Concept
The Supremacy Clause
Supremacy clause and preemption
Federal Supremacy Over State Law
The Supremacy Clause
Article VI, clause 2 makes the Constitution, the federal laws made in pursuance of it, and treaties made under national authority “the supreme Law of the Land,” and it binds the judges in every state to that law “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”1 The clause is a rule of priority. When two valid sources of law collide, it tells a court that the federal one controls, even over a provision of a state’s own constitution.2 It gives Congress no power to legislate. Congress must find that power in a grant elsewhere in the Constitution, such as the commerce power, before any federal law exists to be supreme.3 Without the rule, each state could control what the Constitution defines as the business of the nation as a whole.4
Every supremacy problem therefore raises two questions, in a fixed order. First, does valid federal law exist, meaning law within the powers the Constitution grants Congress? If Congress exceeded its authority, its act has no priority over state action despite the clause. Second, did Congress intend that law to supersede the state policy in dispute? Congress often acts with no intent to preempt state policy-making, or with intent to preempt only on a limited set of issues.5
The two questions also mark the border between two bodies of doctrine. When Congress has validly acted, the issue is preemption of the state or local rule. When Congress has not acted, or a court decides that federal law leaves the state rule alone, the state rule faces other limits, chiefly the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.6 This section takes up the first question. The sections that follow take up the second, which is the law of preemption.
The order matters because supremacy is conditional. A federal measure that exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers outranks nothing, and a state law that contradicts it keeps full force. A student who asks at once whether the two rules conflict may be analyzing a conflict that does not exist. The three subsections below therefore build the threshold in turn: the clause’s text and the hierarchy it creates, Marshall’s explanation of why the hierarchy holds, and the limits on what counts as supreme federal law.
Text and Hierarchy
The clause names three kinds of supreme law, and its wording for each says what it takes to qualify. Federal statutes must be “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, and treaties must be “made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,” a phrase that reaches treaties already in force at adoption as well as later ones.7 The Constitution itself needs no qualifier. The phrase “in Pursuance” is the textual hook for the limit on federal supremacy taken up at the end of this section: a purported law that was not made in pursuance of the Constitution never enters the supreme tier.
Federal law that does qualify outranks every conflicting state source. Article VI creates a hierarchy in which federal law from any federal source — statutory, regulatory, or judicial — is superior to any conflicting state law,8 and the clause’s closing phrase, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” carries that rule into a state’s own constitution.9 Gibbons v. Ogden applied the rule when it held that New York could not prevent federally licensed vessels from engaging in the coastal trade on its navigable waters. The state law purporting to do so conflicted with a valid federal law and was void.10
The ranking presupposes a federal rule to rank. If Congress prohibits the importation of elephants, Kansas may not authorize its state fair to import them from Kenya, and the state authorization yields. If Congress has said nothing about road construction, a Kansas requirement that public roads be built of Kansas-made yellow bricks meets no federal rule, and the clause has nothing to apply. A challenge to that requirement must rest on another doctrine, the dormant commerce clause, which courts invoke against state laws that discriminate against or unduly interfere with interstate commerce even when Congress has made no policy on the subject.11 An answer that calls a state law “void under the Supremacy Clause” without naming a valid federal law and showing the collision has skipped the analysis.
