Concept
Congress Sets the Boundaries
Federal immunity from state law
Congress Sets the Boundaries
Federal immunity from state taxation and regulation is a default rule, and Congress holds the power to change it. The immunity applies the Supremacy Clause, and under that clause Congress may designate federal functions that states may not tax and may consent to state taxes that the immunity would otherwise forbid.1 Where Congress has said nothing, the constitutional doctrine supplies the protection. Where Congress speaks, its choice controls, whether it adds protection or takes protection away. The subsections below follow each direction in turn and then explain why Congress is the right body to decide.
Adding Immunity by Statute
Courts apply the principles of federal tax immunity sparingly, to preserve the legitimate taxing authority of the states, so the judge-made immunity is narrow. A state tax whose legal incidence falls on a private party does not offend the constitutional immunity merely because its economic burden is passed on to the federal government.2 Congress is not confined to those judicially created boundaries. Under its enumerated powers, it may extend federal tax immunity by expressly preempting certain state taxes,3 and it may designate which functions of the federal government may or may not be subjected to state taxation.4
The authority for such a statute is the authority for any federal law. Congress needs an enumerated power behind the federal program, and the Necessary and Proper Clause leaves it a large discretion over the means of executing that power, so long as the means are rationally related to it.5 A protective exemption is one such means. Once enacted, the statute is federal law and prevails over a contrary state tax under the Supremacy Clause.
The scope of federal immunities increasingly depends upon Congress.6 That shift shows in First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission, where the specific McCulloch question resurfaced a century and a half after the original decision and the Court emphasized the dimensions of the statutory grant of immunity. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart. In light of the “present functions and role of national banks,” he argued, they should not be considered “constitutionally immune from nondiscriminatory state taxation,” and McCulloch and other “hoary cases” could “and perhaps should” be read as banning only discriminatory taxes.7
McCulloch itself invites the same observation. In condemning the Maryland tax, Chief Justice Marshall never acknowledged that Congress could have protected the national interests at stake by enacting a law that explicitly preempted programs such as Maryland's.8
The statute does not change what the Constitution requires; it adds a layer of federal protection above the constitutional floor. A tax that clears the legal incidence and discrimination tests can therefore still be invalid because a federal statute preempts it. On an exam, ask two questions in order: does the Constitution alone forbid the tax, and has Congress legislated to forbid it anyway?
Consent to State Burdens
Congress can also move the default the other way, because its power to consent mirrors its power to protect. A state tax that would otherwise violate the immunity, a discriminatory tax on federal personnel for example, is valid if Congress has approved it.11 (See Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).) The same is true of property taxes. Federal property is exempt from state and local property taxes unless Congress expressly permits such taxation or authorizes payments in lieu of taxation.12 In each setting, a state burden that is barred without Congress's approval becomes enforceable with it.
Consent to state regulation follows the same pattern, but the cases state how Congress must speak. A state regulation that otherwise violates the immunity will be upheld if a “clear congressional mandate” authorizes it, as Hancock v. Train put the rule. Congress could, for example, expressly require Postal Service drivers to hold valid state driver's licenses. Without such a requirement, postal workers perform their duties free from the constraints of the state licensing law.13 The demand for clarity fits what consent does. It withdraws a protection the Constitution otherwise supplies, and the standard asks Congress to say so plainly. A statute that is silent on state licensing, or speaks only to something else, supplies no mandate.
Congress may also consent by adopting state law as federal law. Among the techniques Congress uses to order relations between the nation and the states are determining the scope of intergovernmental immunities and federal incorporation or adoption of state law, either expressly or by implication, as in many areas of tax, copyright, and bankruptcy law.15 The federal assimilation of state criminal law on federal enclaves, at issue in United States v. Sharpnack, is a familiar example.16
Why Congress Controls the Default
The two directions fit together once the reason for the judicial immunity is clear. Marshall located it in a gap in representation. When a legislature taxes its own constituents, their right to vote for or against their representatives is usually “a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.” In the national legislature “all [are] represented,” so there is little reason to fear oppressive taxation of the states by the national government. A state legislature that taxes a national instrumentality stands differently, because most of the nation's voters are excluded from representation and the state has every incentive to soak the citizens of other states. Judicial intervention is justified, Marshall suggested, to prevent that predictable political result.18
Congress closes that gap whenever it is the one deciding. Every state and its people are represented in the national legislature, so a congressional decision to permit a state burden is the whole nation choosing how much of itself to expose, and a decision to forbid one is the whole protecting its own operations. Neither presents the danger of one state's legislature acting on a public that cannot vote against it.
The structure of the doctrine follows from that point. The constitutional immunity does its work where Congress has been silent, because there a state legislature's self-interest operates with no federal voice to answer it. Once Congress speaks, a court has no reason to second-guess the balance Congress struck. Marshall's reasoning also grew into a larger theory, since John Hart Ely later generalized such a justification for judicial intervention in Democracy and Distrust (1980).19 Courts supply the protection that silence leaves open, and Congress decides whether to add to it or take from it.