Concept
The Appointments Clause
Appointment of officers
Appointment of Federal Officers
The Appointments Clause
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 decides who staffs the federal government. The President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”1 Three actors share the work. Congress establishes the office by law, the President chooses the officer, and the Senate’s advice and consent conditions the appointment.2 A proviso then relaxes the rule for some offices: “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”3 Because the proviso reaches only “such inferior Officers,” every other officer must be nominated and confirmed, subject only to the recess power taken up later. The text never says what makes an officer inferior, and drawing that line occupies much of this chapter.
Staffing decisions shape what the executive branch actually does, which explains the division of labor. No President can personally monitor the federal bureaucracy, so the President relies on a team, and the people who lead each office determine how well the work gets done: competent allies pursue the President’s agenda, inexperienced leaders bungle it, and closet adversaries can undermine it.4 Hamilton gave the founding-era rationale. One person of discernment, he wrote, is better fitted than a body of men to judge the qualities a particular office needs, while Senate approval is “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President.”5 Keeping Congress out of the selection rests on a separate principle: the framers believed that “the same persons should not both legislate and administer the laws.”6 That principle returns whenever Congress tries to appoint officers itself.
Every appointment question begins with sorting. Other than the President, the Vice President, and members of Congress, who are elected, everyone who works for the federal government is appointed, and each appointee is a principal officer, an inferior officer, or a mere employee.7 The category fixes which methods are constitutional: one for principal officers, a menu for inferior officers, and no constitutional method at all for employees. A problem on appointments therefore proceeds in four steps.
The subsections below state what each tier demands. Later sections teach how to place a borderline position in a tier.
Principal Officers
The main sentence of Clause 2 governs the top tier. For ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, Justices of the Supreme Court, and all other officers whose appointments the Constitution does not otherwise provide for, the President nominates and the Senate gives its advice and consent.9 The same section speaks of “the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,” so the Constitution itself recognizes principal officers at the head of the departments.10 Borderline cases turn on factors that later sections apply: the official’s duties and any policymaking function, the independence and source of supervision, and the position’s tenure and removability.11 What matters here is the consequence of landing in this tier. A principal officer must be nominated by the President and appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent, and the clause offers no second route.
The proviso explains why. Congress may vest an appointment in the President alone, the courts of law, or department heads only for “such inferior Officers,” so the choice stops at the inferior tier.12 Buckley v. Valeo described the structure the same way, quoting an earlier decision: the Constitution “very clearly divides all its officers into two classes,” and the primary class “requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate.”13 The passage adds that everyone who holds an office under the government was meant to be placed by one of the clause’s modes of appointment.14 A principal officer therefore cannot enter office by a method outside the primary one.
Each half of that method does separate work. Placing the nomination in the President alone puts the choice with one decision-maker, who, in Hamilton’s words, can better analyze the peculiar qualities a particular office requires than a body of men can.15 The Senate’s consent then checks favoritism and tends to prevent the appointment of unfit characters chosen out of state prejudice, family connection, personal attachment, or a view to popularity.16 One actor proposes, and a second can refuse.
The Senate’s part is also narrow. It may consent to the President’s nominee or withhold consent, but the clause gives the nomination to the President alone, so the Senate cannot choose the nominee.17 The clause thus fixes who selects as well as who approves. What the Senate may do about an officer after appointment, including removal, is a separate question for a later section.
On an exam, the usual trap is a statute that hands a high post to an appointer that sounds authoritative, such as a department head, a court, or a congressional leader. Those appointers appear in the clause only in the proviso for inferior officers, so none of them is available for a principal office.
One route sits beside the primary method, and a later section covers it in full. Hamilton described the ordinary power of appointment as belonging to the President and Senate jointly, exercised while the Senate sits, and the recess clause as authorizing the President singly to make temporary appointments to vacancies that arise while the Senate is away.18 The clause itself limits those commissions to the end of the Senate’s next session.19 They do not replace confirmation.
Each office is also tested on its own. The clause does not prevent one individual from holding a principal office and an inferior office at the same time, so long as the requirements for each appointment are satisfied.20 The Court so ruled in Ortiz v. United States, in the context of judges sitting on military tribunals.21 Satisfying the rule for one office does not satisfy it for the other.
