Concept
Immunity From State Taxation
Federal immunity from state law
Immunity From State Taxation
McCulloch v. Maryland struck down a discriminatory state tax on the operations of the Bank of the United States, a federal instrumentality, and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity grew from that decision.1 Chief Justice Marshall's slogan that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy” announced a principle without saying how far it reached.2 Later cases answered that question in two stages: expansion, then contraction.
For more than a century the immunity grew. It began as the government's own, or primary, immunity and spread to a derivative immunity for third persons whose dealings related to governmental work, among them employees, lessees, and patentees.3 It reached secondary transactions connected with the performance of governmental functions.4 It also ran in both directions. The Court held in Collector v. Day that state activities enjoy a reciprocal immunity from federal taxation, although Marshall had indicated that his reasoning did not necessarily imply one.5 The doctrine reached its zenith when it was extended to exempt the employees of the state and federal governments.6 The logic is easy to follow. A tax on the officer who runs a federal program, or on the lessee of federal land, seems to burden the government's work at one remove, and a rule built on that thought has no natural stopping place.
The circle began to contract in the late 1930s. Helvering v. Gerhardt and Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe held that the salaries of one government's employees are not immune from income taxes imposed by the other.7 State sales taxes followed the same course of extension and retreat. Absent specific congressional legislation, the Court concluded that a state sales tax affecting federal procurement contracts is permissible if its legal incidence, meaning the legal obligation to pay the tax, falls on someone other than the federal government, even though the federal treasury may bear the economic burden.8 The question moved from who ultimately bears the cost to who is legally obliged to pay, and that move is the hinge of the modern doctrine.
Immunity survives today in a narrow form. Courts apply it sparingly to preserve the states' legitimate taxing authority, and the Court still enforces a few constitutional tax immunities, as when a state taxes federal property directly.9 Each limit is a Supremacy Clause question: whether the state's tax conflicts with federal authority.10 Three rules organize what remains. A state may not tax the United States or its property directly. A state may tax private parties who deal with the government when the legal obligation to pay falls on them, whatever the burden on the treasury. And even that tax is invalid if it discriminates against the federal government or those who deal with it. Congress can alter each rule, so the scope of federal immunity increasingly depends on what Congress has provided, a point developed in a later section.11
Direct Taxes on Federal Property
The core of the surviving immunity is the bar on taxing the United States itself.12 In United States v. New Mexico, Justice Blackmun called this the one constant of the doctrine: a state may not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, lay a tax “directly upon the United States.”13 He marked the limit as carefully as the rule. Tax immunity is appropriate in “only one circumstance,” when the levy falls on the United States itself or on an agency or instrumentality (a body through which the government acts) so closely connected to the government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities.14
That limit shows how much narrower the modern immunity is than McCulloch's language suggested. Read broadly, Marshall's principle would shield any state tax with a measurable effect on the federal government. The modern doctrine is substantially less encompassing.15 The rule therefore has two entry points. When the taxpayer is the United States or its property, no inquiry into closeness is needed, because the taxpayer is the government. When the taxpayer is anyone else, the question is practical: how independent is the taxed entity?
Consider Zandra, a private company that manages federally owned laboratories under a federal contract. Suppose Zandra buys supplies in its own name without advance federal approval, does not tell vendors that it acts for the government, and remains liable to them for the price, while the government denies that Zandra is its purchasing agent. Title to the goods passes to the government, and the government reimburses Zandra's costs, taxes included. Given the independence under which Zandra operates, a court is likely to conclude that Zandra and the federal government are separate entities, so the state may impose its sales tax on Zandra's purchases. United States v. New Mexico reached the same conclusion on similar facts.16 Title and reimbursement give the government a stake in the purchases, but they do not erase the separation in how Zandra actually operates. The next subsection returns to Zandra to ask who legally owes the tax.
Federal property is the most concrete application of the first entry point. Since McCulloch, the established rule under the Supremacy Clause is that property owned by the federal government is exempt from state and local property taxes, unless Congress expressly permits such taxation or authorizes payments in lieu of taxation.17 Van Brocklin v. Anderson is the traditional authority for exempting federally owned real property.18 Congress can move the default in either direction, because it holds power under the Supremacy Clause both to designate federal functions that states may not tax and to consent to state taxes.19
The exemption stops at the lessee. Lessees were among the derivative immunities that the 1930s cases began to cut back, and a private business that leases tax-exempt property does not share the government's immunity.21 The nondiscriminatory property-user tax imposed on such lessees merely equalizes the tax burden relative to those who lease similar facilities from non-exempt owners.22 The tax does not burden the government. It puts the lessee on the same footing as its competitors. A tax that singled out lessees of federal property for heavier treatment would fail for a different reason, taken up in the subsection on discrimination.
