Concept
The Legislative Veto
Nondelegation doctrine
The Legislative Veto
The modern nondelegation doctrine puts few limits on Congress's power to grant broad authority to agencies,1 which leaves Congress to look elsewhere for ways to keep control of what it hands over. One was the legislative veto: a statutory provision reserving to Congress the power to cancel an executive decision without passing a new law. When Chadha was decided, nearly two hundred such devices were on the books,2 and the Court observed that veto provisions were appearing with increasing frequency in statutes that delegate authority to executive and independent agencies.3 The appeal is easy to see. Congress could delegate generously and still hold a lever for the occasions on which it disliked the result.
The Supreme Court held the one-house version of that lever unconstitutional. Any exercise of legislative power by Congress that has the purpose and effect of altering the rights, duties, or legal relations of persons outside the legislative branch must conform to bicameralism and presentment, meaning approval by both Houses and delivery to the President for signature or veto. A one-house veto of an executive decision bypasses both steps.4
The holding sets the terms on which Congress may supervise the agencies it creates. Congress may not use a shortcut around Article I's procedure, however convenient the shortcut proves, but it may use any measure that satisfies that procedure. This section takes up the case itself, then the two separate opinions that keep its reasoning contested, and then the controls Congress retains.
INS v. Chadha
INS v. Chadha began as an ordinary immigration dispute. Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, entered the United States lawfully in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973 the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service told him he had stayed longer than permitted and was deportable.5 Chadha conceded the point and sought suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On June 25, 1974, an immigration judge ordered the deportation suspended, finding that Chadha had lived in the United States continuously for more than seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer “extreme hardship” if deported.6
Section 244(c)(2) let one House of Congress veto a suspension of that kind. Acting on a committee recommendation, the House passed a resolution that Chadha's deportation “should not be suspended.” The resolution was never submitted to the Senate or presented to the President.7 Chadha challenged the one-house veto provision,8 and the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional and severable from the rest of the Act, affirming the Court of Appeals.9
The Court started with the procedure the House skipped. Article I's prescription for legislative action, it said, “represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”10 The President's limited power to veto bills rests on the Framers' “profound conviction” that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed, and it is “beyond doubt” that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.11 The Framers also foresaw evasion by relabeling. James Madison worried that presentment might easily be avoided by calling a proposed law a “resolution” or “vote” rather than a “bill,” and a clause was added to close that gap.12
A label therefore decides nothing; the question is what the act does. Constitutional law refuses to let labels control in other settings too. A state's claim that its regulation serves health or safety does not immunize it under the dormant Commerce Clause, since otherwise states could avoid the restrictions by superficial changes in the language of the law.13
Measured by purpose and effect, the House's resolution was legislative. The one-House veto operated to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation, and without it Chadha would have remained in the United States. In the Court's words, “Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha's status.”14 The action the veto supplanted confirms the point. Neither the House nor the Senate contended that either of them, or both acting together, could require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, using legislatively delegated authority, had decided the alien should stay. That result could have been reached, if at all, only through legislation requiring deportation.15 Nor could the veto be recast as an amendment of the standards in section 244(a)(1) or a repeal of section 244 as applied to Chadha,16 because the Constitution provides no way to repeal or amend laws except through the legislative means Article I prescribes.17
Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision is no different from the original choice to delegate. Each involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way: bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.18 The Court left open whether a statute requiring Chadha's deportation would violate some other constitutional provision.19
The second question was whether the Constitution itself lets one House act alone, since an express grant would excuse the missing Senate and President. It does so in four provisions, each explicit and unambiguous, under which one House may act with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto:20
- The House of Representatives alone initiates impeachments.
- The Senate alone tries impeachments.
- The Senate alone approves or disapproves presidential appointments.
- The Senate alone approves treaties the President negotiates.
The specificity of these grants carries meaning. “[W]hen the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms.” The exceptions are “narrow, explicit, and separately justified,” none authorizes a veto of executive decisions, and they support the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied.21 Once the House's act is classed as legislative and no exception covers it, the ordinary procedure governs, and the House had not followed it.
