Concept
Traditional Delegation Categories
Nondelegation doctrine
Traditional Delegation Categories
Congress may delegate rulemaking and regulatory authority to executive officers and agencies, subject only to minimal requirements such as an intelligible principle, and the Court has applied that formulation to uphold statutes bounded by little more than “just and reasonable” or “public convenience and necessity.”1 The permissive standard took shape in stages. Soon after announcing the nondelegation doctrine, the Court turned back challenges by describing a statute as authorizing an agency only to find a factual contingency that triggered a policy Congress had already announced. When that description no longer sufficed, the Court upheld statutes on the ground that Congress had made the important policy decisions and had authorized an agency only to “fill up the details.” When that too fell short, the Court adopted the intelligible-principle test, which the next section takes up.2
The dissent in Gundy v. United States, discussed later in this chapter, names three things Congress may do without offending the doctrine. First, so long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to “fill up the details.”3 Second, once Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the rule’s application depend on executive fact-finding.4 Third, Congress may assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative responsibilities, because its legislative authority sometimes overlaps with authority the Constitution vests separately in another branch.5 The sections below take them in that order.
Each category answers one structural worry: that a controlling policy choice might escape the Article I filters of two Houses, the President’s signature, and political accountability. When a delegate fills in details, finds a triggering fact, or acts within its own constitutional sphere, the choice has already been made or was never Congress’s alone.
The categories no longer decide cases by themselves. The intelligible-principle test absorbed their reasoning and loosened it, so a delegation can pass on the strength of a statutory standard without fitting any category neatly. Still, as the Gundy dissent does, courts and Justices reach for the older vocabulary when they ask whether a delegation is lawmaking in disguise, because the categories ask what the delegate does while the later test asks how much guidance Congress supplied. The categories also overlap, and one statute can earn its validity under more than one description. The label matters less than whether the delegate chose the content of the rule.
Filling Up the Details
The first category takes its name from Wayman v. Southard. Congress there told the federal courts to follow state procedure in executing judgments but let them make “alterations and additions,” and the Court upheld the statute. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the legislature must itself regulate the important subjects, but that on lesser matters it may make a general provision and give those who act under it the power to “fill up the details.” The statute passed because Congress had already chosen the controlling policy when it adopted state procedure, and the leftover authority to adjust that procedure only completed it. The rule today reads the same way: so long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to fill up the details.6
The rule answers two different worries. By requiring Congress to make the policy decisions, it preserves the Article I filters described earlier in this chapter: a choice that restricts private liberty must still clear two Houses and the President and remain the choice of officials who answer to voters. By permitting Congress to leave details elsewhere, it accepts that no statute anticipates every circumstance in which a general policy will operate. Courts supply a clean example. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States observes that courts may prescribe by rule the manner in which their officers execute judgments, as in Wayman, because that “lawmaking” is ancillary to the exercise of judicial power.7 The category is narrow in theory. It covers completing a policy Congress has chosen and does not cover choosing the policy.
Later cases applied the same logic to matters both trivial and weighty. In In re Kollock the Court upheld a statute assigning the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the job of designing tax stamps for margarine packages. Later still, using the same logic, it sustained a far more consequential law authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt rules regulating the “use and occupancy” of public forests to protect them from “destruction” and “depredations.”8 That law was the one in United States v. Grimaud. It authorized regulations on the use and occupancy of the national forests in order to preserve them from destruction, and it supplied the punishment for violating them. The Secretary then required sheep grazers to obtain a permit before grazing.9 Congress thus decided that violations would be punished and how, and it named the purpose the rules served. The Secretary decided what the permit rules would demand. Those rules governed who could graze sheep on public land and carried criminal penalties, yet they counted as details.
Schechter shows where the category stops. The President adopted a lengthy fair competition code written by a group of New York poultry butchers, without needing to convince a majority of legislators.10 The statute behind that code referred to no pre-existing common law of fair competition that might have supplied guidance on the policy questions, as Congress arguably had done earlier with the Sherman Act. It announced no rules contingent on executive fact-finding, and the power it assigned was one that no one thought inhered in the executive.11 What separates Schechter from Wayman and Grimaud is whether Congress anchored the policy. State procedure anchored it in Wayman, and preservation of the forests anchored it in Grimaud, so the delegate worked inside a choice Congress had made. Nothing in the Schechter statute chose which competitive rules would govern, so the President decided what the law would be.
