Concept
Appointing Inferior Officers
Appointment of officers
Appointing Inferior Officers
Once a position is classified as an inferior office, the remaining question is who may fill it. The Appointments Clause makes presidential nomination and Senate confirmation the default for officers “whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,” but it adds a proviso: “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1 Congress therefore chooses among three appointers, and Congress itself is not one of them.
The three options are not equally easy. Vesting the appointment in the President alone merely drops the Senate from a process the President already begins by nominating. A court of law raises a harder question, because a court sits in the judicial branch while the officer it appoints may do executive work. “Heads of Departments” raises a different one: the phrase sounds like any senior official who runs an agency, yet the Clause uses it for a defined group, and whether a particular official belongs to that group is not obvious. The two subsections below take these questions in turn.
Courts of Law
The Clause lets Congress vest the appointment of inferior officers in the “Courts of Law,” and the puzzle is plain: a court sits in the judicial branch, yet the officer it appoints may do executive work. Call that an interbranch appointment, one in which an official of one branch selects an officer who serves in another. The question became concrete after Watergate, when the judicial appointment of a permanent or temporary special prosecutor to prosecute governmental officials drew doubts about its propriety and constitutionality.2
Morrison v. Olson answered from the text, and its answer was that the Constitution allows interbranch appointments. On its face, the Court said, the excepting clause “admits of no limitation on interbranch appointments,” and the words “as they think proper” give Congress significant discretion to decide whether it is proper to vest the appointment of, for example, executive officials in the courts of law.3 Nothing in the list ties an appointer to officers of its own branch, so any such limit would have to come from somewhere other than the words.
The Court had taken the same view in 1879. Ex parte Siebold sustained a statute authorizing the Circuit Courts to appoint election supervisors, and it read the Clause broadly: the duty to appoint inferior officers, when required by law, is “a constitutional duty of the courts.”4 The one earlier decision that seemed to point the other way, Ex parte Hennen, was distinguished in Siebold as “not intended to define the constitutional power of Congress in this regard, but rather to express the law or rule by which it should be governed.” Morrison found little other discussion of interbranch appointments in the Court’s decisions and saw “no reason now to depart from the holding of Siebold that such appointments are not proscribed by the excepting clause.”5
The Court has not, however, read the Clause as boundless. Siebold found “no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void,” which leaves room for a case where incongruity would excuse them.6 Morrison made the point concrete: judicial appointment of an executive officer would create a fatal “incongruity” if, for example, a court were charged with appointing officials in the Agriculture Department. The Ethics in Government Act raised no such problem, because courts have appointed prosecutors in various circumstances for many years.7 The contrast suggests what incongruity means: a mismatch between what courts ordinarily do and the field whose officers they are asked to choose. In Siebold and in Morrison the Court found none, so incongruity remains an argument against a statute that sends judges into an unfamiliar field, not a doctrine that has defeated one in the decisions discussed here.
Judicial appointment answers only who picks the officer. It cannot turn a principal office into an inferior one, and the Clause permits Congress to vest an appointment in a court only if the officer is inferior. In Edmond, the Court described inferior officers as “officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” It therefore held the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals to be inferior, because they were supervised by the judge advocate general and by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and had “no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers.”8
The leading case on what counts as a “Court of Law” is Freytag v. Commissioner. Congress created the Tax Court under its Article I authority and empowered its chief judge to appoint special trial judges, who preside over proceedings and, in certain specified types of cases, issue opinions.9 The Court unanimously concluded that the special trial judges were inferior officers rather than employees, and it then split on how to categorize the Tax Court.10 The Court held that the Tax Court is not a “department,” a term it appeared to confine to cabinet-level departments, but that it is a “Court of Law” for purposes of Article II, § 2 even though Congress created it under its Article I tax power and not under Article III. The chief judge could therefore appoint the special trial judges.11
The Clause was meant, the Court noted, to “ensure that those who wielded [appointment power] were accountable to political force and the will of the people.” Accordingly, if the President does not appoint an inferior officer directly, Congress may assign the appointment only to an agency that can properly be categorized as either a “Court of Law” or a “Department.”12 Freytag settled the first half of that test for the Tax Court; the next subsection takes up the second half.
