Concept
Presumption Against Preemption
Supremacy clause and preemption
Presumption Against Preemption
The Supremacy Clause makes valid federal law “the supreme Law of the Land” and binds state judges “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” but its text does not say how much state law a given federal statute displaces.1 The Court answers with a default rule traced to Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.: “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”2
A presumption decides who must persuade. The state law is assumed to survive, and the party urging preemption must offer enough evidence of congressional purpose to override the default.3 Rice itself says what that evidence looks like: a federal scheme “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” a federal interest “so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” or an object and set of obligations in the federal law that reveal the same purpose.4 Each is a way to rebut the presumption, not a way to skip it.
The default governs whether Congress speaks or stays silent, though it works differently in each case. Express provisions about state authority are a “reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,” so a court need not infer intent from a statute’s substantive provisions.5 When express language leaves its reach uncertain, the presumption governs the reading: courts define the field “as narrowly as the preemptive language permits so as not to limit unduly the police powers of the states.”6 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission illustrates the rule. A state’s refusal to license a proposed nuclear reactor on economic grounds survived federal occupation of the field of nuclear safety, and the discussion of nuclear power below returns to that case.7 When the statute is silent, the text is no help. The party urging preemption must then show sufficiently clear evidence that the state law frustrates the federal scheme or makes joint compliance impossible, or must show the pervasive scheme or dominant interest that Rice describes.8
Two justifications support the default. States are independent sovereigns in the federal system, and for that reason “we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”9 The presumption also “serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal judges from running amok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately considered) doctrine of implied conflict pre-emption based on frustration of purposes.”10 Obstacle preemption invites a court to identify a federal purpose and then ask whether state law frustrates it. The presumption keeps that inquiry from expanding without limit.
The presumption protects the States’ police power over private citizens. A separate family of canons, the intergovernmental immunity canons, applies when federal law interferes with the operations of state government itself, and those canons sometimes demand a clearer congressional authorization.11 They take a variety of forms, among them the clear-statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft. Because most preemption problems involve rules for private parties, the Rice presumption is the default to name.
Where the Presumption Is Strongest
The presumption carries the most weight when the state law regulates a subject the States have traditionally controlled, and health and safety is the clearest example. In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the dissent said the presumption’s principles “find particular resonance” in drug cases because “[t]he States have traditionally regulated health and safety matters.”12 It also pointed out that Congress enacted an express preemption provision for medical devices in 1976 but included none in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments eight years later, a contrast suggesting that Congress knows how to preempt expressly when it intends to.13
Wyeth v. Levine shows the presumption at work in the same field. According to the dissent there, the Court framed its discussion of Geier between the presumption against preemption and “the longstanding coexistence of state and federal law and the FDA’s traditional recognition of state-law remedies.”14
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. applies the same reluctance to field claims. Federal regulation of blood-plasma collection was detailed, yet local rules operating alongside it survived. The rules addressed health and safety within the police power, and pervasiveness alone did not show that Congress meant to occupy the field.15
The presumption also narrowed an express clause in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. The Court reaffirmed its general presumption, treated health care as a traditional area of state regulation in which intent to preempt must be “clear and manifest,” and held that ERISA’s “relate to” language did not reach a New York law requiring hospitals to charge different rates to insured, HMO, and self-insured plans. The clause, it reasoned, targets state laws that operate directly on the structure or administration of ERISA plans, not laws that only indirectly raise the cost of benefit options.16
A conflict argument must also show real federal injury. The question is whether the state law does “major damage to clear and substantial federal interests,” and some state laws are inconvenient to federal law without damaging federal interests.17 An ERISA dissent shows the clear-purpose requirement in action: no one could seriously argue that Congress had clearly resolved the question, it said, and the only damage to federal interests the majority identified was the added administrative burden on plan administrators.18
An essay fact pattern that combines a comprehensive federal scheme, silence on preemption, and a state health or safety rule that supplements the federal requirements without contradicting them is where the presumption usually decides the case. Apply it before concluding that a pervasive scheme means Congress occupied the field, and read any express clause for what its words actually displace.
