Concept
Immunity From State Regulation
Federal immunity from state law
Immunity From State Regulation
The bar announced in McCulloch v. Maryland reached past taxes. Marshall wrote that the states have no power, “by taxation or otherwise,” to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws Congress enacts to carry its powers into execution, and he called that result “the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared.”1 The words “or otherwise” carry the bank case from the tax collector to the regulator, because a state command can slow federal operations as effectively as a state levy can.
Immunity from state regulation is a specialized application of preemption. The second form of conflict preemption forbids a state to enact legislation that creates “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” A state likewise may not regulate the operations of the federal government in a way that impairs or interferes with the full purposes and objectives of the federal program at issue, and any such obstacle falls under the Supremacy Clause.2 Immunity and preemption describe the same event in two vocabularies. In immunity cases the “preemptive” conflict takes the form of a tax or regulation aimed at federal activities, and under either label a true conflict ends with state law yielding to the superior federal authority.3 Gibbons v. Ogden shows the same result in the more familiar setting, where a state law gives way to a conflicting federal one.
Two questions remain. The first asks how far the immunity reaches when a state directs its commands at the federal government and those who act for it. The second asks what keeps the immunity from becoming a general exemption from state law for everyone who works for Washington. The next subsection answers the first, and the one after it answers the second.
Regulating Federal Functions
The states may not regulate the activities of the federal government unless Congress consents, so the instrumentalities and agents of the United States are immune from state regulations relating to the performance of their federal functions.4 McCulloch supplied the premise in the phrase “or otherwise”: the Court denied the states any power to retard, impede, burden, or control the operations of federal law, and it did not limit that denial to taxation.5 The leading application involves a mail truck.
In Johnson v. Maryland, a state convicted a post office employee for driving a truck without a state license, and the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that relied on McCulloch.6 Justice Holmes wrote that “the immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on.”7
Holmes’s sentence names three features of the license requirement: a halt in the work, an examination, and a fee. Each gives the state control over the federal task, because the task cannot begin or continue until a state officer is satisfied. In preemption terms, the state has set up a gate that the mail must pass through, and a gate of that kind is an obstacle to the federal program.8 The state’s purpose may be entirely sound, since roads are safer when drivers are tested, and the immunity does not turn on that. It turns on who decides whether federal work goes forward.
The immunity also protects those who work for the government. In Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, a contractor working for the federal government was held immune from a state licensing requirement.9 The federal immunity from state regulation may be claimed by those in a close relationship with the government, and, as in the tax area, its scope turns largely on congressional policy.10
The immunity attaches to the federal task and not to the person who performs it. A state requirement that does not touch the federal function binds a federal employee or contractor like anyone else.
Congress can change the result, because the immunity applies the Supremacy Clause and Congress may authorize what the clause would otherwise bar. A state regulation that would violate the immunity is upheld when a clear congressional mandate authorizes it. Congress could, for example, require Postal Service drivers to hold valid state licenses, and the requirement would then bind them. Without such a mandate, the drivers perform their duties free of the state licensing law.11 A later section returns to Congress’s power to set these boundaries.
Incidental Local Rules
Holmes limited the immunity in the same opinion that announced it. A federal employee, he cautioned, “does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment.” Where the United States has not spoken, he thought, the employee’s subjection to local law “would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment,” and his example was a statute regulating how a driver turns at street corners.13
The two kinds of state law differ in what they do to the federal work. A license requirement works as a gate: the carrier must stop performing until a state officer is satisfied, so the state controls whether the task goes forward at all. A stop-sign rule puts no gate in front of the mail. The carrier drives the same route, delivers the same letters, and obeys the sign that every other driver obeys. The immunity therefore reaches only state laws that actually prevent or significantly impair the performance of federal duties, and the working question is whether the state law interferes with the federal instrumentality’s ability to achieve its federally assigned tasks.14 Requiring a carrier to comply with local traffic regulations does not impair the delivery of mail, so the state may cite the carrier unless the federal government has specifically immunized postal drivers from that liability.15
The limit follows from the reason for the immunity. The immunity guards the federal program against state-created obstacles, and a stop-sign rule obstructs nothing. An exemption from every state rule would protect no federal task and would simply place federal personnel above ordinary traffic law. Tying the immunity to actual interference keeps it to its purpose and leaves the states their ordinary power over matters federal law has not addressed.
Applying the working question means looking at the rule’s effect in the circumstances, and the same state law can come out differently as the circumstances change.
Both scenes involve a traffic rule that binds every driver, so the label on the rule cannot decide the case. What decides it is whether compliance would interfere with the federal task. An answer that says “federal employees are immune from state law” misses the carrier, and an answer that says “general traffic laws always apply to federal employees” misses the agent. Generality is evidence that a law’s effect on federal work is incidental, but the conclusion still depends on what the law does when it meets the federal assignment.
Interference is easiest to find when the state intended it. As in the tax area, the Court is particularly alert to state regulations based on hostility to federal law.18 North Dakota v. United States is the casebook example: the state laws there were evidently meant to slow or control the federal government’s acquisition of easements for a wildlife program. A law aimed at a federal program has no incidental effect to excuse, because obstruction is its purpose, and it falls outside the general local rules Holmes described. Hostility is only the clearest evidence of interference. A well-meant state law that blocks a federal task fails for the same reason.
The incidental-law rule and the immunity are both defaults that Congress can adjust. Holmes framed the application of general local rules as operating when the United States has not spoken, and a state regulation that would otherwise violate the immunity is upheld if a clear congressional mandate authorizes it.19 A later section returns to the scope of that power.