The early Court spoke in absolutes and ruled leniently. In truth the executive in these cases was not merely finding facts or supplying details; it was exercising a substantial measure of policy judgment. Field involved authority for the President to impose retaliatory tariffs when foreign nations raised their duties on agricultural products, and Grimaud upheld criminally enforced rules on the use and preservation of the national forests. The holdings therefore belied the Court’s absolutist language.12 One limit ran through all of these cases, small or large: Congress must set forth standards “sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain” whether its guidance has been followed.13 When detail-filling could no longer sustain a statute, the Court shifted to the intelligible-principle test.14
To test a delegation defended as detail-filling, ask who chose the content of the rule. The size of the consequences does not answer the question, since the forest rules were consequential and still counted. A statute that borrows a policy, or states a purpose precisely enough that the delegate’s rules can be checked against it, fits the category. A statute that hands over a whole field with only a general aspiration, as the competition-code provision did, does not.
Contingent Fact-Finding
Congress may prescribe the rule that governs private conduct and make its application depend on a fact the executive determines.16 The embargo statute in Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States shows the structure. The Court said it could “see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion [to impose an embargo] either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”17 A conditional embargo lets Congress settle the policy and leaves the executive to say whether the condition has occurred.
This arrangement leaves Article I’s structure intact because Congress has already decided what the law will be in each state of the world: the rule that applies if the condition occurs and the rule that applies if it does not. The executive then discovers which situation exists and makes no choice about the content of the law. As the Court said in Field v. Clark, quoting an earlier decision, half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, “depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them,” and “it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.”18
The same reasoning sustained a statute that made construction of the Brooklyn Bridge depend on a finding by the Secretary of War that the bridge would not interfere with navigation of the East River. The Court held that Congress “did not abdicate any of its authority” but “simply declared that, upon a certain fact being established, the bridge should be deemed a lawful structure, and employed the secretary of war as an agent to ascertain that fact.”19 Whether a bridge obstructs river traffic has an answer whatever anyone prefers, and Congress had fixed the legal consequence of each answer in advance. The Secretary could neither legalize an obstructing bridge nor forbid a harmless one. The Secretary could only report which kind of bridge was proposed.
The statute in Field shows how consequential such a condition can be. Congress authorized the President to impose retaliatory tariffs when foreign nations raised their duties on agricultural products.20 The Court upheld the Act after reciting the history, reaching back to 1798, of statutes conferring on the President the power to “discontinue the prohibitions and restraints hereby enacted and declared,” to “suspend the operation of the aforesaid act,” and to “declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative.”21 Justice Scalia, writing separately in Clinton v. City of New York, located the limit in the delegation doctrine rather than in Article I, § 7: when authorized executive reduction or augmentation goes too far, it usurps the nondelegable function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.22
The word fact can disguise judgment. Deciding whether a foreign nation’s tariff increases warrant retaliation asks the President to evaluate, not merely to observe. The early Court nonetheless described such authority as finding facts or supplying details, when the executive was in truth exercising a substantial measure of policy judgment.23 A statute does not escape scrutiny by calling its trigger a finding. The question is whether the finding leaves the executive room to choose what the law is.
The limit appears in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. As in Schechter, the statute gave regulated parties no notice of what the President might wind up prohibiting, and the Court observed that Congress had declared no policy, established no standard, and laid down no rule. The statute did not call for the executive to ascertain the existence of facts to which legislation is directed, and it did not ask the executive to fill up details within a policy the legislature had sufficiently defined.24 The embargo statute stated a rule, attached it to a condition, and asked the executive whether the condition held. The Panama Refining statute asked for no finding of any triggering fact, so the President’s own decision about when to prohibit determined when the law applied. The competition-code authority in Schechter failed the same way, because Congress announced no rules contingent on executive fact-finding.25
The checklist sorts the cases above. The Brooklyn Bridge authorization satisfies all four steps, because whether a bridge obstructs river traffic has an answer regardless of anyone’s preference and Congress fixed the consequence of each answer. The Panama Refining statute fails the third step, since it requires no finding at all, and the Schechter statute fails the first, since it announces no rule contingent on a finding. The tariff authority in Field is where the fourth step presses hardest, and the early Court passed it by calling the President’s task ascertainment. When a delegation is defended as contingent fact-finding, test whether the executive answers a question about the world or decides what the law should be.
