Concept
Why the Rule Exists
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
Why the Rule Exists
Congress holds only the legislative powers the Constitution lists, and the Tenth Amendment confirms that all other legislative power stays with the states.1 Nothing on the list authorizes Congress to issue direct orders to the governments of the states, and the anticommandeering doctrine is that omission stated as a rule.2 The earlier sections followed the rule from legislatures to executive officers to prohibitions. This section asks why the rule exists, because a rule with reasons can be applied to statutes the Court has not yet seen.
Murphy took its reasons from New York and Printz, and it offered them without attempting a complete survey.3 Three matter here:
- The rule protects liberty, because dividing authority between two governments reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse from either.4
- The rule preserves accountability, because voters know whom to credit or blame when Congress regulates itself, and lose track when a state acts only on Congress's orders.5
- The rule prevents cost shifting, because a Congress that must pay to enforce its programs has to weigh their costs, and a Congress that can conscript the states does not.6
None of the three turns the rule into an immunity for state functions. Garcia's rejection of state immunity remains good law, and the federal government may regulate many state activities, just not through commandeering.7 Justice Stone's opinion rejecting California's claim to immunity for activities in which states have traditionally engaged reasoned the same way: the plenary commerce power has no such limit, and a state can no more deny that power, once Congress has exercised it, than an individual can.8 The rule restricts the method of federal action and leaves the subjects of federal regulation alone.
The liberty reason comes first because it settles whose interest the rule serves, and that answer determines what a state's own consent can accomplish.
Protecting Liberty Through Structure
The text of the Tenth Amendment does not generate the anticommandeering limit. The amendment is essentially a tautology; what it does is confirm that federal power is subject to limits that may, in a given case, reserve power to the States, and it directs courts to ask whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.9 The anticommandeering rule is such a limitation, and Murphy's first reason explains what it protects. The rule is “one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty.”10 The Constitution does not protect state sovereignty “for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities.” It divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals, because a healthy balance of power between the two reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.11
The Framers had seen the alternative. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the authority in most respects to govern the people directly and could act only upon the States, which Hamilton, among others, called “the great and radical vice” of the Confederation. The Convention considered plans that would have preserved that structure and rejected them in favor of one under which Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over States.12 Printz read the resulting structure the same way: the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states.”13 The practical stake appears in Printz's warning that the power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it could impress into its service, at no cost to itself, the police officers of the 50 States.14 A state government that Congress may command has stopped serving as a separate check on federal power.
Because the protected interest belongs to individuals, the officials who run a state cannot give it up. If the division of authority existed for state governments as institutions, those governments could waive it. It exists for the state's people, so a governor's enthusiasm for a federal mandate does not enlarge a power that Article I never gave Congress.15 The same reasoning explains why Congress cannot disguise a command as a choice. When an instruction to take title to waste and a direct order to regulate would each exceed congressional authority standing alone, Congress cannot offer the States a choice between the two, because “a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”16
The fact that decides the case is the object of the federal command. A direct regulation of private parties leaves the division of authority intact, while an order to the state government erodes it. Exam answers go wrong when they ask whether state officials wanted the mandate, since the doctrine turns on the people's interest in a divided structure and the officials' preference does not enter into it.
Preserving Political Accountability
Voters can reward or punish only the officials they can identify, and the second reason for the rule rests on that fact. When Congress itself regulates, responsibility for the benefits and burdens of the regulation is apparent, and voters who like or dislike its effects know whom to credit or blame. When a state imposes a regulation only because Congress commanded it, responsibility is blurred.18
New York described the distortion from the other side. If a federal command to regulate stood, state officials might bear the brunt of public disapproval while the federal officials who devised the program stayed insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Adherence to the rule keeps those choices in full view of the public, so that the proper lawmakers, state or federal, suffer the consequences if the decision proves detrimental or unpopular.19
Printz put the mechanism in concrete terms. The Government argued that requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does not diminish anyone's accountability, and the Court answered that the argument fails on its own terms. Under the Brady Act, the local chief law enforcement officer, not some federal official, stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of the gun, and that officer will likely be blamed for any error, even one in the designated federal database, that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected.20 The purchaser turned away at the counter sees only the local officer saying no. The faulty record sits in a federal system that the purchaser has never encountered and that Congress designed, so blame falls on the official within reach, who did not write the rule that produced the rejection.
Cost plays no part in this harm. Printz observed that even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and its defects.21 A command can therefore offend the accountability reason although it costs the state nothing, and a task that leaves the officer no discretion offers the state no safe harbor.
Direct federal regulation keeps responsibility visible even when it overrides what a state's voters want, because the federal officials who made the choice answer for it. Exam answers often defend a federal mandate by pointing out that the state legislature voted for it, so that voters know who acted. That argument has the mechanism backward: a vote cast only to satisfy a federal command is the blurred responsibility the rule exists to prevent.
Preventing Cost Shifting
The third reason concerns money. The anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.23 If Congress enacts a law and requires enforcement by the Executive Branch, it must appropriate the funds needed to administer the program, and that obligation pressures it to weigh the program's expected benefits against its costs. If Congress could compel the States to enact and enforce its program, it would not have to perform that analysis.24
Printz stated the political side of the same point. By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for “solving” problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.25 The Court's warning that federal power would be augmented immeasurably if Congress could impress state police officers into service “at no cost to itself” describes the same temptation.26
Congress has recognized the problem in its own procedures. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 was designed “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State . . . governments without adequate Federal funding.” Members may raise a point of order against a pending bill that contains an unfunded mandate of over $50 million, and the mandate may not then be enacted unless the Members make an explicit decision to proceed anyway.27 That procedure makes cost shifting visible, but it still leaves Congress free to choose it. The constitutional rule works differently, because it limits Congress's Article I power, and a vote therefore cannot unlock a command to state officers.28
Cost explains the rule without defining it. Murphy called the distinction between “affirmative” commands and prohibitions empty, a matter of happenstance, because the basic principle, that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures, applies in either event.29 A prohibition on state action may cost a state little to obey, yet Murphy treated it as a forbidden direct order. A challenge therefore does not turn on proving that a particular order actually cost the state money, and a defender of a federal command cannot win by showing that the burden was light.
Congress still has lawful ways to get what it wants. It can run a program through federal officers, and then it must appropriate the money and weigh the costs against the benefits.30 Offers of money to the states raise their own limits, which the later section on coercive funding conditions takes up. An answer that defends an unfunded federal command by noting its low cost, or by noting a governor's support for it, asks the wrong questions. The question is whether Congress or the state will pay for the program, and whether Congress had to face that price before it chose to spend.