a reminder that limits how far its deference reaches. He acknowledged some common ground with the dissent, because governmental action may in some instances be subject to judicial review to determine whether it is “inexplicable by anything but animus,” and he left to the remand whether proceedings could continue in light of the substantial deference owed the Executive in foreign affairs. He then observed that the many instances in which officials’ statements and actions escape judicial scrutiny do not free those officials to disregard the Constitution. The oath they take is not confined to the spheres where courts can correct or comment, and broad discretion free from judicial scrutiny makes adherence to the Constitution all the more imperative.41 The point separates judicial enforcement from constitutional obligation: a deferential court may decline to enforce a limit that still binds the official.