Concept
Other Quasi-Suspect Classes
Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
Other Quasi-Suspect Classes
Race draws strict scrutiny and gender draws intermediate scrutiny, but two other traits fit neither pattern cleanly. Classifications based on nonmarital birth receive intermediate scrutiny.1 Classifications based on alienage, a person's status as a noncitizen, receive strict scrutiny in the ordinary state case, but the standard shifts with the government that drew the line and with what the line does.2 Intellectual disability falls outside the heightened tiers altogether. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. treated such classifications as neither suspect nor quasi-suspect, though even rational basis review forbids a government to act out of mere prejudice, and a later section returns to that case.3
Neither nonmarital birth nor alienage draws uniform strict scrutiny, because each trait sometimes tracks something a government may legitimately care about. A state has an important interest in minimizing the problems often associated with proving paternity.4 A state or local government has a legitimate and substantial interest in limiting the right to govern to full-fledged members of the political community.5 Each interest opens a door in the doctrine, and each section below follows what comes through it.
Illegitimacy Classifications
Intermediate scrutiny governs laws that discriminate against nonmarital children, meaning children whose parents were not married. In Clark v. Jeter, the Court said so expressly while striking down a state law that required a nonmarital child to establish paternity within six years of birth in order to seek support from the father.6 The law must therefore serve an important governmental objective, and the discrimination must be substantially related to that objective.7 The standard has less force than its gender counterpart. Gender review has strengthened to the point where it often approaches strict scrutiny, so the legitimacy standard is probably less rigorous than the gender standard now is.8
The central reason for heightened review is that the child is blameless. No child is responsible for his birth, and legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.9 A state therefore cannot use classifications that burden nonmarital children to punish the illicit relations of their parents, because “visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”10 The punishment fails on its own terms as well, since penalizing the child is an ineffectual way to deter the parent.11
The trait also resists the usual political remedy. A child can be legitimized, so the condition is not completely immutable, but the change runs in one direction only, as it does with alienage, and that reduces the extent to which empathy might otherwise temper the legislative process.12 The availability of a cure does not rescue a burdensome law, either. In a gender case, a state defended a statute giving the husband exclusive control over community property by pointing to steps the wife could have taken to stop him from mortgaging the home. The Court answered that the defense overlooked the critical question, whether the law substantially furthers an important governmental interest, and that “the absence of an insurmountable barrier” will not redeem an otherwise discriminatory law, a principle it drew from Trimble v. Gordon.13 A state that answers an illegitimacy challenge by observing that the parents could have married is making the same kind of argument.
Two principles organize the decisions.14 First, a law that gives a benefit to all marital children and to no nonmarital children always fails. Levy v. Louisiana is the example: a state law let marital children, but no nonmarital children, sue under a wrongful death statute for losses from a mother's death, and the Court found the line unreasonable because legitimacy has no relation to the nature of the wrong inflicted on the mother.15 The government cannot categorically exclude nonmarital children from benefits that would be paid to them if they were legitimate.16 The paternity-proof interest explains why. It supports a requirement that parentage be proved, but it does not explain excluding every nonmarital child, including the child whose parentage is established.
Second, a law that gives a benefit to some nonmarital children while denying it to others is evaluated case by case under intermediate scrutiny.17 Time limits on proof of paternity belong in this group. A time limit on a nonmarital child's attempt to prove paternity as a precondition to benefits will be upheld if it is substantially related to the state's interest in avoiding litigation of stale or fraudulent claims, but the limit must be reasonable and not appreciably shorter than necessary to achieve that goal.18 The six-year limit in Clark failed that test. It was impermissible because financial needs may not emerge until later and because the period did not give the child a sufficient opportunity to present his or her claims.19
The remaining decisions on the usual case list sort the same way. Gomez v. Perez, Trimble, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. are the standard examples of rules that disadvantaged nonmarital children and fell, while Lalli v. Lalli and Labine v. Vincent are the standard examples of distinctions the Court sustained. Test each against the two principles above.20
Exam answers on this topic go wrong in two opposite ways. One declares every distinction between marital and nonmarital children unconstitutional, which ignores the proof requirements and reasonable time limits that survive. The other approves a rule because it advances some plausible state purpose, which is rational basis reasoning. The middle tier requires an important objective and a substantial relationship, and a purpose of punishing the parents through the child never qualifies.21
Alienage Classifications
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, and the word “person” encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens.23 In Graham v. Richardson, the Court added that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. That holds even in the area of economics and social welfare, where rational basis review ordinarily governs.24 State and local legislation that discriminates on the basis of alienage will therefore be sustained only if it advances a compelling governmental purpose, and examples of compelling state interests are relatively rare.25
Two reasons support strict scrutiny of state laws that discriminate against aliens. The first is political. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and insular” minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate, and the condition, like nonmarital birth, is alterable in only one direction, which reduces the empathy that might otherwise temper the legislative process.26 The second concerns the federal structure. The national government has exclusive authority to regulate the terms and conditions on which aliens are admitted, and if states could discriminate against aliens subject only to rational basis review, they could make life so difficult for aliens as to nullify the federal decision to let them live here.27 Graham put the point as a conflict with overriding national policies in an area the Constitution entrusts to the federal government. Congress had imposed no burden on aliens who become indigent after entry, and the states may not add one merely because of alienage.28
The interests that carry a law under the deferential baseline do little against this standard. A state's desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify restricting benefits to citizens and longtime resident aliens.29 In Sugarman v. Dougall, New York confined permanent positions in its competitive classified civil service to citizens. The Court emphasized that the ban did not cover all high policymaking positions but did cover a number of menial ones, so the restriction had “little, if any, relationship” to the State's “substantial” interest in having employees of undivided loyalty.30 The same scrutiny governs state limits on student financial aid, as in Nyquist v. Mauclet. The failure in Sugarman was a failure of fit: the state's interest was real, but the classification swept in many positions that had nothing to do with it.