Compare the post office with the lessee. Both involve federal property, but the first bill goes to the sovereign and the second goes to a private business that profits from using the property. Who is asked to pay decides the outcome, and the next subsection generalizes that question.
The Legal Incidence Test
When the taxpayer is a private party that deals with the government, one question sorts the cases: on whom does the law place the obligation to pay? That obligation is the tax's legal incidence. The economic incidence is something else, namely who ends up bearing the cost after prices, wages, and reimbursement clauses have done their work. Immunity turns on legal incidence. To violate the principle, the legal incidence of the tax must fall on the federal government or its instrumentality, and it is not enough that the economic burden is passed on to the federal government.24
The line sits at legal incidence because the alternative is a blanket immunity. If economic burden controlled, every state tax that raised the government's costs would be suspect, and the broad immunity that McCulloch's language seemed to promise would return in full.25 Legal incidence marks one identifiable point, the party the statute commands to pay. Congress remains free to add protection where it wants it, because it may designate federal functions that states may not tax and may consent to state taxes.26
Apply the test to a state income tax on federal employees. The employee owes the tax, measured by the employee's own earnings, so the legal incidence falls on the employee and not on the government.27 The state may therefore tax federal salaries, as Helvering v. Gerhardt and Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe held.28 Any upward pressure on federal pay is an economic effect that the test disregards. The principle runs both ways, because state employees pay federal income tax too.29 Contractors fare no better when the tax is laid on their own receipts. In Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., a private contractor was held not immune from a state tax on gross receipts for work on a federal project on an Indian reservation.30
Sales taxes on contractors look harder, because the government visibly pays. Return to Zandra. A state sales tax that places the obligation to pay on the purchaser falls on Zandra, which buys in its own name. The government's reimbursement and its title to the goods show only who bears the economic burden, and the economic burden is irrelevant.31 Immunity could survive only if Zandra and the government were so closely tied that they could not realistically be viewed as separate, and Zandra's independence defeats that claim.32
Every fact about Zandra points toward an independent buyer: purchases in its own name, no advance approval, silence toward the vendors, personal liability for the price, and the government's denial that Zandra is its agent. The depot firm reverses each of them. Title passing to the government and reimbursement, which Zandra also had, therefore do not signal agency.
A cost-plus or reimbursement arrangement settles nothing by itself. Reimbursement shows who bears the economic burden, and the test sets that burden aside.33 An examiner who mentions reimbursement is probably testing whether you will answer with the burden instead of the incidence.
Justice Brennan's summary in South Carolina v. Baker compresses the structure: “[T]he states can never tax the United States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom it deals.”34 Legal incidence supplies the first limit in that sentence and discrimination supplies the second. A tax that passes the legal incidence test can still fail there.
Discriminatory State Taxes
A tax can pass the legal incidence test and still be invalid, because the state must also treat the federal side evenhandedly. The immunity doctrine forecloses taxes that discriminate against the federal government, its instrumentalities, its agents, or its employees.36 A state could not tax the income of federal employees if it did not impose a similar tax on the income of individuals employed by the state or in the private sector.37 Justice Brennan's formulation says the same thing: private parties who deal with the United States may be taxed even though the burden falls on the government, “as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom it deals.”38 Narrow as the modern doctrine is, this prong remains.
The two limits operate as separate gates. The first gate asks who must pay. The second asks whether the state has put the federal side at a disadvantage. A student who stops after finding that the tax falls on a private party has answered half the question. An ordinary income tax on federal salaries clears both gates, because the employee owes it and everyone else pays it too. If the state taxes federal pay but exempts the pay of its own workers, the legal incidence has not moved, since it still falls on the employee, but the state has made federal service the disfavored category.
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury supplies the standard illustration. Michigan exempted from its income tax the retirement benefits paid by state and local governments but taxed the benefits paid by the federal government. The tax fell on the retirees, so it cleared the first gate. It failed the second because the state had favored its own retirees, and intergovernmental tax immunity means that a state may not relieve only its state and local employees of taxes on retirement income while taxing all other retirement income, including that of federal employees.39
A state that taxes all retirement income at one rate, whether the payer is the state, a local government, a private employer, or the United States, stays on the valid side of the line. Federal retirees then carry exactly the burden everyone else carries.40 The two states differ in only one respect: one of them exempts its own retirees. That single exemption decides the outcome.
Congress holds power under the Supremacy Clause both to designate federal functions that states may not tax and to consent to state taxes. A tax that would otherwise discriminate can therefore stand when Congress approves it.41 The scope of that power is taken up in a later section.