The Court conceded the practical case for the veto and held that it could not save it. “In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President,” but the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.22 “[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.” Convenience and efficiency are not “the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government,” and the Court said its inquiry was “sharpened rather than blunted” by the growing number of veto provisions in statutes that delegate authority to executive and independent agencies.23
The Court also had to answer the argument that a delegation and a veto belong together: if agencies may make binding rules without bicameral approval, why may Congress not keep a check on them? Its reply was that Congress's authority to delegate portions of its power “provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto.” Executive action under delegated authority is bounded by the statute that authorized it, is open to judicial review if it exceeds that authority, and remains subject to Congress's power to modify or revoke the delegation by later legislation.24 A one-house veto, by contrast, “is clearly legislative in both character and effect and is not so checked,” so the need for the check Article I provides is clear.25 The reply keeps two questions apart. Whether Congress gave the Attorney General too much discretion is a nondelegation question, governed by the intelligible principle test. Chadha asks only how Congress may take back or override what it has given, and its answer is that Congress must act through the legislative process.
The facts involved a single alien, but the reasoning reaches any device that lets Congress, or one House of it, cancel an executive action with legal effect on outsiders. Chadha appeared to invalidate all of the nearly 200 legislative veto devices then on the books, and two weeks later the Court summarily upheld challenges to two more vetoes, both involving rulemaking proceedings: United States Senate v. FTC and Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council.30 Justice White, dissenting, wrote that the Court “sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a ‘legislative veto.’”31
Powell and White Opinions
Two separate opinions explain why the reach of Chadha is still debated, and neither states the law. Justice Powell concurred only in the judgment, and Justice White dissented. Each offers a theory that can be tested against new facts, but the governing rule remains the majority's: a one-house veto with the purpose and effect of altering legal rights outside the legislative branch must satisfy bicameralism and presentment.33
Powell thought the cases could be decided on a narrower ground. When Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence, he wrote, “it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers.” He would not reach the broader question whether legislative vetoes violate the Presentment Clauses.34
The record explains why he saw adjudication. A House committee reviewed 340 cases and concluded that the aliens named in the resolution did not meet the statutory requirements, “particularly as it relates to hardship.”35 Without further explanation and without a recorded vote, the House rejected the Service's determination that these six people met the criteria. On its face, Powell wrote, the action “appears clearly adjudicatory.” The House “did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria,” a decision of the type traditionally left to other branches. Even if the House only reviewed the Service's findings, it assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts.36
Three concerns supported the view that Congress should not adjudicate. The first is history. State legislatures during the Confederation had exercised judicial power, and Jefferson observed that Virginia's General Assembly had “decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy.” The Framers knew the danger of subjecting one person's rights to “the tyranny of shifting majorities.”37 They responded by vesting the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate branches and, in more specific provisions such as the Bill of Attainder Clause, by guarding against a legislature unilaterally imposing a substantial deprivation on one person.38 The second concern is the absence of safeguards. Unlike a court or an administrative agency, the House gave Chadha no right to counsel and no hearing before it acted.39 The third is the weakness of the one check that remains. The only effective constraint on Congress is political, and Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides the rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to “the tyranny of a shifting majority.”40
Powell rejected the Court's reliance on the fact that review of the suspension decision may not be committed to the courts; that reliance, he said, “misses the point.” The House still assumed a function generally entrusted to an impartial tribunal, and in effect it acted as an appellate court by overruling the Service's application of established law to Chadha. The parallel is not complete, he conceded, but the effect on Chadha's rights would not have differed in principle had he been acquitted of a federal crime and then found guilty by one House of Congress.41
Powell's theory is as narrow as his reasoning. Because his objection is to Congress deciding the rights of specific persons, it reaches a veto only when the veto has that adjudicative character. The majority's reasoning has been widely criticized, and his point is part of the criticism: the House's action might more properly have been called judicial than legislative, since it adopted no general rule and “made its own determination” that Chadha failed statutory criteria.42
Justice White shared Powell's regret about the breadth of the holding but started from the opposite premise about Article I. He warned that the Court “sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions” and said it would have been well advised to decide on the narrower ground of separation of powers, leaving for full consideration other review statutes, including those on war powers and agency rulemaking.43 His central argument is one of symmetry. By virtue of congressional delegation, he wrote, legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and executive departments without new legislation. The wisdom and constitutionality of those broad delegations “still have not been put to rest,” but the cases sanctioning them establish the point.44 From that premise he drew his conclusion: if Congress may delegate lawmaking power to agencies, “it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself.” Without a veto, agencies may issue regulations with the force of law without bicameral approval or the President's signature, so it is “not apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting test.” In both cases, he said, “it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with the Art. I requirements.”45
White also turned the majority's own definition against it. Agency rules and adjudications, he argued, “alte[r] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch” and involve “determinations of policy,” so they meet the Court's definition of legislative action. Under the majority's analysis, however, the executive branch and the independent agencies may make rules with the effect of law, while Congress, in whom the Framers confided the legislative power, “may not exercise a veto which precludes such rules from having operative force.”46
The majority's answer, developed above, is that agency action is checked by the authorizing statute and by judicial review while a one-house veto is not.47 The three opinions therefore disagree about what Article I protects. The majority treats it as controlling any action with legislative effect on outsiders. Powell reads the case as one about adjudication and declines to reach vetoes generally. White reads Article I as satisfied once the initial statutory authorization complies with it.