Inferior Officers
For the second tier, the clause gives Congress a power it lacks over the first. Congress “may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”23 An inferior officer is a lower-ranking officer of the United States, and the proviso changes only the default. The starting rule for these officers remains presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, the method required for principal officers.24 Congress may override the default whenever it thinks proper, but it must do so by enacting a law.25
Read together, the main sentence and the proviso give Congress four options for each inferior office:26
- Nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, the method that governs principal officers.
- Appointment by the President alone.
- Appointment by a court of law.
- Appointment by the head of a department.
Congress has no duty to depart from the first option. A statute that creates an inferior office and says nothing about the appointer leaves the default in place, so the President must nominate and the Senate must confirm.
The Court has explained why the proviso exists. The Constitution foresaw that when offices became numerous and sudden removals necessary, nomination and confirmation might prove inconvenient, so for “officers inferior to those specially mentioned” Congress may vest the appointment in the President alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments.27 Classification therefore decides how much freedom Congress has. A principal office offers no menu, and an inferior office offers four options. Later sections show how to place a position in the inferior tier and who counts as a court of law or a head of a department.
The list of permitted appointers has a conspicuous gap: Congress is not on it. In the clause’s scheme, Congress is confined to enacting statutes, with the single exception of the Senate’s advice and consent.28 Buckley shows the consequence. The Federal Election Commission had six voting members, and four of them were chosen in a way that gave neither the President, the head of any department, nor the Judiciary any voice.29 The Court reasoned that “Heads of Departments,” used alongside “Courts of Law,” points to departments in or connected with the executive branch. Because the clause names courts expressly but contains no similar language for Congress, neither Congress nor its officers can be “Heads of Departments.”30 The omission applies the principle that the same persons should not both legislate and administer the laws.31
The pair shows why classification does not end the analysis. A position can be inferior and still be filled unconstitutionally, because the second question is whether the appointer is one the clause names. On an exam, an inferior-officer statute that gives the appointment to a congressional leader, a committee, or either house should fail for that reason, while the same statute vesting the appointment in a department head, a court, or the President alone passes.
Employees Outside the Clause
The Appointments Clause regulates the appointment of “Officers of the United States,” and its text says nothing about the other people who work for the government.33 The main sentence names officers, and the proviso reroutes the appointment of inferior officers only, so the clause supplies no method for anyone below that line. Those people are employees, also called non-officers: “lesser functionaries” subordinate to officers of the United States, whose hiring the clause neither addresses nor restricts.34 The consequence of landing in this tier is simple. When an agency hires a mere employee, one who will not wield significant authority under federal law, the appointment need not comply with the Appointments Clause at all, and the later questions about rank, method, and recess never arise.35
The Commission Clause points the same way. Article II, Section 3 provides that the President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”36 The phrase matches the one in the Appointments Clause, and requiring a presidential commission for every federal worker would have made little sense even around 1789.37 The phrase therefore signals a select group, and the Appointments Clause governs that group and no wider one.
The limit fits the clause’s purpose. The staffing decisions that matter most are those for high-ranking positions, where a leader’s competence and loyalty shape what the government does.38 Employees are subordinate to officers, and the clause leaves the design of their hiring to Congress. Drawing on the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may devise any method for selecting employees, such as competitive examinations or hiring by agency personnel offices, so long as the method otherwise satisfies constitutional requirements.39 The Appointments Clause drops out of the analysis, but the rest of the Constitution continues to govern the hiring system.
Lucia v. SEC shows the opposite result. The Court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s method of appointing its administrative law judges was unconstitutional.40 Those judges held continuing, career positions. An ALJ assigned to an enforcement action had authority to do all things necessary and appropriate to ensure a fair and orderly proceeding, and the initial decision the ALJ issued became the action of the SEC if the Commission declined review.41 The Court held that they were inferior officers, not employees. The Commission could have made the appointments itself as the head of a department, but it had left the task to its Chief ALJ.42 A continuing job alone does not make someone an officer, and the specialist above also holds a steady job. What separates the two positions is the authority each carries.
Two instincts mislead students in opposite directions. Demanding Senate confirmation for every federal job misreads a clause that governs officers only. Treating anyone hired through a routine process as an employee skips the question the clause actually asks: whether the position is a continuing one that wields significant authority.43 The next section teaches that test, and it must be run before concluding that no appointment method applies.