Concept
Revival of the Doctrine
Nondelegation doctrine
Revival of the Doctrine
For most of its existence, the nondelegation doctrine has had more bark than bite. Congress has enacted thousands of laws defining agency powers, some of them conferring wide authority to promulgate statute-like regulations, and the Court has not found a single violation since 1935.1 That leniency has a counterweight in Chadha. Any exercise of legislative power that alters the rights, duties, or legal relations of persons outside the legislative branch must satisfy bicameralism and presentment, so a one-house veto of executive decisions is unconstitutional.2 Courts therefore ask little of Congress when it hands power over, and they insist on Article I's procedures whenever Congress tries to take control back.
Two developments now press on that arrangement, and they work in different ways. The first attacks the intelligible principle test directly. Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy would have done away with the test, and Justice Alito, who cast the fifth vote to uphold the statute, said he would support reconsidering the Court's approach of the past 84 years if a majority were willing.3 The second leaves the constitutional test alone and works through statutory interpretation. Under the major questions doctrine, an agency claiming extraordinary power must point to clear congressional authorization,4 and that requirement substantially limits the reach of existing statutes much as a stricter nondelegation doctrine would.5
Neither development is current law in the sense an exam answer needs. A delegation problem is still analyzed under the intelligible principle test, and the dissent's framework remains a dissent. The doctrine's future, however, depends on how many Justices will adopt a stricter approach, and the Court's membership has changed since Gundy: after Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation, there might be a majority willing to reconsider.6 The three subsections that follow take up Gundy, the dissent's proposed framework, and the major questions doctrine in turn.
Gundy v. United States
Gundy v. United States left the intelligible principle test in place without a majority opinion to explain why. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, concluded that the delegation of authority to the Attorney General under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.7 Justice Alito supplied the fifth vote. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented, and Justice Kavanaugh, who had just been confirmed, took no part.8 A plurality opinion speaks for fewer than five Justices, so it resolves the case for the parties while carrying less authority than a majority opinion. Most of the argument took place before anyone applied the intelligible principle test, because the Justices first disagreed about what the statute says.
Congress enacted SORNA in 2006 because state registration statutes varied so widely that their “loopholes and deficiencies” had let over 100,000 sex offenders, about 20% of the total, escape registration.9 The Act's ordinary requirements cannot readily apply to people convicted before it took effect, many of whom were unregistered when it passed or were unable to comply with subsection (b).10 Subsection (d) of § 20913 therefore gives the Attorney General “the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter” and to prescribe rules for registering them.11 The plurality called these people pre-Act offenders and stressed that for years after 2006 most sex offenders in the country would belong to that group.12 The Attorney General used the authority in 2007 and again in 2010 to specify that SORNA's requirements apply in full to all pre-Act offenders, and that rule has not changed.13 Herman Gundy had pleaded guilty under Maryland law to sexually assaulting a minor the year before SORNA was enacted. He moved to New York after his release in 2012 without registering and was convicted of failing to register.14 He argued that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power, and every court to consider the claim, including eleven courts of appeals, had rejected it.15
The plurality began with a point of method: a nondelegation inquiry starts, and often nearly ends, with statutory interpretation.16 The reason follows from the test itself. The question is whether Congress supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegate, and a court cannot say whether a statute contains guidance until it knows what task the statute hands over and what instructions come with it. A court that skips this step is testing a statute Congress may never have written.