The clause also reaches the people who apply the law. It binds the judges in every state, and the sentence that follows extends an oath to support the Constitution to state legislators and to the executive and judicial officers of both governments.12 In Dodge v. Woolsey, the Court read the oath as added to make supremacy “more complete, impressive, and practical,” so that there would be “no escape from its operation” and its binding force on the states and on members of Congress would be unmistakable.13 Printz v. United States described the resulting duty of all state officials as a duty to enact, enforce, and interpret state law so as not to obstruct federal law, and it treated every state action that does obstruct, even a legislative act, as invalid.14 For state courts the duty is concrete. Testa v. Katt held that the clause required state courts to treat the laws of the United States as laws of the state rather than as laws of a foreign government, and it concluded that whether to enforce the federal claim was a policy judgment for Congress to make and for state courts to accept as supreme federal law.15
Treaties sit in the same tier. The clause lists them beside statutes and does not rank one against the other. In Ware v. Hylton, the Court held that the 1783 Treaty invalidated state laws that would impede British creditors from collecting their debts, including state laws enacted before the Treaty, and it recognized that some treaties are addressed to the legislative and executive branches while others are addressed specifically to the judiciary.16 A treaty reaches state law only as domestic law, and whether it operates as domestic law by itself depends on whether it is self-executing. A self-executing treaty establishes enforceable domestic law without further action by Congress, while a non-self-executing treaty requires legislative implementation before its provisions have any effect as domestic law. Which kind a treaty is turns on interpretation.17
A state law that loses is simply void. Where federal law preempts, the state law is supplanted, just as it would be if it conflicted with a provision of the Constitution.18 The text of the clause goes no further. It declares that federal law wins a clash and says nothing about when a clash exists, and the answer can turn on a state law’s effect on federal authority. In one dispute over state sanctions on a foreign regime, the sanctions were immediate and perpetual, with no termination provision. The Court found that they undermined the President’s intended statutory authority, because he had less economic and diplomatic leverage when he chose the discretionary action open to him.19
Courts answer both questions the clause leaves open. They decide whether a federal statute is valid, since Marbury v. Madison concluded that federal courts have the power and the duty to determine the constitutionality of federal statutes.20 They also decide what Congress meant the statute to displace, the subject of the preemption doctrines below.
Marshall's Foundations
The working meaning of Article VI’s single sentence comes largely from two opinions by Chief Justice Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).22 Neither breaks ground beyond what the text of the clause makes evident. Both affirm, in confident and enduring rhetoric, federal supremacy within the sphere of constitutionally granted federal powers, and the essence of that principle is that no state may transgress the norms of the Constitution or interfere with the constitutional exercise of federal authority.23 The two cases also supply the two doctrinal categories that organize the field: preemption of conflicting state law, which Gibbons illustrates, and federal immunity from state taxation or regulation, which McCulloch illustrates.24
In McCulloch, Maryland imposed a tax on the federally chartered Bank. The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Marshall, first upheld the Bank as within Congress’s enumerated powers and then held that states were categorically forbidden from taxing branches of the Bank within their borders.25 The order of the two holdings matters. Supremacy attaches only to valid federal law, and the Bank’s constitutionality was the premise of everything that followed.
Marshall rested the second holding on three propositions: that a power to create implies a power to preserve; that a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to and incompatible with the powers to create and to preserve; and that where this repugnancy exists, the authority that is supreme must control, not yield to the one over which it is supreme.26 Applied to taxation, the propositions yielded the rule that the states “have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.” The Court called that rule “the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared.”27
The reasoning has a structural core. Any one state may be willing to control the operations of the federal government, but no state is willing to allow the others to control them, so on the subjects on which the nation can act, it must bind its component parts. Marshall added that the question was not left to reason alone: the people decided it in express terms, by making federal law supreme and by requiring state legislators and executive and judicial officers to swear fidelity to the Constitution.28
Gibbons put the same supremacy in its conflict form. A state law that conflicts with a valid federal law is void, and the word “valid” carries weight, because the federally licensed vessels could prevail over New York’s law only if Congress could regulate their navigation.29 Marshall rejected a narrow definition of commerce because it “would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations.” Commerce includes navigation as well as trade, and more: “Commerce undoubtedly is traffic,” Marshall acknowledged, “but it is something more: it is intercourse.”30
The two categories overlap so heavily that the labels are nearly interchangeable. McCulloch could be described as a case in which the federal law chartering the bank preempted Maryland’s tax, and the federal licensee in Gibbons could be described as immune from the restrictions of state law.31 Immunity is a specialized preemption in which the conflict takes the form of a tax or regulation directed at the activities of the federal government, and under either label a true conflict makes state law yield to the superior federal authority.32 Immunity corresponds in particular to the form of conflict preemption, taken up below as obstacle preemption, that bars a state law creating “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” A state may not regulate the operations of the federal government in a way that impairs or interferes with the full purposes and objectives of the federal program at issue.33
Because immunity borrows the logic of conflict, it reaches only state laws that actually prevent or significantly impair the performance of federal duties.34 Johnson v. Maryland marks the clear case. A state could not convict a postal worker for driving without a license in the course of his employment, because the instruments of the United States are immune from a state requirement that they stop performing until they satisfy a state officer that they are competent to perform.35
The two examples mark the line. A licensing requirement lets the state decide whether the carrier may do the federal job at all, and immunity forbids that. A general traffic rule governs how anyone drives and touches the federal work only incidentally, so it stays in force.37 Congress can also move the line. A state regulation that would otherwise violate federal immunity is upheld when a “clear congressional mandate” authorizes it, so Congress could expressly require postal drivers to hold a valid state license, though without such a requirement they may perform their duties free from the state licensing law.38
McCulloch and Gibbons thus settled that valid federal law wins a true conflict. The later sections of this page ask what counts as a conflict, and they answer by asking what Congress meant its law to displace.
