Concept
Working Through Problems
Appointment of officers
Working Through Problems
An appointments problem is Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 applied to a set of facts. The President nominates, and with the Senate’s advice and consent appoints, “all other Officers of the United States.” Congress may vest the appointment of “such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” And the President may “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” by commissions that expire at the end of the Senate’s next session.1 Those phrases yield four questions, and the answer to each decides whether the next one matters.
The first two questions are answered by comparison, not by definition. An officer is “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” and an employee is one of the “lesser functionaries” subordinate to officers; but those definitions are so general that they offer little guidance, and they say nothing about the line between principal and inferior officers.2 Close cases are therefore decided by matching a position’s supervision, duties, and tenure against positions already classified. The first problem below classifies a position. The second tests the method by which officials were chosen.
Classifying a Position
The first problem asks whether a statute may let the Attorney General appoint a new prosecutor, and the answer depends on the prosecutor’s rank.
Each classification leads to a different answer. If the prosecutor is a principal officer, the provision is invalid, because the clause requires nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. If the prosecutor is an inferior officer, the provision is valid, since Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the head of a department, and the Attorney General heads one. If the prosecutor is a mere employee, the provision is also valid, because the clause does not address or restrict how employees are appointed.3 Only the first result defeats the statute.
The employee result is the easiest to eliminate. Mail carriers, prison guards, and computer programmers are employees: they implement policy rather than make it, and persons far down the executive hierarchy ordinarily supervise them. Their jobs may be permanent and terminable only for cause, yet the lack of significant authority is dispositive.4 A prosecutor who may investigate a federal agency and bring criminal proceedings against its agents exercises significant authority under federal law, and so is an officer.5
Rank is the contested question, and supervision comes first. “[T]he term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President,” so whether an officer is inferior depends on whether the officer has a superior who is a principal officer. Inferior officers are those whose work a presidentially nominated, Senate-confirmed official directs and supervises at some level.6 The judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals in Edmond v. United States met that description. The judge advocate general and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces supervised them, and they had no power to render a final decision for the United States unless other executive officers permitted it.7
The customs prosecutor’s link to a superior is the Attorney General, who appoints and may remove. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court treated the Attorney General’s power to remove an independent counsel as a sign that she was “to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority,” even though she kept “a degree of independent discretion.”8 The customs statute differs in one respect. Removal requires cause, and the statute says nothing about whether the Attorney General may direct or review the prosecutor’s charging decisions. An answer that treats for-cause removal as full supervision skips the one point on which the classification could turn.
Two other features favor inferior status. The independent counsel in Morrison could perform only certain, limited duties, restricted primarily to investigation and prosecution of certain federal crimes,9 and the customs prosecutor’s mandate is equally narrow: one agency, one kind of offense. Tenure adds more. A temporary position can allow someone who would otherwise be an officer to be deemed an inferior officer. A vice-consul appointed to perform a consul’s functions on a temporary basis was inferior even though consuls are principal officers.10 The customs prosecutor’s office likewise ends when the Attorney General certifies that the work is finished.
The better answer, then, is that the prosecutor is an inferior officer whom the Attorney General may appoint, with supervision as the point to flag. The conclusion is not automatic. Make the office permanent, with an open-ended charge to police the Customs Service, and the tenure factor stops pulling toward inferior status. Supervision then carries the classification. If the Attorney General cannot direct the prosecutor’s work, a court may find no principal-officer superior and treat the prosecutor as a principal officer, who could be appointed only by presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.11
A second problem turns on the first question alone.
Career status and a staff appointment invite the answer “employee.” The test looks elsewhere, to authority, and permanence alone does not make anyone an employee. These judges run adversarial proceedings, and their decisions can become the agency’s own action without further review.12 A continuing, career appointment that carries significant authority over the enforcement of federal law is an office, so the judges are officers subject to the Appointments Clause, as Lucia v. SEC held.13 As officers, they must be appointed in a manner the clause permits, so the staff’s method now has to be tested against the list of permitted appointers.
Testing the Method
Once a position is classified, the method for filling it must come from the clause’s own list. A problem modeled on the commission in Buckley v. Valeo shows how the check works and where it saves effort.15
The first two questions resolve quickly. The commission’s duties are substantial and quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative, so its members are clearly officers within the meaning of Article II, Section 2.16 Rank is debatable. There is a good argument that they are principal officers, since they hold broad rulemaking and adjudicative authority and no higher executive official appears able to supervise or remove them.17 A careful answer states that argument and then observes that the result does not depend on it.
Each tier leads to a fixed list of appointers, and none of the statute’s three methods survives either list. If the commissioners are principal officers, the list has one item: presidential nomination with Senate consent. If they are inferior officers, it adds the President alone, a court of law, and a head of department. Rank decides which list to consult and changes nothing else.
Part (a) fails because the clause lets the Senate alone approve a presidential nomination, and here the House has inserted itself into confirmation.18 The commission in Buckley had the same feature. The President’s two nominees there were subject to confirmation by the House as well as the Senate.19
Parts (b) and (c) fail at a different point, the identity of the appointer. Even if the commissioners were inferior officers, neither the Speaker nor the President pro tempore is the President, a court of law, or a head of department.20 Buckley reasoned that “Heads of Departments,” used alongside “Courts of Law,” points to departments within or connected with the Executive Branch. The Clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest appointments in the courts but has no similar language for Congress, so neither Congress nor its officers fall within the phrase. Of four of the six voting members of that commission, the Court could say that “neither the President, the head of any department, nor the Judiciary has any voice in their selection.”21 United States v. Germaine likewise reads “heads of departments” to mean the heads of the major executive branch departments.22
The two defects are independent. Curing the House’s role in part (a) would not help parts (b) and (c), and adding House approval to a selection by the Speaker would not make the Speaker a listed appointer.
The method of testing follows from this. Take each seat separately and ask who selects the occupant and who must approve. A selection by Congress, one of its houses, or a congressional officer appears on neither list, and House participation in confirming a presidential nominee is not permitted. When a seat fails under both tiers, say so in a sentence and move on, because the rank question need not be resolved. Presidential nomination of all six commissioners with Senate confirmation, by contrast, would pass whichever tier they occupy, since the clause prescribes that route for officers generally.23
Congress may appoint directly in only one setting, a position that is purely legislative, involving only investigatory, informative, or similar tasks for Congress. The appointee is then an agent or employee of Congress and not an officer. If such a person performs any duties of officers of the United States, however, the appointment must conform to Article II, Section 2.24 The Commission on Smuggling writes rules and imposes sanctions on federal agents, so that exception is unavailable to it.
The recess route needs a check of its own, because it dispenses with the Senate’s vote altogether.
The clause answers both questions. It gives the President power to fill “all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate” by commissions that “expire at the End of their next Session.”26 The vacancy here opened while the Senate was away, so it falls within the text on any reading. The office’s rank does not matter, because the power reaches all vacancies, and for a department head, a principal officer, the recess commission is the one route that bypasses Senate confirmation. In most recess problems, the first question to test is whether the break counts as a recess at all, the length and pro forma questions treated earlier in this chapter. A four-month break with no meetings scheduled raises neither.
The successor serves until the end of the Senate’s next session. To hold the post longer, the successor must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in the ordinary way. A recess commission is therefore a temporary bridge and not a substitute for confirmation.