Gundy read subsection (d) as giving the Attorney General plenary power to require pre-Act offenders to register or not, and to change that policy for any reason at any time. The plurality accepted that such a power would raise a nondelegation question and denied that the statute confers it.17 On its reading, § 20913(d) requires the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible, and the discretion that remains extends only to considering and addressing feasibility issues.18 The plurality drew that meaning from the statute's declaration of purpose, which announces a “comprehensive national system” of registration. A system cannot be comprehensive if the Attorney General may exempt the pre-Act offenders who, for years, would make up most of the offenders.19 The legislative history pointed the same way, since Congress designed SORNA to close loopholes in state registration laws and registering pre-Act offenders was central to that effort.20
With that reading in hand, the plurality found the constitutional step easy. A delegation is valid if Congress has laid down an intelligible principle or, in a related formulation, has made clear the general policy the delegate must pursue and the boundaries of the delegate's authority.21 Those standards are not demanding. The Court has found a delegation excessive only twice, in the 1935 decisions, each time because Congress articulated no policy or standard to confine discretion, and it has upheld delegations to regulate in the “public interest,” to set “fair and equitable” prices, and to issue air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health.”22 Section 20913(d), so read, announced a policy, registering pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible, and left the Attorney General feasibility questions of an administrative and transitional kind.23 The Attorney General therefore decides how and how fast to bring a defined group into a scheme Congress chose, and does not decide whether the group belongs in it. That distinguishes this statute from the 1935 provisions, where Congress gave no policy against which to measure the delegate's choices.
The plurality added a practical reason for refusing to tighten the inquiry: if SORNA's delegation were unconstitutional, most of Government would be unconstitutional, because Congress depends on giving discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.24 No statute can anticipate every circumstance in which a policy will operate, and rolling out a registration scheme to a large existing population turns on administrative facts that Congress is poorly placed to settle in advance. A test that required Congress to settle them would invalidate ordinary statutes.
The alignment of the Justices matters as much as the reasoning. Eight Justices decided the case, and Justice Alito's vote came with a caveat: “If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”25 He did not act on that view in Gundy because no majority was then willing to take that step.26 The result was a 5–3 decision with no majority opinion, and it exposed four likely votes for a less Congress-friendly doctrine. Later developments suggest more. Justice Barrett replaced Justice Ginsburg, one of the plurality's four, and Justice Kavanaugh has since indicated willingness to join an effort to rejuvenate the doctrine, so at least five Justices, and perhaps six, may now favor reinvigorating it.27 None of that is current law. An exam answer should treat Gundy as a decision upholding the delegation under the intelligible principle test and as a signal of where the test may go.
Justice Gorsuch read the same provision very differently, and that difference accounts for the split. In his reading, SORNA lets the Attorney General apply or not apply any or all of its requirements to roughly half a million pre-Act offenders and change his mind at any time, so there is not a single policy decision about pre-Act offenders on which Congress even tried to speak.28 The government's present answer, that the statute compels registration to the maximum extent feasible, was in his words a figment of the government's very recent imagination.29 Read his way, the provision has close relatives in the 1935 cases. If letting the President draft a “code of fair competition” for slaughterhouses was “delegation running riot,” and if Congress may not give the President discretion to ban or allow interstate transportation of petroleum, then it is hard to see how Congress may give the Attorney General discretion to apply or not apply any or all of SORNA's requirements to pre-Act offenders.30
The dissent's structural objections explain why it would not let the case go. Because SORNA vested lawmaking power in one person rather than many, the resulting edicts proved frequent and shifting, with fair notice sacrificed, and Congress could claim credit for “comprehensively” addressing the problem of every existing sex offender while leaving the Attorney General to sort it out.31 The framers warned against uniting legislative and executive power in the same person, and they knew that keeping legislative power within the legislative branch could not be left to Congress's self-policing, since legislators often face rational incentives to pass problems to the executive.32 Justice Gorsuch denied that enforcing the limit would leave government helpless. Separation of powers, he wrote, is a procedural guarantee requiring Congress to assemble a social consensus, and Congress remains free to authorize executive officials to fill in even a large number of details, to find facts that trigger a rule Congress has specified, or to exercise non-legislative powers.33 Those three permissions match the traditional categories, and the next subsection develops the framework the dissent built from them.
The two opinions also rest on different views of what a stricter test would cost. The plurality saw a threat to ordinary government, because a test demanding more detail would reach every statute that leaves a judgment to an executive official. The dissent saw the opposite danger, that a lenient test lets Congress avoid the consensus-building Article I requires and puts lawmaking and law enforcement in one office. Both sides agree that Congress must supply the policy, and they part over whether it did so here. The statute's meaning is therefore the hinge: the plurality's reading controlled the judgment, and the dissent's reading shows what a failing delegation looks like in the same words.
