Concept
Even-Handed Laws and Balancing
Negative implications of the commerce clause
Even-Handed Laws and Balancing
A state law that treats in-state and out-of-state interests alike travels a more forgiving track than a discriminatory law, and the track usually decides the case. The Court’s balancing is not the same in every dormant Commerce Clause case; it varies with whether the law discriminates against out-of-staters or treats both groups alike.1 Against a discriminatory law the presumption is strong, and the law survives only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose.2 The state carries the burden there: once discrimination is shown, on the face or in practical effect, it must demonstrate that the law serves a legitimate local purpose that available nondiscriminatory means could not serve as well.3 For an even-handed law the presumption reverses, and the law stands unless its burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits.4
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. supplies the test for that second track. A discriminatory restriction is virtually per se invalid; a nondiscriminatory regulation with only incidental effects on interstate commerce is valid unless “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”5 The formula covers a state law that “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,” and six Justices have reaffirmed it.6 Courts apply it with relative deference and strike down such laws only when the burdens clearly exceed the public-regarding benefits.7 The harsher track also has exceptions, because “virtually” does not mean “always.” The Court upheld, 8–1, a ban on importing out-of-state baitfish after deferring to the district court’s findings and holding that the ban served a legitimate environmental purpose.8
The political check behind deference
The gap in scrutiny rests on a political logic. A law that falls equally on residents and nonresidents burdens people who were represented in the process that produced it, so an inner political check lessens the need for active judicial review; a parochial scheme that favors locals and disproportionately burdens nonresidents has no such check.9 The Court has leaned on the same representation-reinforcement theme before. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., it stressed that the challenged law created problems for a number of local interest groups.10 In the Court’s words, “the existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act” is “a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.”11
Deference stops short of immunity, however. Most state legislation is neither proprietary nor discriminatory and is less suspect than a facially discriminatory law, but two risks remain. A state may legislate without adequately weighing the effect elsewhere, because consumers and businesses in other states have no electoral power in it, and a state may use apparently nondiscriminatory legislation as a covert means of burdening out-of-state businesses.12 North Carolina’s apple-grade statute shows why the first question in any balancing problem examines consequences as well as text. It reached all closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the state and expressly prohibited any grade other than the applicable U.S. grade. Its obvious consequence, though, was to bar the display of Washington State grades on apples shipped in, and it handed Washington’s apple industry a marketing problem of potentially nationwide significance.13
Weighing burdens and benefits
A court measures burden against the legal landscape in other states. In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., Illinois required every truck operating in the state to carry a special contour mudflap, and the burden on interstate commerce depended on what other states required. Had every other state demanded the same device, the burden would have been de minimis; because none did, and one state barred its use, the burden was substantial.14 Compliance cost alone does not carry the day. Bibb noted that if the only issue were the interstate carrier’s cost of adjusting to new safety regulations, the Court would have sustained the law.15
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona shows a second kind of burden, the spillover of one state’s rule onto a national system. The trial court found that long trains were standard practice throughout the United States and that about 93 percent of Arizona’s freight traffic and 95 percent of its passenger traffic was interstate. The train-limit law required the railroad to haul over 30 percent more trains in Arizona, and trains had to be broken up at the border or cut to the lowest limit of any state on their route, so that Arizona’s law “often controls the length of passenger trains all the way from Los Angeles to El Paso.”16 Cost was not the ground of decision. The decisive comparison was the minimal evidence supporting the safety rationale against the onerous burden on interstate movement, and the burdens exceeded the benefits of local safety.17 Justice Black dissented, reading the Court as deciding only that shorter trains would raise the cost of railroad operations and finding no doubt that many employees had been seriously injured and killed because of “slack movement” in trains.18 A disagreement over one record previews the objection to judicial weighing that resurfaced in Ross.