White's symmetry argument draws force from the delegation cases covered earlier in this chapter. The intelligible principle test rarely invalidates a delegation, so the statutory limits on which the majority relies are only as tight as courts insist. A reader who finds that doctrine lenient will feel the pull of White's contrast between lawmaking that Congress may hand over freely and a check that it may not keep.
A resolution that names persons and applies statutory criteria to them draws both the majority's rule and Powell's objection. A resolution that disapproves a general agency rule draws only the majority's rule, and White's dissent supplies the best argument against it.
Congress's Remaining Controls
Chadha closed one route to supervising delegated power and left the others open. Congress can always revoke or narrow the authority it has granted through subsequent legislation, and at times it moves quickly and explicitly to reverse or postpone controversial agency action.54 When the Food and Drug Administration tried to ban saccharin, then the only approved artificial sweetener, popular opposition was so strong that Congress imposed a moratorium on regulatory action and substituted a warning label for products containing the chemical.55 Each such measure is a statute and must clear both Houses and the President, which is the burden the veto avoided.
Congress can also shape how agencies decide without reversing any single decision. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires that any agency rule imposing high compliance costs on other governmental units or the private sector be accompanied by an extensive analysis of the rule's economic effect. The agency must consider alternative regulatory approaches and adopt the least burdensome alternative that meets the rule's objectives, or explain why it did not.56 A statute of this kind cancels nothing. It changes the inputs to every later decision and binds the agency as a limit Congress enacted.
After Chadha, Congress also turned to report-and-wait provisions. These defer the effective date of agency action so that Congress has an opportunity to pass a statute blocking the action and to secure the President's signature on it.57 The delay is all Congress gains. If it does nothing, the action takes effect on schedule, and if it wants the action stopped, the blocking measure must pass both Houses and be presented to the President like any other law.
The Congressional Review Act, adopted in 1996, is the best-known surviving device. Using expedited procedures, Congress may adopt a joint resolution of disapproval of any regulation adopted within the previous 60 days of legislative session. If the President signs the resolution, the regulation is nullified, and the agency may not reissue the rule “in substantially the same form” unless a law enacted after the resolution specifically authorizes it.58 Congress invoked the Act only once between 1996 and 2016. At the start of the Trump Administration it rejected a host of Obama Administration regulations, among them an Interior Department rule restricting disposal in streams of debris from mountaintop removal mining, which Pub. L. No. 115-5 repealed.59 The pattern fits the mechanism. Because the President must sign, a resolution aimed at the sitting administration's own rule would likely meet a presidential veto, and the device works most readily when a new administration takes office.
The Act resembles a legislative veto because Congress nullifies an agency's product, yet it lies on the other side of Chadha's line. In Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the Act from a legislative veto because its resolutions require compliance with bicameralism and presentment.60 A resolution cannot nullify a regulation unless both Houses pass it and the President signs it, so the nullification is itself a law made through Article I's process. Compare the two outcomes. Pub. L. No. 115-5 erased the Interior rule after clearing both chambers and receiving the President's signature, while the House resolution in Chadha overrode a decision to suspend one man's deportation without ever reaching the Senate or the President. Each undid an executive decision with legal effect on outsiders, and what separated them was who had to agree.61
On an exam, a fact pattern in which Congress “disapproved” an agency action therefore calls for a procedural question before any conclusion: did the measure pass both Houses and go to the President? The words resolution and disapproval appear on both sides of the line, and the expedited procedures of the Review Act change how quickly the chambers act, not whether both must act. A measure that both Houses pass and the President signs is a law and can nullify a rule. A one-house action with legal effect on outsiders is the veto Chadha struck down.