The second step decides most problems, because the same sentence of § 20913(d) passes under one reading and raises a serious problem under the other. An answer that jumps to the intelligible principle test without first fixing what the statute lets the delegate do is testing a hypothetical statute.
Gorsuch's Proposed Test
Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy offers the most developed alternative to the intelligible principle test, and no majority has adopted it. It begins with history. J.W. Hampton established that the validity of a congressional grant of agency authority hinges on the open-endedness of the enabling act's terms, but the Court left unclear how intelligible the directive must be.35 The dissent traces the problem to a misreading of Chief Justice Taft's phrase. Taft, it argues, sought only to explain how the traditional tests operate and gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them.36 Everyone then agreed that the relevant inquiries were the lines between policy and details, between lawmaking and fact-finding, and between legislative and non-legislative functions, even when the exact lines invited reasonable debate.37 The proposal is accordingly a return to those older questions, which are the categories taught earlier in this chapter.
Two facts support that reading. Taft wrote the phrase seven years before Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, and it did nothing to alter the analysis in those cases or to prevent the challenges from succeeding by lopsided votes.38 The phrase then sat more or less silently entombed until the late 1940s, when lawyers began arguing that it had displaced all earlier teaching without anyone saying so.39 In the dissent's account, the resulting “mutated version” has no basis in the Constitution's original meaning, in history, or in the decision from which it was plucked. Judges and scholars of widely differing views have condemned it as resting on misunderstood historical foundations and as permitting delegations that on any other account would be unconstitutional.40
In place of the formula, the dissent offers three principles it finds in the framers' design, and each restates a category from earlier in this chapter:
- Congress makes the policy decisions when it regulates private conduct, and it may then authorize another branch to fill up the details. In Wayman v. Southard, the Court upheld a statute that told federal courts to borrow state procedural rules but let them make “alterations and additions.”41
- Once Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the rule's application depend on executive fact-finding. The embargo statute in Cargo of the Brig Aurora told the President to impose a trade embargo on Britain or France if the other stopped interfering with American trade.42
- Congress may assign non-legislative responsibilities where its legislative authority overlaps with authority the Constitution separately vests in another branch, so wide discretion over matters already within executive power may raise no separation-of-powers problem.43
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in 1825 that the line separating subjects the legislature must regulate itself from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made and power given to others to fill up the details, “has not been exactly drawn.”44 The first category therefore carries a line-drawing problem from the start.
The dissent then recasts the intelligible principle inquiry in terms of those principles, and its illustration is Touby v. United States. Touby upheld a provision letting the Attorney General temporarily add a substance to the list of prohibited drugs when necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety, after the Attorney General considered the drug's history and pattern of abuse, the scope, duration, and significance of the abuse, and the risk to public health.45 Whether or not one agrees with how Touby characterized the statute, the dissent says, it may have begun to point the Court back toward the right questions.46 Those questions ask whether the statute assigns the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings, whether it sets forth the facts the executive must consider and the criteria for measuring them, and, most importantly, whether Congress, and not the Executive Branch, made the policy judgments.47
The third step does most of the work, because the first two are ways of showing that Congress, and not the delegate, chose the policy. The fourth step works differently. It does not ask who chose the policy but whether the power already belonged to the executive, since wide discretion over matters within the executive's own authority raises no separation-of-powers problem.48
The two outcomes of the test appear in the examples the dissent discusses. The registration scheme shows the questions failing a statute. On the dissent's reading, the Attorney General could apply or not apply any or all of SORNA's requirements to half a million pre-Act offenders and change his mind at any time, so Congress made no policy judgment about them.49 The embargo statute shows the questions passing one. Congress wrote the embargo rule itself and made it operate only if the President found that Britain or France had stopped interfering with American trade.50 The President in that case answered a question about the world, namely whether a foreign power had ceased its interference. The Attorney General, on the dissent's reading, answered a question about policy, namely whether hundreds of thousands of people would be covered at all.
