Concept
Informational Privacy
Other rights and interests
Informational Privacy
The word privacy names two different interests in the due process cases, and every privacy problem starts by sorting out which one the facts raise. Autonomy privacy is a person's interest in making personal and intimate decisions without outside interference; when the decision is fundamental, the state needs a compelling justification. Informational privacy is a person's interest in determining whether, how, and to what extent information about oneself reaches others.1 The Court's leading treatment of the second interest is Whalen v. Roe, which rejected a patients' challenge to a state's computerized file of prescription records. The facts show why the challenge failed.
New York feared that dangerous drugs were being diverted into unlawful channels, so in 1970 its legislature created a special commission to evaluate the state's drug-control laws. The commission found the laws deficient: nothing effectively prevented stolen or revised prescriptions, repeated refills by unscrupulous pharmacists, one user collecting prescriptions from several doctors, or doctors over-prescribing.2 After consulting enforcement officials in California and Illinois, where central reporting systems were working well, the commission drafted legislation that put patient identification on prescriptions for the most tightly controlled drugs and placed the resulting data on computer tapes.3
The program surrounded that data with security. The forms went to a receiving room ringed by a locked wire fence and an alarm system, were kept in a vault for five years, and were then destroyed. The tapes stayed in a locked cabinet, and the computer ran off-line, so no terminal outside the computer room could read or record anything. A statute and a Department of Health regulation forbade public disclosure of patients' identities, and willful violation was a crime punishable by up to a year in prison and a $2,000 fine. At the time of trial, 17 Department of Health employees had access to the files, along with 24 investigators authorized to look into overdispensing that the computer might identify.4
A few days before the Act took effect, patients who regularly received Schedule II prescriptions, doctors who prescribed those drugs, and two physicians' associations sued. At a one-day trial they offered evidence tending to show that some people who needed these drugs would decline treatment for fear that misuse of the computerized data would stigmatize them as "drug addicts."5 The three-judge district court found that the state had been unable to demonstrate, from its first twenty months of experience, that the patient-identification requirement was necessary. That finding alone would once have sufficed to invalidate the statute.6
The Supreme Court answered that the holding of Lochner has been implicitly rejected many times. Legislation with some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part, and states have broad latitude to experiment with solutions to problems of vital local concern.7 The New York statute was "manifestly the product of an orderly and rational legislative decision." A specially appointed commission held extensive hearings and drew on the experience of other states, and nothing was unreasonable in assuming that identifying patients would deter potential violators and help detect specific instances of abuse.8
The Court needed only that reasonableness because the program threatened neither privacy interest enough to matter. It was persuaded that the program did not, on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either one.9 On independence in decisionmaking, the record showed that some patients were discouraged, yet about 100,000 prescriptions a month were still being filled before the injunction, so the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs. The state did not condition access on the consent of any official or third party, and within dosage limits the plaintiffs did not challenge, the decision to prescribe or use the drugs stayed entirely with the physician and the patient.10 On disclosure, the Court held only that this record, with its security provisions, did not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctors' claim, to the extent it rested on patients' refusal of treatment, was derivative of the patients' and fell with it.11
The line between this deferential review and strict scrutiny runs through what the government does with the choice. Griswold v. Connecticut held that a state cannot prohibit a married couple from using contraceptives in the privacy of their home.12 A ban of that kind takes the decision out of the couple's hands. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Whalen states the consequence: a statute that did deprive people of the interest in making such decisions would be consistent with the Constitution only if necessary to promote a compelling state interest, but absent a deprivation the state need not prove its statute absolutely necessary.13 A reporting program deprives no one of the choice. It records a fact about a choice already made, and the physician and patient still decide whether to prescribe and take the drug. A fact pattern that says only that a statute invades privacy has therefore offered a label, and the first question is whether the law restricts a decision or collects information.
Whalen decides less than it may seem to. The Court expressly declined to decide any question presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data, whether intentional or unintentional, or by a system that lacked comparable security provisions.14 That reservation shows how much work the safeguards did. The two concurrences point in opposite directions on the question left open. Justice Brennan wrote that broad dissemination of such information by state officials would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests.15 Justice Stewart answered that, whatever the ratio decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information.16