Concept
Federal Government and Equal Protection
Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
Federal Government and Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches state and local governments.1 The Fifth Amendment, which governs the federal government, contains no equal protection clause of its own.2 Read literally, that text would leave Congress freer to discriminate than any State. The Court refused that reading in Bolling v. Sharpe, a challenge to racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia, where the federal government rather than a State ran the schools.3
The Court decided Bolling on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, which had held that the Constitution forbids the States to maintain racially segregated public schools.4 Bolling reached the same result by a different route. Equal protection and due process, the Court explained, both stem from the American ideal of fairness and are not mutually exclusive, and discrimination may be so unjustifiable that it violates due process.5 Segregation in the District's schools was an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.6 The opinion then rests on symmetry: it would be “unthinkable” for the same Constitution to impose a lesser duty on the federal government than on the States.7
That symmetry explains the holding. If the Fourteenth Amendment were the only source of an equality duty, Congress could draw a racial line that no State could draw, and the government with national reach would be freer to discriminate than the governments the amendment restrained. The Fifth Amendment prevents that result because an arbitrary racial line deprives people of liberty whoever draws it. The guarantee therefore reaches the federal government through the Due Process Clause and the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, but the requirements are identical: equal protection analysis under the Fifth Amendment is the same as under the Fourteenth.8
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena called this equivalence congruence and put it to work on race. Adarand held that every racial classification, whether imposed by a federal, state, or local actor, must satisfy strict scrutiny: it is constitutional only if it is a narrowly tailored measure that furthers a compelling governmental interest.9 That holding overruled Metro Broadcasting, which had applied a lesser standard to certain federal classifications styled as benign. The Court's reason was both doctrinal and practical. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect persons rather than groups, and because it may not always be possible to tell whether a classification is truly benign, a lesser standard risks permitting illegitimate uses of race.10 Cases against the States and cases against the United States are therefore decided under one set of standards, and precedent from either setting can be used in the other.
The first question in any problem is who classified. A state or local classification falls under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and a federal classification falls under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.11 Brown and Bolling show the choice. Segregation by States was tested under the Equal Protection Clause, segregation in the District of Columbia, where no State acted, was tested under due process, and both failed.12 Because the standards match, naming the wrong clause rarely changes the analysis, but it misidentifies the source of the duty. An answer that attributes a federal statute to the Fourteenth Amendment, or to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, names a clause that does not apply to the actor.
The sameness has one standing exception, and it concerns alienage. An alienage classification awards burdens or benefits according to United States citizenship, which distinguishes it from a national origin classification, a matter of ancestry or ethnicity.13 Most, though not all, state discrimination against noncitizens draws heightened scrutiny. The federal government, however, has considerably greater latitude to discriminate against and among noncitizens, because the immigration and naturalization power reflects a predominant federal interest in immigration.14 In Mathews v. Diaz the Court upheld a federal rule that conditioned a noncitizen's eligibility for a Medicare program on admission for permanent residence and five years of continuous residence in the United States.15 Congress regularly makes rules about noncitizens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens, so unequal treatment of the two groups does not by itself show invidiousness, and the Court described review of such immigration and naturalization decisions as narrow.16 The latitude comes from the immigration power. It gives Congress no easier path to classifying citizens by race, which draws strict scrutiny from every governmental actor.17 A later section on alienage develops the difference.