The dissent makes policy judgment the central question because of what it thinks Article I was built to secure. The framers believed the new federal government's most dangerous power was the power to enact laws restricting liberty, and they made lawmaking difficult on purpose. A proposed law had to win approval in two Houses, elected at different times, by different constituencies, and for different terms, and then gain the President's approval or survive a veto override. To the framers these procedures were bulwarks of liberty.51 A statute that announces a goal and leaves another body to write the rules removes those procedures from the decision that matters, because an official then adopts the rule restricting liberty without persuading either House. Asking who made the policy judgment is therefore a way of asking whether the hard part of lawmaking took place in Congress. The dissent adds that enforcing the limit protects the people's sovereign choice to vest the legislative power in Congress alone, and that Congress cannot be trusted to police the line itself.52
Defenders of the current approach answer with history and practice. The first Congress created the first agencies with power to issue legally binding rules and decisions, and agencies staffed by specialists who may use relatively informal procedures are better equipped than overburdened legislatures or generalist judges to solve problems that arise in implementing regulatory and benefit programs.53 The Gundy plurality gave the practical version of the same answer, that holding the delegation invalid would make most of government unconstitutional.54
Whether a majority will adopt the proposal depends on signals from other Justices. In Gundy the decisive fifth vote came from Justice Alito, who said he would support reconsidering the Court's approach but did not act because no majority then supported it.55 Justice Kavanaugh, who did not participate, has since indicated willingness to join such an effort, and one commentator expects the Court to return to serious consideration of the doctrine in the near future.56 Counting votes is a prediction, and the dissent's questions have not yet received a formal sign-off from a majority.57 The more immediate vehicle may be the major questions doctrine, which Justice Gorsuch describes as a canon of statutory construction applied in service of the constitutional rule against divesting legislative power.58
An answer to a delegation problem should keep the layers distinct. The intelligible principle test governs today, so a statute that states a general policy and boundaries passes it. The dissent's questions supply a stricter argument a challenger can add, and for a statute like the registration scheme, which the plurality sustained after reading it to require registration as soon as feasible, the two approaches can diverge on the same words.
Major Questions Doctrine
In West Virginia v. EPA the Court described the doctrine this subsection studies. In certain extraordinary cases, separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent make a court reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text the power an agency claims is hiding there. A merely plausible textual basis is not enough, and the agency must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it claims.60 That is a clear-statement rule, meaning a presumption that a statute does not reach a particular result unless Congress says so in plain terms. The earlier subsections showed that the intelligible principle test almost never invalidates a statute and that Justice Gorsuch would replace it. The major questions doctrine reaches a similar end by another route, because it substantially limits the scope of existing statutes by preventing their expansion in certain contexts without new legislation. It thus marks a change from a past when courts generally upheld broad delegations that had sufficient standards and then deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of how the statutes might be extended.61
The doctrine is nominally a canon of statutory construction, but Justice Gorsuch has explained that the Court applies it in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that power to an executive agency.62 The connection has a history. In 1980 a plurality found it “unreasonable to assume” that Congress gave an agency “unprecedented power[s]” without a clear mandate, and in the years that followed the Court routinely enforced the nondelegation doctrine through narrow constructions of statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought unconstitutional.63 The mechanism resembles the avoidance canon taught earlier in this chapter. A court that finds an agency's reading unsupported need not decide whether Congress could have written a statute that broad, and Congress remains free to respond by legislating.
The facts of West Virginia show what a claim of that size looks like. The EPA relied on section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, and the Court noted that the provision required an innovative reading of the statute, which it took as an indication that Congress had not intended that power.64 The reason lay in what the new reading did to the statute. Under the agency's prior view of section 111, its role was limited to ensuring the efficient pollution performance of each regulated source, and if a source already operated at that level, nothing more remained for the EPA to do. Under its newly discovered authority, the EPA could demand much greater reductions based on a different kind of policy judgment, that it would be “best” if coal made up a much smaller share of national electricity generation, and it could go further, perhaps forcing coal plants to shift away virtually all of their generation.65 The Court treated that as a fundamental revision of the statute, one that changed it from one sort of regulatory scheme into an entirely different kind.66
The same case supplies the contrast between an ordinary exercise of delegated power and one that triggers the doctrine. The EPA argued that it had regulated other pollutants in similar ways, but the Court found its purpose here fundamentally different. A cap-and-trade rule for mercury, for example, required polluters to change specific business practices and technology, while the claimed authority over carbon dioxide would have altered how the entire industry worked.67 The statutory words in each situation could be called broad. What changes the analysis is the size and novelty of the power the agency draws from them.