Heads of Departments
The last appointer on the Clause’s list is “the Heads of Departments,” and the Clause defines neither word. A statute that vests an inferior officer’s appointment in some official works only if the institution is a department and the official is its head. Four decisions mark the boundaries. Buckley v. Valeo excluded congressional officials, Freytag v. Commissioner suggested a narrow, Cabinet-level reading, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board widened that reading to a freestanding agency run by a commission, and Lucia v. SEC showed that the appointment must actually come from the head.
In Buckley, the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House appointed four of the Federal Election Commission’s six voting members.14 The Court held that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an Officer of the United States and must be appointed as the Clause prescribes. Congress could vest the appointment of “inferior Officers” in Courts of Law or Heads of Departments, but congressional officials could not be considered Heads of Departments.15 The text explains why. The Clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest certain appointments in the “Courts of Law,” and the absence of similar language for Congress means that neither Congress nor its officers are included in “Heads of Departments.”16 The Court rejected the argument that Congress’s authority over elections put the case on a different footing, and it answered the fear that a commission of presidential appointees would administer the Act to the President’s advantage by saying that “such fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers’ work.” Congress soon cured the defect by reconstituting the Commission with a membership consisting entirely of presidential appointees.17
Buckley left open how far into the Executive Branch “Department” reaches, and Freytag answered narrowly. The Court insisted that the Tax Court’s chief judge could not be a head of a “Department,” because that term applies only to “executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments.”18 Even so, Freytag specifically reserved whether a “principal agenc[y], such as . . . the Securities and Exchange Commission,” is a Department. Four Justices would have said it is, because the Commission is a “freestanding, self-contained entity in the Executive Branch.”19
Two decades later, Free Enterprise Fund adopted that position. The SEC’s Commissioners had appointed the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and the Court held that the five Commissioners were properly considered the head of a Department, so the Commission could make the appointments.20 The reasoning was structural: because the Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such component, it is a Department.21 The Court pointed to early practice, since a 1792 statute authorized the Postmaster General to appoint “an assistant, and deputy postmasters, at all places where such shall be found necessary,” treating him as head of a department although he lacked the title of Secretary and any role in the President’s Cabinet. It added that its prior cases had never invalidated an appointment made by the head of such an establishment.22
The objection that a multimember body cannot be a head also failed. The petitioners argued that the Framers vested the nomination of principal officers in the President to avoid the perceived evils of collective appointments, but they showed no similar concern about inferior officers, whose appointments may be vested elsewhere, including in multimember bodies, and practice has sanctioned such appointments.23
The two negatives in the test, “not subordinate to” and “not contained within,” do the work. An entity that sits beneath another is part of that other, and the official the Clause has in mind sits at the top of the freestanding unit. The test also reflects the Court’s wariness about the risks of excessive diffusion of the appointment power.24
The same agency supplies the cautionary example. The SEC instituted a proceeding against Raymond Lucia for deceiving prospective clients about a retirement savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.” An administrative law judge found him guilty and imposed sanctions that included $300,000 in civil penalties and a lifetime bar from the investment industry. Lucia argued that ALJs are officers subject to the Appointments Clause and that the ALJ had not been constitutionally appointed.25 The decision designated ALJs as officers, and the SEC and other agency heads who had been similarly lax had to ratify the appointments of their ALJs quickly. The SEC also had to retry around 200 cases.26 The Commissioners were already the head of a Department; the problem was that the head had not itself made the appointments.
The pieces fit together in a single statute. A federal statute creates a customs prosecutor, who investigates the Customs Service and brings criminal proceedings against any agent found to have accepted a bribe. The Attorney General appoints the prosecutor, who serves until the Attorney General certifies that the investigation and related prosecutions are complete, and the Attorney General may remove the prosecutor only for cause.27 Under Edmond, inferior officers are those whose work is directed and supervised at some level by officers appointed by presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.28 Because the Attorney General can remove the prosecutor, and the office ends when the work does, it looks inferior. The Attorney General heads the Department of Justice, a Cabinet department even under Freytag’s narrowest reading, so the appointment provision is valid.
Rank inside a department does not make an official a head. Deputies and bureau chiefs sound senior, but each works beneath someone, and the test asks who sits at the top of the freestanding entity. Buckley reaches the same result from the other side: the Speaker and the President pro tempore lead bodies in Congress, so no amount of rank makes them heads of departments. A statute that names the true head of a freestanding executive entity, whether a single secretary or a commission acting together, passes if the office is inferior.