Concept
Ministerial and Political Duties
Congressional limits on the executive
Ministerial and Political Duties
Kendall’s rule turns on a sorting question: how much choice did the statute leave the officer? The Court held that Congress may impose on an executive officer any duty it thinks proper, so long as the duty is not repugnant to rights the Constitution secures, and that the duty and responsibility then “grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”1 The same passage acknowledges, however, that “certain political duties” remain “under the direction of the President.”2
Both statements hold because statutes differ in what they leave open. Where a statute fixes the act, Congress has already made the decision and the officer only carries it out; the Court called a duty of that kind ministerial. Where a statute leaves the officer a choice, someone in the executive branch must make it, and the President’s direction has a place. The label attaches to the duty a statute imposes, not to the office its holder occupies. Ministerial duties come first below, because the label explains why the Postmaster General had no defense in Kendall; political and discretionary duties follow, because they mark where Kendall’s rule stops.
Ministerial Duties
The act of 1836 required the Postmaster General to do one thing: “simply to credit the relators with the full amount of the award of the solicitor.” The Court called that “a precise, definite act, purely ministerial,” about which he “had no discretion whatever.”3 A ministerial duty, then, is one the law prescribes so completely that the officer exercises no judgment of his own. The word measures how much choice a statute leaves, and that measure decided whether the Postmaster General could resist.
The second step needs the most care, because the act of 1836 did require judgment from someone. Congress placed that judgment with the Solicitor, who acted as arbitrator. Under the law the Postmaster General was “vested with no discretion or control over the decisions of the solicitor,” and the act provided for no appeal or review of them.5 The terms of the submission, the Court added, were a matter “resting entirely in the discretion of congress,” and it “did not rest with the postmaster general to control congress, or the solicitor, in that affair.”6 The Justices’ own statement of the point is just as plain: “no discretionary power in relation to the award, was given to the postmaster general,” and “the duty enjoined upon him was merely ministerial.”7
The Postmaster General stood much as a clerk stands who records a judge’s order: the decision had been made elsewhere. The Court put it this way: “There is no room for the exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise: all that is shut out by the direct and positive command of the law.”8
The label did the legal work in the case. The mandamus, the Court said, did “not seek to direct or control the postmaster general in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act, which neither he, nor the President had any authority to deny or control.”9 The reason follows from what executive direction is. A President directs a subordinate by choosing among courses the law allows, and where the statute has already made the choice, no course remains. An order to credit a different sum would have commanded the Postmaster General to disobey the statute. The Court drew the same connection in general terms, saying that control by the law and not by the President “is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.”10
Because the label measures choice, the importance of the act plays no part in it. A refusal to enter a credit, pay a sum, or issue a patent may cost a claimant everything and still involve a ministerial duty; and a trivial act can be discretionary if the statute leaves it to the officer’s judgment.
The contrast case is Decatur v. Paulding (1840), where mandamus was denied because the statute had conferred discretion on the executive officer to decide on what basis to pay pension claims.11 Both cases turn on where the statute placed the choice. In Kendall, Congress moved the judgment out of the Postmaster General’s hands and into the Solicitor’s, leaving him a closing entry. In Decatur, the judgment stayed with the officer whom the petitioner sought to compel. An order to perform a ministerial act substitutes no one’s judgment for the executive’s, because Congress has already exercised the judgment. An order to reach a particular result where the statute leaves the choice with the officer would substitute the court’s judgment for the one Congress assigned, and the statute would supply no precise command to enforce. The ministerial limit therefore protects executive discretion as much as it permits enforcement.
The principle reaches beyond the Post Office. Courts have issued mandamus to the Treasurer of the United States, compelling payment on a finding that the law clearly imposes a duty to pay, as in Roberts v. United States (1900), and to the land office, compelling issuance of a patent that reflects the petitioner’s ownership of the property, as in Lane v. Hoglund (1917).12 Each order enforced an act the law required, not a choice the law left to the officer. Duties on the other side of that line, where Congress left the choice with the officer, come next.
Political and Discretionary Duties
Kendall marks the edge of its own rule in the same passage that announces the rule. Immediately before declaring that duties Congress imposes are subject to the control of the law, the Court acknowledges that “[t]here are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President.”14 The sentence names the category without defining it, but the contrast with the ministerial act before the Court shows the idea: a political duty is one whose performance calls for executive judgment, so the President may guide how the officer exercises it. The Court also declined to examine “the line to be drawn between the powers of the executive and judicial departments,” observing that the departments may be regarded as independent of each other “so far as these powers are derived from the constitution.”15 It did not need to map that line, because the act before it was a mere ministerial one.
Chief Justice Taft described the political category in Myers v. United States, a decision about removal. “This field is a very large one,” he wrote. “It is sometimes described as political,” and he cited Kendall for the description. He then added that “[e]ach head of a department is and must be the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.”16 The underlying idea is delegation. Where the law requires the President to exercise authority, the department head who carries it out acts as the President’s alter ego, and an alter ego has no independent judgment for a statute to protect. Ministerial and political duties thus sit at opposite ends of one question: whose judgment does the statute call for? A ministerial duty calls for none at the officer’s level, because Congress has already decided. A political duty calls for executive judgment, and in the field Taft described, that judgment belongs to the President.
Kendall supplies the floor and leaves the ceiling open. Early in the nineteenth century, the justices made Kendall the starting point for defining the president’s supervisory power over executive officers, and the federal courts have had surprisingly little to say on the question.17 The statute in Kendall clearly directed the Postmaster General to carry out the Solicitor’s arbitration award and so left him no discretion to refuse.18 Statutes, though, are often unclear or let an administrator choose among several lawful options. May the president direct the administrator to choose a particular interpretation or option, or must the president let the administrator’s preference stand?19
Myers gives a broad answer in the President’s favor, though only in dicta, meaning statements beyond what the case needed to decide. Drawing on the premise of a unitary executive, Chief Justice Taft recognized broad presidential authority over the decisions officers make under their statutory powers. “The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute,” he wrote, “come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.”20 Taft qualified the statement. He questioned the president’s power to intervene in agency adjudications, where due process values are at stake, and he allowed that “there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance.”21 One commentator adds that because Myers lets the president fire such officials at will, the president may fire one who refuses to follow policy directions, but whether the president may also require the official to adopt those directions in exercising statutory discretion does not follow automatically.22 The removal holding itself is a separate subject that this section sets aside.
Kendall supplies the opposite pole. The statute there named the sum the Postmaster General had to credit, so a presidential direction to credit less would have commanded him to deny an act that, in the Court’s words, neither he nor the President had any authority to deny or control.23 The two scenes differ in one fact: whether the statute left any choice for the President to guide.
Congress’s power to create independent officers complicates the picture. A later opinion on limits on removal states that whether a function falls within “the far larger class that may be relegated to independent officers” “will depend upon the character of the office,” citing Humphrey’s Executor, and that a limit on the President’s power to remove an officer who performs executive functions is judged by whether it “prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”24 A test that turns on the character of each office explains why the answer for independent officers is not settled.
Decatur v. Paulding bears on this question only from the courts’ side. Mandamus was denied there because the statute had conferred discretion on the executive officer to decide on what basis to pay pension claims.25 That result shows what a court may order, and it does not decide what the President may direct. A court that cannot compel an officer’s choice has not held that the President can dictate it, so the two questions need separate answers.