The doctrine rests on two stated bases, and each answers a different gap. The first concerns legislative intent. Agencies have only the powers Congress gives them, and enabling legislation is generally not an open book to which an agency may add pages and change the plot line, so courts presume that Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself and does not leave them to agencies.68 The second basis is structural and does the more distinctive work. A plausibility test would let an agency exploit any gap, ambiguity, or doubtful expression in a statute to assume responsibilities far beyond those the people's representatives conferred, while a clear-authorization requirement sends the question back to Congress.69 The first basis tells a court what a reasonable legislature probably meant, and the second explains why the court should insist on proof of it.
The Court has applied the doctrine across many subjects. It has used the doctrine in all corners of the administrative state, whether the issue involved an agency's asserted power to regulate tobacco products, to ban drugs used in physician-assisted suicide, to extend Clean Air Act regulations to private homes, to impose an eviction moratorium, or to enforce a vaccine mandate.70 In Gonzales v. Oregon, for example, the Attorney General asserted that he could revoke the license of a physician who prescribed a controlled substance for assisted suicide, even in a state where that was legal, and he pointed to his statutory power to revoke licenses “inconsistent with the public interest.” The Court found it unsustainable that Congress had conferred such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation.71 The cases mark significance in different ways, through the number of people or sources reached, the intrusion into an area of state law, and the novelty of the claimed power. Each also offered the agency a colorable textual hook, which is why the plausibility of the text could not decide it.
The doctrine therefore demands a different showing from the intelligible principle test. In such cases the government must show not just an intelligible principle that would justify the regulation but clear congressional authorization, and in West Virginia the Court found none.72 The OSHA vaccine-or-testing case shows the gap. One commentator argues that the intelligible principle standard was met there, unlike in the historic 1935 cases, yet a concurring opinion concluded that the delegation involved a major problem and might be unconstitutional no matter how those other tests fared.73 Satisfying the older test thus does not answer a major questions objection. The first question is whether Congress spoke clearly about the power at all.
Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in West Virginia ties the doctrine to the constitutional text. The Court has applied the doctrine for the same reason it has applied other similar clear-statement rules, to ensure that the government does not inadvertently cross constitutional lines, and the lines at stake here are no less important than those that justify the parallel rules about retroactive liability or sovereign immunity. They concern self-government, equality, fair notice, federalism, and the separation of powers.74 He traced the idea to a 1897 decision holding that a transfer of such power to an administrative body is not to be presumed from doubtful and uncertain language, when Congress could have used words clear and direct.75 The structural worry is the one the nondelegation doctrine has always raised. If Congress could divest its legislative power, legislation could become nothing more than the will of the current President or of unelected officials barely responsive to him.76 On this account the doctrine is a nondelegation rule in interpretive form.
The structure of the doctrine has a consequence for nondelegation. The doctrine tests how plainly Congress spoke, and it does not by itself forbid large delegations. Whether an express grant of vast power would survive nondelegation review is a separate question.
The amendment in that scenario returns the problem to the framework in the earlier sections, which shows that the doctrine adds a prior question and leaves the old test in place. An exam answer can follow that order.
The second step does the sorting, and the case law gives no formula for it. An argument that a power is major should rest on markers the cases have used, and an answer should avoid predicting how far the doctrine will extend. A common error is to treat any broad grant as a major question, when ordinary regulation within a long-understood reading does not trigger the rule. The opposite error is to stop at the intelligible principle test and miss that a statute can satisfy it and still fail to authorize a transformative agency claim.