Concept
Congress and the Appointment Power
Appointment of officers
Congress and the Appointment Power
Only Congress can create federal offices, principal and inferior, yet it may fill none of them itself. The Appointments Clause describes the officers the President nominates as those “which shall be established by Law,” and it provides that “the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1 For inferior offices, Congress therefore holds “significant discretion” over who the appointer will be, and as a corollary of its power to create offices it has some leeway to specify the qualifications of those who hold them.2
Congress itself has no place on the list of appointers. The legislative branch has one role in the appointment of officers, the Senate’s advice and consent to the President’s nominees, and beyond that Congress may not appoint the incumbents of the offices it creates, just as it may not execute the statutes it enacts.3 The prohibition applies a principle that runs through the whole Constitution. Madison called the separation of governmental powers an “essential precaution in favor of liberty,” and he defined tyranny as “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands.”4 A legislature that wrote the statutes and also chose the officials who applied them would hold a share of both the legislative and the executive power.
This section takes up the prohibition first and then the two tools Congress keeps. One is the power to set qualifications for an office, and the other is the power to assign new duties to officers who already hold one. Each lets Congress shape who serves, or what the officeholder does, without making an appointment.
No Congressional Appointments
Buckley v. Valeo treated the clause’s silence about Congress as a rule. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate chose four of the six voting members of the Federal Election Commission, and neither the President, a department head, nor the Judiciary had any voice in their selection.5 The Commission’s powers were executive and quasi-judicial in character, so its members were officers, and the Court held that “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.”6
The clause’s second part lets Congress vest the appointment of inferior officers in “the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,” but neither the Speaker nor the President pro tempore comes within that language.7 A commission filled with congressional appointees can therefore exercise only the powers Congress could delegate to one of its own committees, such as investigatory and informative powers, while executive and quasi-judicial tasks require officers appointed in the constitutionally prescribed manner.8
The court of appeals had upheld the arrangement. It called the challengers’ argument based on the Appointments Clause “strikingly syllogistic” and concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress authority not only to establish the Commission but to appoint its members.9 The Supreme Court found a closer authority in Springer v. Philippine Islands, which held that the legislature of the Philippine Islands could not provide for legislative appointment to executive agencies.10 The text pointed the same way. The clause specifies the method of appointment for every officer whose appointment the Constitution does not otherwise provide for, and no provision of the Constitution offers an alternative means of selecting the members of the Commission or any body like it.11
The drafting history confirms that reading. An interim draft of the Constitution would have vested in the Senate the authority to appoint ambassadors, public ministers, and Supreme Court judges, and Article II as finally adopted departs from it. The Court believed the Framers made that change deliberately, intending to deny Congress any authority itself to appoint officers of the United States.12
Behind both the text and the history stands a division of functions between Congress and the Executive. Under its legislative power, Congress establishes offices, determines their functions and jurisdiction, prescribes reasonable and relevant qualifications, and fixes terms and compensation, all except as the Constitution otherwise provides.13 But once an office and its powers and duties exist, the power of appointment, as the Constitution limits it, vests in the Executive, and Myers v. United States read Article II as withholding from Congress the power to determine who shall appoint, except as to inferior offices.14 Congress defines the job, and the appointers the Constitution names fill it.