Strict scrutiny gives way when the classification concerns self-government. The Court has said that “a democratic society is ruled by its people,” and it permits a state to deny noncitizens the right to vote, to hold political office, or to serve on juries, applying only rational basis review to discrimination related to self-government and the democratic process.31 The Court has not set clear standards, by contrast, for how far governments may act to improve the voting power of racial minorities.32 The Court has applied the same political function exception to citizenship requirements for police, public school teachers, and probation officers.33 The state then need justify its classification only by showing some rational relationship between its interests and the limiting qualification.34
Foley v. Connelie shows the reasoning. The Court found that the state police force fell within the exception Sugarman had left open, because police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy as such but are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary power, so citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the job.35 Sugarman itself had cautioned that a state may require citizenship in an appropriately defined class of positions. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido extended the exception to probation officers, and Ambach v. Norwick extended it to public school teachers.36
The exception stays tied to the function of the position. Bernal v. Fainter marks the limit: a citizenship requirement for a position that carries no governing power remains under strict scrutiny. Sugarman points the same way, because the civil service ban there swept in menial jobs unrelated to the state's interest in loyal policymaking. Public employment alone does not trigger the exception; the work does. Restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that primarily affect economic interests will be strictly scrutinized, while exclusions from important positions tied to the form of government receive a lesser standard.37 For that reason, the label “suspect” overstates the case, since the Court has at times called alienage classifications suspect without invalidating all uses of them.38
Congress stands in a different position. The federal government has considerably greater latitude, under the immigration and naturalization power, to discriminate against and among noncitizens, given the predominant federal interest in immigration.39 The allocation follows from Graham's reasoning. A state that restricts benefits to its citizens and longtime resident aliens risks undoing the federal decision to admit those residents,40 while Congress holds the power over admission itself. The Court has not yet imposed substantive restrictions on how Congress defines the class of persons who may lawfully reside in the country, or on its ability to disfavor unlawfully resident persons in distributing federal benefits.41 The latitude is substantive only. Every person within the jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to a fair process before being deported or prohibited from returning.42 An answer that carries strict scrutiny from the state cases over to a federal statute governing noncitizens misses this allocation of power.
Unlawful presence adds a third setting. Undocumented aliens are not a suspect class, and education is not a fundamental right, yet the Court still demanded more than the baseline when a state burdened children for their parents' unlawful entry.43 In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan reasoned that the law imposed a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their status, and that the discrimination could hardly be considered rational unless it furthered some substantial goal of the State. He found inadequate Texas's interests in discouraging illegal immigration, avoiding burdens on public schools, and reserving public education for those likely to reside later within the state.44 The State had to show that the classification was reasonably adapted to its purposes and actually furthered a substantial state interest, and Texas could not.45
The reason lies in who bears the burden. The children had been brought into the country illegally, and “legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice,” the same logic behind the illegitimacy decisions.46 The result is a middle level standard under which the state must show that a classification burdening the children of illegal aliens in fact furthers a substantial goal. States might receive greater leeway when they act under federal authority or promote an articulable federal policy.47
Plyler's review rests on that burden on children, not on a fundamental right. The Warren Court's fundamental-rights strand had suggested that states might owe an affirmative duty to equalize access to benefits such as welfare, education, housing, and medical care.48 Justice Powell had already written that it is not the province of the Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection, even though the plaintiffs argued that education is essential to First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent use of the vote.49 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, which applied rational basis review to a school bus fee, is the usual example of the Court declining to extend Plyler.
The first step decides more than any other, since a limit on benefits for noncitizens fails when a state draws it and receives far more deference when Congress draws it. The fourth step decides most state employment problems, because the function of the job, not its public character, sets the standard.