Concept
Extraterritorial Regulation
Negative implications of the commerce clause
Extraterritorial Regulation
The two analyses taught above both start from how a state law treats commerce that touches the state. A discriminatory law meets a strong presumption against it and survives only if it is necessary to achieve an important purpose; a nondiscriminatory law is presumed valid and falls only if its burdens on interstate commerce outweigh its benefits.1 A separate line of cases asks a different question: whether a state has reached past its borders to govern transactions that belong to other states. Healy v. The Beer Institute, Inc. is the leading example. The Court held there that Connecticut's beer price-affirmation statute was an impermissible extraterritorial regulation under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the Twenty-first Amendment.2
The Connecticut statute required out-of-state shippers to affirm that their prices were no higher than the prices charged in the border states as of the moment of affirmation.3 Connecticut defended the law as a way to secure the lowest possible prices for its own consumers, and the Court allowed that this might be a legitimate justification.4 The trouble lay in the statute's reach, which tied what a brewer could charge in Connecticut to what it charged in other states.
Healy gathered the Court's earlier cases on the extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation into propositions that mark the reach of the doctrine. At a minimum, those cases stand for two:5
- The Commerce Clause precludes applying a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside the state's borders, whether or not that commerce has effects within the state. A state therefore may not adopt legislation whose practical effect is to establish a scale of prices for use in other states.
- A statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the state exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting state's authority. It is invalid whether or not the legislature intended that extraterritorial reach.
These propositions reflect two concerns the Court named: the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limits on interstate commerce, and the autonomy of each state within its own sphere.6 Because the second proposition makes intent irrelevant, the statute's practical effect decides the question. Healy measured that effect in two ways beyond the text of the statute: by how the statute worked alongside the laws of other states, and by what would follow if other states adopted similar laws.7
In Healy, the extraterritorial control came from the interaction of Connecticut's law with the laws of its neighbors. New York required promotional discounts to remain in effect for 180 days, and Connecticut treated a promotional discount as a reduction in price.8 A brewer could therefore offer a promotional discount in New York only by locking in the discounted New York price as the ceiling on its Connecticut prices for the full 180 days.9 The Connecticut statute never literally forbade a brewer to lower its out-of-state prices, but read together with other states' laws it made lowering them legally impossible, and a brewer could escape only by ceasing to do business in Connecticut.10 As a practical matter, the statute regulated sales that took place wholly outside Connecticut.
The Court also asked what would happen if other states copied Connecticut. If a significant group of states enacted contemporaneous affirmation statutes linking in-state prices to the lowest price in any state in the country, the short-circuiting of pricing decisions based on local conditions would be carried to a national scale. Regional or national regulation of the pricing mechanism for goods, the Court said, is reserved by the Commerce Clause to the federal government and may not be accomplished piecemeal through the extraterritorial reach of individual state statutes.11
Healy applied principles drawn from older cases. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., New York set minimum prices for milk and barred the sale of milk bought in Vermont for less, and Justice Cardozo wrote that New York had “no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there.”12 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority carried the principle to liquor. Under the New York statute in that case, a distiller that had posted prices in New York was not free to change its prices elsewhere in the United States during the relevant month, and the Court held that forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one state before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce.13 New York could regulate liquor sold within its borders and could seek low prices for its residents, but the Commerce Clause barred it from projecting its legislation into other states by regulating the price to be paid for liquor there.14
Healy rests on more than the extraterritorial reasoning. It followed Brown-Forman in rejecting the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense: the Amendment gives a state considerable authority over the domestic sale of alcohol but does not immunize it from the Commerce Clause's bar on statutes that regulate alcohol sales in other states.15 The Court also found that the Connecticut statute discriminated against interstate commerce. The affirmation requirement applied only to brewers and shippers that sold in Connecticut and in at least one border state, while a brewer selling only in Connecticut remained free to charge wholesalers whatever price it chose. That treatment created a substantial disincentive to engage in interstate commerce, penalizing Connecticut brewers that sought border-state markets and out-of-state shippers that sold in both places.16 Granholm v. Heald later grouped Brown-Forman and Healy among the decisions that invalidated state liquor regulations under the Commerce Clause, and it noted that Healy explicitly relied on the discriminatory character of the Connecticut statute.17 Healy's result therefore never rested on extraterritoriality alone, a point that matters again in the Court's 2023 treatment of these cases below.
Separate opinions in Healy marked the line that later cases would draw. A concurring opinion would have refrained from the more expansive analysis that struck the law down because it controls beer pricing in the surrounding states, calling that rationale unnecessary and questionable. It observed that innumerable valid state laws affect pricing decisions in other states, even so rudimentary a law as a maximum-price regulation.18 A dissent argued that a distributor that considers the Connecticut law when setting prices in Massachusetts, or when offering a discount in New York, is under no legal obligation to do so, and that it was arbitrary to strike the law down because, together with neighboring laws, it might require a brewer to plan its pricing somewhat farther in advance.19 Both opinions press the same distinction, between a law that governs out-of-state conduct and a law that merely gives out-of-state sellers a reason to adjust it. The two requirements taken up next build that distinction into the doctrine.