The benefit side is where a state’s justification gets tested. In Pike itself, Arizona’s tenuous interest in having a company’s cantaloupes identified as Arizona-grown could not constitutionally justify requiring the company to build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the state.19
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. tests both variables at once. Iowa barred trucks longer than 55 feet from its highways, and the challenging trucking company proved that 65-foot trucks, which many surrounding states permitted, were as safe as 55-foot trucks. A 65-foot limit would therefore have given Iowa the same safety benefit while substantially reducing the burden on interstate commerce, and the plurality, in an opinion by Justice Powell, held that the 55-foot limit violated the dormant Commerce Clause because Iowa derived no more benefit from it than from a longer limit.20 The Court did not accept Iowa’s safety label at face value. The statutory exemptions, their history, and the arguments Iowa advanced all suggested that the deference traditionally accorded a state’s safety judgment was not warranted, and because Iowa imposed the burden without any significant countervailing safety interest, the statute fell.21 This search for a less burdensome alternative contrasts with the deference to a legislature’s choice among regulatory means that South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. reflects.22
That alternatives inquiry differs from the one on the discrimination track. A discriminatory law burdens out-of-state interests more heavily than local ones, and a state could cure the discrimination by increasing the burdens on local commerce or by reducing the burdens on interstate commerce. Only the second cure also lightens the law’s burden on interstate commerce, so a less discriminatory alternative may or may not be a less burdensome one.23
Balancing sometimes yields no answer at all. In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, an ordinance required all milk sold in the city to be pasteurized at a plant within five miles, a rule the city defended as a health measure because its two inspectors could not cover a larger area. The ordinance excluded all milk processed in other states, a tremendous burden, yet the health benefit was also considerable, since only safe milk would be sold there. With both sides heavy, the balancing test was inconclusive, and the Court invalidated the ordinance on other grounds without mentioning it.24
Across these cases a pattern emerges. The laws that fail the balance pair a heavy burden with a thin local benefit: a mudflap rule that collided with other states’ laws, a train limit backed by minimal safety evidence, a packing-plant mandate justified by a tenuous interest, and a truck limit that bought no more safety than a longer one. Where both sides are heavy, as in Dean Milk, the test may not resolve the case. That is one reason challengers press discrimination first, since laws that discriminate facially, intentionally, or in effect are virtually assured of invalidation, while laws that merely burden commerce are much more likely to survive.25
Ross and the limits of balancing
The settled formula now carries a caution from National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023), a challenge to a state ban on the in-state sale of pork from pigs confined in a cruel manner. The challengers urged an extraterritoriality principle that would prohibit virtually all state laws having the “practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even absent intentional discrimination against out-of-state economic interests. The Court emphatically rejected that “almost per se” rule, because it would undermine numerous state laws that necessarily affect behavior outside the enacting state, such as tax laws and health and safety laws, which may cause individuals and companies to relocate.26
On balancing, the Justices divided. Justice Gorsuch, joined in this part only by Justices Thomas and Barrett, concluded that courts lack the power and the practical ability to weigh economic costs against non-economic benefits. He borrowed Justice Scalia’s image: “The task is like being asked to decide whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”27 The fractured Court upheld the law on the narrow ground that the complaint failed to allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Six Justices nonetheless reaffirmed the Pike principle, so it remains good law even though the Court is divided over whether and how to apply the balancing test to nondiscriminatory statutes.28
Rejecting an extraterritoriality rule does not make a state’s reach beyond its borders irrelevant. The Court has squarely rejected New York’s argument that the Twenty-first Amendment saved a liquor statute from the Commerce Clause.29 The Amendment gave New York considerable authority to regulate the domestic sale of alcohol, but it did not immunize a statute that regulates alcohol sales in other states, and the conclusion that the New York law regulated out-of-state sales conclusively resolved the Twenty-first Amendment issue against the state.30 The extraterritorial and Twenty-first Amendment sections below take up those problems. Ross itself left Pike standing while leaving open how far courts will weigh costs against benefits.
Applying the test
Consider a state that requires every truck on its highways to carry a particular rear-axle device that no other state requires and that one neighboring state forbids. The state defends the rule as a safety measure, and it applies identically to local and out-of-state carriers. If step one finds no discrimination, Pike governs, and the burden is substantial for the reason it was in Bibb: the rule collides with the law of other states. If the challenger can show that the device adds little or no safety, the thin benefit set against that burden leaves the law vulnerable, as in Southern Pacific. If the state instead proves a measurable safety gain, both sides of the scale are heavy, the balance may prove inconclusive as it did in Dean Milk, and the challenger does better to look for discrimination in effect or purpose, or for an equally effective alternative that burdens commerce less. On an exam, argue discrimination first, then argue Pike by pairing a heavy burden with a thin benefit, and flag the Ross uncertainty.