Concept
Source of the Doctrine
Negative implications of the commerce clause
The Dormant Commerce Clause
Source of the Doctrine
The Commerce Clause is phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, yet the Supreme Court has long read it to restrain the states. In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, the Court explained that the Clause has a “negative” aspect that denies the states the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.1 No sentence of the Clause says so. The limit is inferred from a grant of power to Congress, and it operates while Congress leaves that power unused, which is why the doctrine is called the dormant (or negative) Commerce Clause.
Oregon Waste shows the inference at work. Oregon’s legislature imposed a surcharge on every person who disposed of out-of-state-generated solid waste in an Oregon disposal site, and the Environmental Quality Commission set it at $2.25 per ton.2 In-state solid waste paid $0.85 per ton, so the fee that applied to any shipment turned on one fact: whether the waste was generated out of state. The Court deemed the surcharge discriminatory on its face.3 Oregon argued that the surcharge only recouped the cost of disposing of out-of-state waste. That purpose did not matter, the Court answered, because the justification for a law has no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory, and a differential charge that favors shippers of Oregon waste over shippers of waste from other states patently discriminates against interstate commerce.4 The next section takes up that threshold inquiry.
The inference answers a problem the founding generation had already lived through. When victory relieved the colonies of the pressure for solidarity that war had exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between the states began. In Story’s account, each state would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial view, and that tendency threatened at once the peace and safety of the Union.5
Congress could police such laws by statute, but restraints on interstate commerce are “individually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters.”6 Nor can the courts of one interested state referee the dispute. In a unified national economy, differing state environmental laws can impede commerce, yet states often lead in that field because of pressing local problems, and neither the regulating state nor the affected states can provide a neutral forum. The federal courts have therefore emerged as the tribunals in which these conflicting interests are assessed.7
The doctrine is easy to mistake for preemption, and one fact separates the two: whether Congress has acted. Where Congress has used its commerce power to enact federal legislation, any conflicting state law falls under the Supremacy Clause and the principles of preemption.8 Where Congress is silent, having taken no action, express or implied, to make federal policy on the subject, the objection to the state law rests entirely on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.9 The first question on any fact pattern is therefore whether a federal statute speaks to the subject. If one does, analyze preemption. If none does, analyze the dormant Commerce Clause, which the rest of this chapter develops.
Because the Court infers the limit from silence, Congress keeps the last word. A decision under the dormant Commerce Clause can be read as identifying a federal policy that states should not regulate interstate commerce in this way, so Congress may by ordinary statute declare such regulations consistent with federal policy.10 Together with preemption rulings, these are the only constitutional decisions of the federal courts that Congress may reverse by ordinary statute. The override is real but not free: a judicial invocation of the doctrine still shifts the burden of inertia, because Congress must act affirmatively to restore the invalidated law.11
Other constitutional limits on the states do not bend that way. A federal statute purporting to authorize the states to make treaties or coin money would exceed Congress’s power, and Congress could neither waive the Article IV guarantee of privileges and immunities nor undo the Supremacy Clause.12
A different claim does not depend on congressional silence. When a state or local government discriminates against out-of-staters with regard to a fundamental right or important economic activities, a challenge can be brought under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, §2, so the dormant Commerce Clause is not the only route against such laws.13
Not every Justice accepts the inference. In a 1997 dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, argued that no valid textual or other justification supports the doctrine. At most, the dissent said, the clause should strike down discriminatory state taxes on interstate or foreign commerce, and beyond that the task of protecting interstate commerce from state interference belongs exclusively to Congress.14 The objection has resurfaced in later cases such as United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority. Its core is simple: to the extent Congress does not exercise its authority, the Constitution does not limit the states’ power to regulate commerce, and “the States are free to set the balance between protectionism and the free market.” The critics add that the negative Commerce Clause instead gives nine Justices the power to decide that balance.15 A narrower criticism targets the doctrine’s expansive reach. One separate opinion would have refrained from the “more expansive analysis” that finds a law unconstitutional because it controls beer pricing in surrounding states, reasoning that innumerable valid state laws affect pricing decisions in other states, even so rudimentary a law as a maximum price regulation.16 That debate returns under Extraterritorial Regulation. For exam purposes, treat these views as background. The Court’s decisions, Oregon Waste among them, apply the doctrine, and so should you.