Concept
Nondelegation as Avoidance Canon
Nondelegation doctrine
Nondelegation as Avoidance Canon
The Supreme Court has struck down a statute on delegation grounds on only two occasions. The more common judicial response is quieter: a court interprets the statute so that the delegation at issue becomes acceptable, and the constitutional clash with Congress never happens.1 The instrument is the canon of constitutional avoidance. When a statutory intelligible principle can be read broadly or narrowly, and the broad reading would give rise to nondelegation concerns, the court is likely to adopt the narrow one.2 The statute survives, and what shrinks is the power the agency may claim under it.
The canon suits a doctrine whose boundary is blurry. Article I vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress and so makes it the main policy-making arm of the government, but the sentence does not mean that none of that power may be delegated.3 Chief Justice Marshall conceded in 1825 that “the line has not been exactly drawn” between the important subjects the legislature must regulate itself and those on which it may make a general provision and let others “fill up the details.”4 A court that narrows a statute can respect Congress’s choice without announcing where that line falls.
Narrowing is attractive because invalidation is expensive. A holding that a delegation is unconstitutional invites a major confrontation between the branches, since it may require radical restructuring or even abandonment of an entire program. A statutory interpretation that specifies limits to regulation or requires procedural fairness is less disruptive, and Congress can correct it more easily if the court has misread its will.5 The habit also fits the modern approach to delegation. Courts ask not only whether a statute states an “intelligible principle” on its face but whether the scheme as a whole, with its substantive and procedural controls, assures adequate control and accountability in the exercise of official power. The principle that a court should construe a statute to avoid constitutional difficulties is integral to that analysis. Courts therefore sometimes adopt relatively restrictive interpretations of regulatory legislation while stating or suggesting that a more permissive reading could raise nondelegation problems.6
The Benzene case, Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, shows the technique at its most visible, and it shows that narrowing is a choice among options. The Court set aside the Secretary of Labor’s benzene rule but divided over the reason. Justice Rehnquist supplied the fifth vote against the Secretary and would have held the statute itself unconstitutional. He called the phrase “to the extent feasible” a “legislative mirage” by which Congress avoided deciding when employers may be allowed to take some risk of injury to workers because protective measures are costly. Resolving fundamental, politically divisive policy issues, he insisted, is the very essence of legislative authority and cannot “unnecessarily” be left to a politically unresponsive administrator.7 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, declined to accept Rehnquist’s conclusion that the Act was unconstitutionally vague. He held instead that the rule was flawed because the agency had not found that its requirements would cure a “significant risk” in the workplace, which he claimed the Act required. Most commentators agree that this construction was rather forced, and Stevens said he adopted it partly because, without the limit, the Act would have violated the nondelegation doctrine.8 The statute survives, and the agency loses because it skipped a step the plurality read into the Act.
Two other decisions show the same technique. In National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. United States, the Court followed the more common pattern and interpreted the statute so that the delegation became acceptable rather than holding it invalid.9 In Touby v. United States, the technique operated on procedure rather than on a substantive standard. Under a 1984 amendment to the Controlled Substances Act, the Attorney General could summarily issue a “temporary scheduling order” imposing strict controls on newly invented “designer drugs.” A manufacturer prosecuted for violating such an order argued that the statute was an invalid delegation, in part because the Act said the order “is not subject to judicial review.” The Court read that bar to cover only preenforcement challenges, so a defendant facing criminal charges could still attack the order’s validity as a defense to prosecution. By adopting this somewhat strained interpretation, the Court seemed to acknowledge that a more literal reading might have raised serious doubts about the Attorney General’s powers.10
Judicial narrowing carries costs of its own. Substituting judicial for executive lawmaking does little to promote one of the major objectives of the nondelegation doctrine, which is to encourage Congress to take responsibility for major policy choices, because it replaces one unelected decisionmaker with another. A judicially imposed construction may also impair the efficacy of the regulatory scheme or make it less workable.11 The Benzene plurality’s admittedly forced reading shows the strain: the significant-risk requirement decided the case even though most commentators doubt the Act said it.12
The canon also has a boundary, and Whitman v. American Trucking Associations marks it. The Court held that the canon requiring texts to be construed to avoid serious constitutional problems had no application there, because “[n]o matter how severe the constitutional doubt, courts may choose only between reasonably available interpretations of a text.”13 Where the words leave no narrower reading available, the court has nothing to choose between and must decide the delegation challenge on the statute as Congress wrote it. The Court also rejected the idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation by declining to exercise some of its power. That idea seemed internally contradictory, since the very choice of which portion of the power to exercise, the prescription of the standard Congress omitted, would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether a statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing on the answer.14 Even so, the Court upheld the Clean Air Act and used statutory interpretation to define its limits.15 A court narrows a statute by reading what Congress enacted, while an agency’s self-restraint rests on the agency’s own choice, which is the kind of lawmaking the doctrine is concerned with.
The canon tests the first link in what may be a chain. Congress delegates to an agency, and the agency may in turn outsource certain functions to private providers by contract, a delegation twice removed. A wide range of procurement laws specifies the procedures and rules for letting public contracts.16 A court applying the avoidance canon reads the statute that made the first grant. The major questions doctrine pursues a similar goal by other means. It functions like the nondelegation doctrine because it substantially limits the scope of existing statutes by preventing their expansion in certain contexts without new legislation, and a later section takes it up.17
The third step does the work in most problems. An answer that invokes the canon whenever a delegation looks broad has skipped the question whether the words can bear the narrower reading. An answer that treats the canon as unavailable whenever a statute is broad has skipped the question whether other provisions of the Act supply a limit.