Concept
Congress May Impose Duties
Congressional limits on the executive
Congress May Impose Duties
When Congress tells an executive officer to do one thing and the President may prefer another, the officer needs to know whose direction governs. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes answers by looking to the source of the duty. A duty the Constitution gives to a department belongs to that department. A duty Congress imposes belongs to the law.
The Court began with the theory of the Constitution: the great powers of government are divided among separate departments, and "so far as these powers are derived from the constitution, the departments may be regarded as independent of each other."1 Independence therefore follows the source of the power. Beyond those constitutional powers, the opinion continues, "all are subject to regulations by law, touching the discharge of the duties required to be performed."2 Anyone who claims that an executive officer is immune from congressional direction must start by naming a constitutional power the claim protects. Without one, the claim has nothing to stand on.
The President's own position fits the same pattern. So far as his powers are derived from the Constitution, he is "beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power."3 Neither a statute nor a court order can direct how he exercises such a power. But the Court refused to stretch that protection over the whole department. It said that "it by no means follows, that every officer in every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the President," a principle that "certainly cannot be claimed by the President."4 The President's constitutional powers and the duties of subordinate officers rest on different foundations, and the Postmaster General's duty to credit the Solicitor's award belonged to the second group.
From that baseline the Court stated the rule at the center of this chapter. It would be "an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution."5 When Congress does impose such a duty, "the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President."6 The rule has two parts, a power and a consequence, and each has its own reason.
The power follows from where executive offices come from. The dissent, which disputed the writ but not this principle, observed that the Constitution neither creates the office of postmaster general nor marks out its powers or duties. Wherever Congress creates such an office by law, the dissent said, it may by law "limit its powers, and regulate its proceedings; and may subject it to any supervision or control, executive or judicial, which the wisdom of the legislature may deem right."7 A body that can bring an office into being can say what the officeholder must do. The Necessary and Proper Clause points the same way. It gives Congress power to make the laws needed to carry into execution the powers vested in the government or in any department or officer of it, which suggests that legislators have at least some say in how the government is administered.8 The Court's one stated qualification, that the duty not be repugnant to rights secured by the Constitution, marks the outer edge of that power. Ordinary legislation cannot rewrite what the Constitution itself provides.
The consequence answers a different question: who controls the officer once Congress has spoken? A statute that the President could countermand would bind an officer only while the President agreed with it, and every statute directed at an officer would amount to advice. The Court instead placed the duty under "the control of the law." The President cannot direct an officer to violate a statutory duty, and statutes bind agencies and the President alike.9 The constitutional text fits this result. The Opinions Clause lets the President demand reports from department heads about their duties, but not take those duties over as his own. The President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed requires him to use the executive power consistently with valid acts of Congress, not simply according to his preferences.10 An officer's membership in the executive department shows where he sits. The source of his duty shows who controls how he performs it.
The contractors' dispute followed that chain. Congress had passed a statute requiring the Postmaster General to honor the Solicitor's arbitration award, so the President had no power to direct otherwise.11 The Court found that under the act the Postmaster General had "no discretion or control over the decisions of the solicitor," and the act provided no appeal or review of them. It "did not rest with the postmaster general to control congress, or the solicitor, in that affair."12 The mandamus therefore enforced "a mere ministerial act, which neither he, nor the President had any authority to deny or control."13
The rule stops where the duty no longer comes from a statute.
The Court took care to say how little its opinion decided. Because the mandamus enforced a mere ministerial act, the Court would not "enter into any particular examination of the line to be drawn between the powers of the executive and judicial departments of the government."14 The same passage concedes that many executive officers carry political duties whose discharge is under the President's direction, a category taken up in a later section. The dissent shows how settled the core principle was. It saw no question about the constitutional powers of the executive or the judiciary, and it framed the controversy as turning simply on the construction of an act of Congress: whether the act organizing the circuit court for the District of Columbia gave that court the power to issue the writ.15