Limits on Federal Supremacy
Article VI gives supreme status to the laws of the United States “which shall be made in Pursuance” of the Constitution, and that phrase makes supremacy depend on the validity of the federal law invoked.40 In Alden v. Maine, the Court explained that the clause enshrines as “the supreme Law of the Land” only those federal acts that accord with the constitutional design, so an appeal to the clause alone merely raises the question whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power.41 The reason follows from what the clause does. It ranks laws that already exist and says nothing about where a law gets its authority. If it also lent authority to measures that lacked it, Congress could enlarge its own jurisdiction simply by declaring state law void, and the enumerated powers would limit nothing.
The enumerated-powers requirement is one of the structural limits that keep the federal government from amassing too much power at the states’ expense. Justice Thomas, concurring in Wyeth v. Levine, identified it among the limits that a federal law “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution must respect: the Constitution confers upon Congress “not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.”42 The usual illustration is the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which the Court held in United States v. Lopez to exceed the commerce power. A state law that contradicted that Act would raise no supremacy problem, because a conflict with an invalid federal law is no conflict at all. State law must yield only to constitutionally valid federal law.43
Treaties are subject to the same premise. Reid v. Covert found nothing in Article VI, or in the debates over its drafting and ratification, suggesting that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them need not comply with the Constitution. Treaties were not limited to those made in “pursuance” of the Constitution so that agreements made under the Articles of Confederation, including the peace treaties that ended the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect. Reading Article VI to let the United States exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions would be manifestly contrary to the framers’ objectives.44
The second limit concerns what kind of provision the clause is. In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Court explained that the clause specifies only that federal law is supreme in case of a conflict with state law, so a provision said to preempt must meet two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power the Constitution confers on Congress, and pointing to the Supremacy Clause will not satisfy that requirement. And because the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states, the provision must be best read as one that regulates private actors.45 Conflict, express, and field preemption all work the same way: Congress imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors, a state law confers conflicting rights or imposes conflicting restrictions, and the federal law takes precedence.46
Preemption is, at bottom, a collision between two commands addressed to the same person. A private party told by federal law to do one thing and by state law to do another cannot obey both, and the clause tells a court which command prevails. A federal directive aimed at a state legislature creates no such collision. It simply tells the legislature what to enact, and the Constitution withholds from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the states, a limit the anticommandeering doctrine expresses.47 A command to a legislature does not become preemption by being called preemption. In Murphy, the respondents and the United States defended the statute’s anti-authorization prohibition as a valid preemption provision, and the Court answered that it was “no such thing.”48
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. shows how much valid regulation of private actors can accomplish. Congress had comprehensively regulated surface coal mining and offered each state the choice of implementing the federal program or yielding to a federally administered one. States were not compelled to enforce the federal standards, to spend state funds, or to take part in the federal program in any way, and a state that declined to regulate left the full burden with the federal government.49 The Court held that Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining, so the Act did not become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the states a regulatory role. The only limit on congressional authority in this respect is that the means selected be reasonably related to the goal of regulating interstate commerce.50
Hodel and Murphy sit on opposite sides of one line, and what separates them is whom the federal law commands. The mining statute regulated surface coal mining and offered states a choice. The anti-authorization prohibition told state legislatures what they could not authorize.
The affirmative power also has a firm floor. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court observed that state acquiescence in federal regulation cannot expand the bounds of the Commerce Clause, and that state action likewise cannot circumscribe Congress’s plenary commerce power. As the Court put it in United States v. Darby, that power “can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.”51 The Constitution’s grant sets the boundary of the commerce power, and no state’s policy moves it in either direction.