Concept
No Presidential Dispensing Power
Congressional limits on the executive
No Presidential Dispensing Power
It was urged at the bar that the Postmaster General answered only to the President for the duty the statute laid on him, and that the President's control came from his constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.1 The Court would not have it. “This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this court,” it said, and its reasons run from the consequences of the argument to the text of the clause it relied on.2
Follow the argument to its end, the Court reasoned, and it vests in the President “a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its support in any part of the constitution.” Carried out “to all cases falling within it,” the principle “would be clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”3 A dispensing power lets the executive excuse obedience to a law that Congress has enacted. If the President could forbid execution of any statute he disliked, every statute would bind the executive branch only while he approved of it.
The text of the Constitution defeats the argument on its own terms. The Court called the notion that “the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution” “a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”4 A duty to see that something is done points toward its being done, and a reading that turns the duty into authority to prevent it turns the clause upside down. The rest of Article II points the same way. The president has the power and the obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed, yet the text stops short of giving him power personally to execute them. The Opinions Clause lets him demand reports from department heads about the execution of their duties, but it does not let him take those duties over. Congress holds the Necessary and Proper power, which suggests the legislators have at least some say in how the government is administered. The Take Care obligation therefore requires the President to deploy executive power consistently with all valid acts of Congress, and not according to his preferences.5
None of this strips the President of supervision. Agency execution of the laws is generally subject to presidential supervision under Article II, though the extent of that supervision is disputed.6 Agencies, for their part, exercise only the authority statutes delegate to them, and those statutes bind both the agencies and the President.7 A President may question, coordinate, and guide his subordinates. He may not order one of them to disobey a clear statutory command. Which duties Congress has left to executive choice, and so remain under the President's direction, is the subject of the next section.
The Court added that the President himself had not made the claim urged on his officer's behalf. The argument “necessarily leads to such a result,” it said, “but we do not perceive from the case that any such power has been claimed by the President.”8 According to the committee report the opinion quoted, the President's message expressed no opinion on the subject and recommended no measure. It simply passed along the Postmaster General's report, the Solicitor of the Treasury's review of that report, and the Postmaster General's answer, with the supporting vouchers. The committee considered those documents, found no cause to change its earlier opinion, and recommended adopting the resolution it had reported before.9 A message to Congress leaves the officer's statutory duty exactly where it was.
Later opinions show the same idea from other angles. One put it this way: perhaps the chief duty of the President is to carry into effect the will of Congress through such instrumentalities as Congress has chosen to provide, so arguments that assume Congress may wilfully impede executive action are not important.10 Another opinion warned that Justice Holmes, in dissent, “perhaps overstated his case.” There are undoubtedly executive functions that, whatever Congress enacts, must be performed by officers the President can remove at will, and whether a function falls in that class or in the far larger class that may be left to independent officers “will depend upon the character of the office.”11 The last sections of this chapter return to those functions.