The Commission’s defenders argued that Congress’s other powers carried an appointment power with them, and the Court rejected each version. The first rested on authority over elections. Article I, Section 4 lets Congress regulate “the Times, places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” and Section 5 makes each House the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. The Court answered that Section 5 confers “not a general legislative power upon the Congress, but rather a power ‘judicial in character’ upon each House.”15 The broader claim fared no better. The idea that explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field includes the power to appoint those who administer the regulatory statute was, in the Court’s words, “both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause.” Unless their selection is provided for elsewhere, all officers of the United States are appointed under the clause, and no class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.16 The Court likewise refused to treat the case as standing on a different footing because of Congress’s extraordinary authority over elections.17
The second argument was that the Commission performed “appropriate legislative functions,” so Congress could provide for its appointment under the Appointments Clause itself or under its substantive legislative powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause.18 The answer turned on what the Commission did. A body that exercises executive or quasi-judicial power needs officers appointed under the clause, and the Constitution offers no other method for choosing them.19 The Court also marked the limit of its own holding: nothing in it denied Congress “all power to appoint its own inferior officers to carry out appropriate legislative functions.”20
The third argument was practical. Congress, the defenders said, had good reason not to give a commission made up wholly of presidential appointees the job of administering the Act, since that administration would bear on any incumbent President’s campaign for reelection. The Court granted that such a fear may be rational and held that “such fears, however rational, do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers’ work.”21
Article II also bars a subtler congressional role in appointments. The clause allows a presidential nomination to be approved only by the Senate, so a statute that gives the House a vote on the President’s nominees improperly inserts the House into the confirmation process.22
The holding reaches only as far as its reason. Congress may take part directly in filling a purely legislative position, one that involves only investigatory, informative, or other tasks for Congress, because the appointee is then an agent or employee of Congress and not an officer of the United States.23 If such a person performs any duties of an officer, the appointment must conform to Article II, Section 2.24 The Court noted that it would have reached a different result had the Commission held only investigative and informative powers. The 9/11 Commission is an example of such a body: the President appointed its chair, and congressional leaders appointed the other members.25 The test is function. A body that gathers facts and reports to Congress executes no law, so Congress’s choice of its members gives Congress no hand in executing the law.
A statute that lets congressional leaders help choose the members of a new body therefore raises one threshold question: what can the body do to people outside Congress?
Congress repaired the defect in the Federal Election Commission soon after the decision by reconstituting it with a membership consisting entirely of presidential appointees.26 It kept the Commission and changed only who picks its members, which shows what the Court’s objection was.
Qualifications and Added Duties
Congress cannot select an officeholder, but two of its legislative powers still bear on who serves and what the officeholder does. It may prescribe qualifications for an office, and it may give new duties to officers who already hold one. Each power has a core the Court has accepted and an edge where it would shade into selection by another route, and the Court has never tested one of those edges.
Congress’s power over an office includes “the prescribing of reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees,” alongside the office’s establishment, functions, jurisdiction, term, and compensation.29 Myers saw “no conflict” between that power and the executive power of appointment, “provided of course that the qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”30 The condition separates channeling a choice from making it. A qualification describes a class of eligible people and leaves the appointer to choose among them, whereas a requirement that only one person can meet has already made the choice.
Mistretta v. United States shows the permitted core. Congress authorized the President to appoint the seven members of the United States Sentencing Commission with the Senate’s advice and consent, but required that at least three members be federal judges and that no more than four belong to the same political party. The Court upheld that appointment procedure.31 The requirements narrowed the field without removing the choice, because the President remained the nominator and could select any qualifying person.
An exam answer should present the Rail Safety Board as the limit that Myers describes, and it should present the limit as an open question. One source observes that Congress might at some point so circumscribe the appointing authority’s discretion that the appointment would for all practical purposes be Congress’s own, in violation of Article II, and that the Court has yet to address such a case.32 Ordinary requirements, such as a cap on party membership or a quota of members with judicial experience, belong on the permitted side with Mistretta, because each leaves the appointer a real pool of candidates.
The second power raises a different question: when Congress hands an existing officer a new job, does the new job require a new appointment? In Weiss v. United States, commissioned military officers, each already appointed by the President with the Senate’s advice and consent, were assigned to serve as military judges, and the question was whether they needed another appointment under the Appointments Clause before assuming their judicial duties.33 Petitioners argued that the position of military judge differs so much from other assignments that either Congress had implicitly required a second appointment or the Appointments Clause itself required one. The Court rejected both arguments.34 Congress’s own practice undercut the first. When Congress wants a separate appointment, it says so, and it has expressly required presidential appointment and Senate confirmation for top-level military posts such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.35
The result follows from what the clause regulates, which is how a person enters an office. An officer who has passed through the process the clause demands for that rank has satisfied it, so extra work attached to the existing position leaves nothing unchecked.
The permission has a boundary set by rank. A person appointed as an inferior officer by the President alone, by a head of a department, or by a court cannot be named by Congress to a position whose duties are those of a principal officer, because a principal officer may be appointed only by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.36 Without that boundary, Congress could avoid Senate confirmation by naming someone who entered office through a lighter appointment and then assigning principal powers by statute.
Both powers call for the same inspection when a problem presents them. For a qualification, the question is whether the requirement describes a class of candidates or points to one person. For added duties, the question is how the person entered the first office and what rank the new duties carry, since a valid original appointment supports added duties only when it was of a kind that could have supplied them.