Concept
Why Presentment Matters
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
Why Presentment Matters
Article I, Section 1 vests the legislative powers the Constitution grants in a Congress made up of a Senate and a House of Representatives.1 Section 7 then brings the President into the process, so that a bill must clear both houses and the President, or an override, before it becomes law.2 Read one at a time, these provisions look like procedural hurdles, and a student who sees only hurdles cannot say whether a new device is permitted. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the Court explained what each hurdle is for, and that explanation lets you predict how it will treat a device the Framers never mentioned.3 The first subsection takes the safeguards in turn: the President's role, the two houses, the two-thirds override, and the single procedure they form together. The second subsection draws the consequences for amendment, repeal, and execution of the laws.
Purposes of the Procedure
The President's participation in lawmaking serves two ends: it protects the Executive Branch from Congress, and it protects the whole people from improvident laws.4 The second end rests on how the President is chosen. The President is a representative of the people just as members of the Senate and House are, and on some subjects the President, elected by all the people, may be more representative of them all than members of either body, whose constituencies are local and not countrywide.5 A bill that pleases majorities drawn from districts and states must therefore also satisfy an officer who answers to the whole country. The check comes from a differently chosen decision maker, and a second reading by the same body would not supply it.
The division of Congress into two distinctive bodies serves a different purpose. It assures that the legislative power is exercised only after an opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings.6 The two bodies also speak for different constituencies. Under the Great Compromise, one House represents the people and the other the states. That arrangement allayed two opposite fears: the smaller states worried that the larger states, sharing a common interest, would work to their disadvantage, and the larger states distrusted a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people.7 A bill must therefore win agreement from two bodies constituted differently, and win it through two rounds of deliberation.
The two-thirds override limits the limiter. The President's unilateral veto power is checked by the power of two thirds of both houses to overrule it, which precludes final arbitrary action by one person.8 Without the override, a President could have the last word over the combined judgment of two chambers. With it, the veto still carries real weight, because a bill that cannot gather two thirds of each house stays dead, but it can no longer end the matter when the supermajority exists.
The three safeguards interlock. The President checks Congress, each house checks the other, and a supermajority of Congress checks the President. The Court concluded that Article I, Sections 1 and 7 reflect the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with "a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."9 The word single means the Constitution recognizes one route for exercising legislative power and offers no menu of alternatives. The phrase finely wrought explains why a substitute for any part is suspect, since each part restrains a different actor and a device that removes one restraint leaves some actor unchecked. A one-house action removes the second chamber and the President together, while a presidential cancellation of enacted text removes both chambers' reconsideration and the override.
Repeal, Amendment, and Execution
The procedure governs every change in what federal law says. The Court put the principle directly: amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Article I.11 The reasoning follows from what the safeguards protect. A statute binds because it survived the checks, and deleting or rewriting a provision alters legal rights and duties just as the original provision did. If repeal had a shortcut, whoever held it would decide what the law says after enactment, and the checks at the front end would govern only the first draft.
Chadha shows the principle at work. Section 244(c)(2) gave one House of Congress a veto over an executive decision under the statute. Without that provision, Congress could have reached the same result, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation.12 The Court refused to defend the one-House veto as an amendment of the standards in § 244(a)(1) or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha, because amendment and repeal must follow Article I too.13 It held § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional and severable from the Act.14
The one-House veto was easier than lawmaking, and the Court said convenience cannot save it. Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, conceded that it is obviously easier for one House to act without submitting to the President. But he found it crystal clear from the records of the Convention and from contemporaneous writings and debates that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.15 The majority likewise found no support in the Constitution or the Court's decisions for avoiding the cumbersomeness and delay of explicit constitutional standards, "either by the Congress or by the President." Despite the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, the Court had not found a better way to preserve freedom than carefully crafted constitutional restraints.16 The point follows from the mechanism. Delay, the need for two majorities, and an Executive holding a veto are the burdens the procedure exists to impose, so an argument that a device is faster describes the very feature that makes it a bypass.
Where the Framers wanted one House to act alone, they said so in explicit, unambiguous terms. Powell described these exceptions as narrow, explicit, and separately justified, and he found that none of them authorizes the action challenged in Chadha. They reinforce the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied.17 The Line Item Veto Case, below, asks the same question when the claimed shortcut belongs to the President instead of a House.
Execution of the law sits on the other side of the line. When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Article II, and when one House purports to act, it presumptively acts within its assigned sphere.18 Those presumptions explain why carrying out a statute needs no separate legislative procedure: the Executive applies the law as Congress wrote it, and nothing is enacted, amended, or repealed. They also show where the line is crossed, since an act that rewrites or deletes what the statute says changes the law itself. Exam questions usually describe an official act and ask whether it needed presentment, and the useful test is whether the act changes what the statute says or carries out what it says.
The harbor order fails even though it came after the signature, because Article I governs changes to enacted text whenever they occur. The prosecutorial directive stands because it takes the statute as given. Both acts came from the same office, and the only difference is whether the text of the law was altered.