Overlapping Constitutional Powers
The third category rests on the recipient’s own constitutional authority. Congress may assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative responsibilities, because its legislative authority sometimes overlaps with authority the Constitution separately vests in another branch.27 When a statute confers wide discretion on the executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if “the discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of executive power.”28 The category therefore looks at the recipient before it looks at the statute. A branch that already holds constitutional authority over a subject can act on it without any statute, so a broad grant from Congress supplements power the branch holds in its own right.
Foreign affairs is the standard example of a field in which the Executive and Legislative branches share power.29 The nondelegation doctrine guards against Congress surrendering the legislature’s monopoly over binding rules for private conduct, which would let policy choices skip bicameralism, presentment, and political accountability. When the recipient already holds authority over the field, the field was never Congress’s alone, and no exclusive power changes hands.
The leading illustration is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. A joint resolution of Congress in 1934 authorized the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions to Bolivia and Paraguay, which were involved in armed conflict.30 The issue was the constitutionality of that delegation of power to the President in the area of foreign policy.31 The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the resolution would have been an unlawful delegation had it related solely to internal affairs, because the whole aim of the resolution was to affect a situation entirely external to the United States and falling within foreign affairs. The Court explained the difference this way: the premise that the federal government holds only enumerated powers is categorically true only of internal affairs, because the states never possessed international powers and so those powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers. They were transmitted to the United States from some other source, having been held exclusively by the Crown during the Colonial period.32 The case thus decided that this delegation, in this setting, was valid. It did not decide that a domestic delegation of the same openness would be.
The timing sharpens the point. The Court decided the case in 1936, while it was still enforcing the nondelegation doctrine aggressively.33 Justice Sutherland nonetheless closed his opinion by stressing the unwisdom of requiring Congress, in this field of governmental power, to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed.34 The embargo statute in Cargo of the Brig Aurora, discussed in the preceding subsection, can be read here as well. The Gundy dissent suggests that the statute may be an example of permissible lawmaking in this category, since many foreign affairs powers are constitutionally vested in the President under Article II.35
The rhetoric of Curtiss-Wright reaches further than its holding. The opinion contains a sweeping dictum, often summarized as the President’s role as “sole organ” in foreign relations, that the President has exclusive power to conduct international relations. In Zivotofsky the Court claimed to reject that dictum, although Justice Scalia’s dissent accused the majority of replicating its reasoning.36 The delegation holding does not need the dictum. The question was whether Congress could authorize presidential action in an external field, and the Court answered by explaining how external affairs differ from internal ones, a premise that stands whether or not the President’s power there is exclusive. A student who cites the sole-organ passage as the basis for the delegation holding leans on the contested part.
Military command supplies the second standard example. In Loving v. United States, Congress authorized the President to prescribe aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penalty on a member of the Armed Forces convicted of murder, a decision that may implicate in part the President’s independent commander-in-chief authority.37 The Court said it is hard to deem lawless a delegation giving the President broad discretion to prescribe such rules, because the delegated duty was “interlinked with duties already assigned to the President by express terms of the Constitution.”38 The rules governing how the armed forces punish their own members are bound up with commanding those forces, so the grant added to a responsibility the President already bore.
The category also reaches the judiciary. Wayman, which the earlier subsection treated as detail-filling, might be explained by the same principle applied to courts, because even without a statute courts hold power under Article III “to regulate their practice.”39 The same statute can thus be described as filling up details or as confirming a power the judiciary already holds, and both descriptions lead to the same result.
The reasoning extends beyond federal branches. Delegations to the President, the states, or tribal governments, which hold independent constitutional or sovereign authority, are less likely to be problematic. The President’s powers in military matters and foreign affairs, for example, justified delegating to the President or executive officials the power to define court-martial offenses and to activate a statutory arms embargo.40 Delegations to private parties stand differently, because private recipients have no comparable independent footing, and they draw separate suspicion, taken up later in this chapter.41
The competition-code power in Schechter shows what a statute looks like when no overlap is available. The Gundy dissent observes that nobody thought the power assigned there inhered in the executive power.42 Regulating the competitive practices of domestic industry is a function the Constitution gives to the legislature, so that grant moved power out of Congress instead of supplementing power the President already held. With no overlap to rely on, the statute needed Congress to supply the guidance.
The overlap lowers the amount of statutory guidance a court will demand, and it applies only where the subject actually lies within the recipient’s own constitutional sphere. Curtiss-Wright reserved the domestic question, and Loving rested on duties interlinked with the President’s constitutional ones. A common error is to treat every grant touching foreign affairs or the military as automatically valid without tying the subject to the recipient’s own constitutional role. The safer reason for validity is that the grant supplements authority the recipient already holds.