Where the Presumption Weakens
The presumption assumes a tradition of state regulation, so it weakens where that tradition is missing. A state pursuing ends long regarded as part of its governmental domain faces a harder preemption argument than one “seeking to enter new or nontraditional waters.”19 One opinion suggested folding that distinction into the conflict inquiry itself: it “would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law preempted.”20 The result is a sliding scale.
Arizona v. United States shows the scale at its low end. The majority recited the presumption among its preemption principles, citing Rice and Wyeth, and then examined each of the four challenged provisions under them.21 Section 3 made it a state misdemeanor to fail willfully to complete or carry an alien registration document, a subject with no comparable tradition of state regulation. The presumption gave the State little to stand on, and the Court found the field preempted.22 A state acting under a traditional police power stands on firmer ground, as the plasma, ERISA, and health-care cases show.
Even in a traditional field, the presumption yields as the conflict sharpens. Although it may matter in a close case that the state has long regulated the subject, when a state law’s conflict with federal goals is pronounced, “[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material.”23 A separate opinion, quoting Fidelity Federal, went further: preemption for actual conflict “is automatic,” because “state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,” and the majority’s federalism concerns are irrelevant to that kind of preemption.24 The presumption therefore raises the bar for proving Congress’s purpose without changing what counts as a conflict once the purpose is clear.
A weak presumption does not make preemption automatic. When a defendant’s federal authorization is the premise of its preemption defense, preemption reaches only what federal law authorizes. A court in a bank overdraft case accepted that claims attacking the banks’ manipulation of overdraft fees, rather than their right to charge them, were not preempted, because the banks were not federally authorized to manipulate the transactions as alleged.25
Unsettled Limits
The presumption is settled as a starting point and unsettled as a measure of weight. Four decisions show the disagreement, and an answer that applies the presumption should flag it.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council left the question open for state laws that touch foreign affairs. The Court said it would “leave for another day a consideration in this context of a presumption against preemption,” assumed for argument that some presumption applied, and held that the state act presents a sufficient obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress’s objectives under the federal Act.27 A conflict strong enough to win under a presumption wins without one, so the Court never had to decide whether the presumption applies.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. pulled the other way, and later opinions disagree about how far. The Geier dissent charged that the majority treated the question as close yet ignored the presumption, preferring “to put the burden on petitioners to show that their tort claim would not frustrate the Secretary’s purposes.”28 The Wyeth dissenters read Geier as having “specifically rejected” the argument that the presumption is relevant to conflict preemption, and they faulted the Wyeth majority for framing its analysis with the presumption anyway.29 A partial dissent in Arizona, citing Geier, accepted that a statutory provision on the point “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” against preemption. It maintained, however, that the provision remains probative of congressional intent, the “ultimate touchstone.”30
The PLIVA dissent extended the dispute to impossibility. It invoked the presumption’s principles and said they find “particular resonance” in drug cases because the States have traditionally regulated health and safety. It also stressed that preemption is an affirmative defense, so a defendant seeking to set aside state law bears the burden of proving impossibility.31 The majority, whose test the impossibility discussion above sets out, saw the matter differently. Behind the disagreement lies the burden: the dissent placed it on the party claiming preemption.
Arizona divided the Court over the same default in the immigration setting. The majority listed the presumption among its principles and applied them to all four provisions.32 The partial dissents objected that the Court gave “short shrift to our presumption against pre-emption” on Section 5(C), which imposes criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. With no express statement of congressional intent, they said, the Court inferred its conclusion “from stale legislative history and from the comprehensiveness of the federal scheme.”33 Congress’s choice not to impose federal criminal penalties on such workers does not show that it chose to preempt state penalties, they added, because “[w]ith any statutory scheme, Congress chooses to do some things and not others.” If that alone sufficed, “States would occupy tiny islands in a sea of federal power.”34 That, in their view, is why state laws implicating traditional state powers are not preempted without a “clear and manifest” congressional intention.35 Whether a provision implicates a traditional state power is itself contestable, and the answer determines how much work the presumption does.