Read carefully, Brown-Forman and Healy suggest that a state law is a forbidden extraterritorial regulation only if it meets two requirements. First, the law must in fact prohibit, mandate, or control out-of-state behavior through the threat of legal sanctions, rather than merely influence that behavior for economic reasons. Second, its legal impact must fall on a transaction that occurs wholly outside the state, not one that is partly related to the state.20 The first requirement separates control from influence. An economic incentive to comply with respect to out-of-state activities does not suffice, and the extraterritorial regulatory effect must be proven, not merely speculative.21 A law that is rationally related to a legitimate goal can still fall if, in practical effect, it regulates commerce wholly outside the state, and it is then invalid per se whether or not the legislature intended that effect.22
The affirmation laws met both requirements. Read with the other states' pricing rules, they left a seller no lawful way to lower out-of-state prices except by leaving the Connecticut market, and the transactions they controlled were sales that took place wholly in other states.23 A law that falls short on either requirement looks different.
Had the state instead ordered sellers to refrain from the pesticide on all of their crops, including crops sold only in other states, both requirements would be met, and the law would be invalid as applied to that wholly out-of-state farming.24
Lower courts have applied the same line. In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, the Ninth Circuit rejected an extraterritoriality challenge to California's low-carbon fuel standard. The standard said nothing at all about ethanol produced, sold, and used outside California, did not require other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal standards before their ethanol could be sold in California, made no effort to ensure that ethanol prices were lower in California than elsewhere, and imposed no civil or criminal penalties on noncompliant transactions completed wholly out of state.25 The Tenth Circuit likewise rejected an extraterritoriality challenge to Colorado's renewable portfolio standard.26 It reasoned that the doctrine should be limited to price control or price affirmation statutes that link in-state prices with those charged elsewhere and discriminate against out-of-state interests.27
The Supreme Court turned aside a similar attack in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh. The district court had found that a Maine Medicaid drug law violated the principle of Baldwin because it limited the revenue manufacturers could realize on out-of-state sales to drug wholesalers. The Supreme Court rejected that analysis: unlike the law in Baldwin, the Maine law did not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain price, so it did not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction.28
The line between legal control and economic effect took on new weight in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023). California had banned the in-state sale of whole pork meat from pigs confined in a cruel manner, with detailed requirements such as minimum cage dimensions, even if the pigs were confined in another state.29 California imports most of the pork it consumes, so the producers argued that most of the compliance costs, including substantial new capital investments by some processing firms, would fall on out-of-state firms.30
The Justices all agreed that the ban did not facially and purposefully discriminate, because in-state and out-of-state producers were equally burdened.31 The producers therefore relied on what they called an extraterritoriality doctrine, an “almost per se” rule against state laws that have the practical effect of controlling commerce outside the state, even when the laws do not purposely discriminate.32
The Court rejected the rule. The producers said it followed from Healy, Brown-Forman, and Baldwin, but a close look at those cases revealed nothing like it, because, in the Court's words, “each typifies the familiar concern with preventing purposeful discrimination against out-of-state economic interests.”33 The Court also gave a structural reason: an almost per se rule would undermine numerous state laws that necessarily affect behavior outside the states that enact them, such as tax laws and health and safety laws, which may lead individuals and companies to relocate.34 That reasoning echoes the Healy concurrence's concern about the innumerable valid state laws that affect pricing in other states. The Court did not minimize the role of territory and sovereign boundaries in the federal system, but it declined to treat every question about a state's projecting its power beyond its borders as governed by an almost per se rule under the dormant Commerce Clause.35
Ross therefore reads Healy through the lens of discrimination. The laws in Brown-Forman and Healy were designed to remove the competitive advantage that sellers in other states enjoyed, so that local buyers would be discouraged from shopping outside the state, which is a form of economic protectionism.36 Discrimination can be found in a law's means as well as its ends. As City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey put it, “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”37 After Ross, a challenge that rests only on a law's out-of-state practical effects has no freestanding basis in the Court's current account. It must be framed as discrimination, which draws a strong presumption against the law, or, if the law is even-handed, as a claim that its burdens outweigh its benefits.38 A student should not carry away a broad rule that a state law is invalid whenever it affects commerce elsewhere. What remains is the narrow recognition that a state may not directly fix or tie the terms of wholly out-of-state sales, and the safest way to use Healy on an exam is as a discrimination case that also shows what control of out-of-state prices looks like.
An exam fact pattern in which a state bans the in-state sale of a product made by methods the legislature disapproves, so that out-of-state manufacturers must change how they work to keep selling there, calls for the Ross analysis. The law regulates sales within the state, and its pull on producers elsewhere comes from their wish to keep selling there. That is the extraterritoriality theory the Court rejected, so the arguments that remain are discrimination and, for an even-handed law, the balancing of burdens against benefits. A statute that instead ties the price of in-state sales to what the seller charges elsewhere, and so leaves the seller no lawful way to change out-of-state prices, is the Healy pattern and should be argued as both extraterritorial control and discrimination.