Concept
Withholding Funds Versus Canceling
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
Withholding Funds Versus Canceling
The Government’s second defense of the Line Item Veto Act began with an everyday practice: Presidents sometimes leave appropriated money unspent. Article I, Section 7 says nothing about that practice. It governs how statutes are made. Both houses pass a bill, the President signs it or returns it with his objections, and two thirds of each house may repass it over his veto.1 In Clinton v. City of New York, the Government argued that the President’s authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefit items was no greater than his traditional authority to decline to spend appropriated funds.2 The Court rejected the argument, and its reason also yields a rule about when a President may decline to spend at all.
The argument had force because Congress often gives the Executive room to spend less than it appropriates. The Government reviewed in some detail the series of statutes that did so, and it contended that the Act merely conferred comparable discretionary authority over the expenditure of appropriated funds.3 One scholarly account lays out the reasoning as a chain of small steps. Congress can plainly authorize spending “up to” a stated sum. It could narrow that authority to a binary choice between the full amount and nothing. It could then state the choice once, in a single statute covering every appropriation, instead of repeating it line by line. With some complications, that is what the Act said.4
The Court answered with one distinction. The critical difference between the Act and its predecessors, it said, is that “unlike any of them, this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.” None of the predecessors could even arguably have been construed to authorize such a change.5
The distinction turns on where the discretion lives. In the statutes the Government cited, Congress itself had given the Executive discretion over spending.6 A President who spent less applied the law as written, and the statute read the same afterward. Under the Act, Congress enacted an item, and the President’s cancellation repealed it. The Court drew the line in these terms: impoundment does not repeal or amend the underlying law but exercises the Executive’s discretion in implementing it, while the Act permitted the President to repeal parts of the law itself.7 Two actions can leave the same dollars unspent and still differ in procedure. Article I, Section 7 regulates how legal text is made and changed, so a matching dollar result does not help the Government.
That description also marks the limit of impoundment. Because impoundment is discretion in implementing the law, it reaches only as far as the statute leaves discretion. Where Congress has mandated the expenditure, no discretion exists to exercise, and the President may not simply refuse to spend; Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes is the classic authority for that principle. On an exam, a President who leaves appropriated money unspent raises a question the appropriating statute answers: did Congress confer discretion, or did it mandate the payment?
The three scenes divide along two questions: did Congress authorize the President’s action, and does the action leave the enacted text intact? The first President passes both tests, because the statute itself confers the discretion. The second fails the first test, because nothing authorizes him to refuse a mandated payment. The third is the hard case. He passes the first test and fails the second, and Clinton holds that the failure is fatal even though Congress consented. The Court said that Congress’s intent to produce that result is of no moment, because Congress cannot alter the procedures of Article I, Section 7 without amending the Constitution.8 The next section turns to the debate over whether the majority drew this line in the right place.