Concept
Rational Basis in Special Settings
Rational basis review
Rational Basis in Special Settings
Two settings produce rational basis review, or something close to it, even when the same burden in an ordinary civil case would draw a harder look. In the first, the federal government classifies noncitizens, and the Court defers because the relationship between the United States and noncitizens has been committed to the political branches.1 In the second, officials regulate life inside a prison, and the Court defers because prison administrators, not courts, are to make the difficult judgments about institutional operations.2 The reasons for deference differ, so each setting has its own test and its own limits.
On an exam, the first move in either setting is to ask who is acting and what is being regulated. That answer fixes the deferential test before any classification is examined.
Federal Alienage Classifications
Mathews v. Diaz is the leading case on how courts review a federal alienage classification, meaning a line drawn by a person’s status as a noncitizen. Diaz, a Cuban refugee over sixty-five who had been lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier, filed a class action challenging the denial of his application to enroll in the Medicare Part B supplemental insurance program.3 His co-appellees were in the same position. All three were lawfully admitted noncitizens over sixty-five; two were Cuban refugees who remained in the country at the Attorney General’s discretion, and the third had been admitted for permanent residence.4 The Court upheld the five-year line. Because the federal government’s plenary power over immigration requires judicial deference, only rational basis review applies when Congress or the President creates the classification.5
The Equal Protection Clause is addressed to the States: “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”6 The appellees, who were challenging an act of Congress, therefore argued that it deprived them of liberty or property without due process of law, and the Court held that it did not.7 Its reasoning began with the breadth of the federal power. In exercising its power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens: it may exclude noncitizens and reserve the power to deport them, and it has no counterpart power over its own citizens. A federal law that treats noncitizens differently from citizens is therefore not “invidious” for that reason alone.8
Judicial restraint follows from the setting. Decisions about noncitizens may implicate relations with foreign powers and must be defined in light of changing political and economic circumstances, so they suit the legislature or the executive better than the judiciary.9 The facts of Diaz show why. Two of the appellees were among more than 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived between 1961 and 1972, and the United States has admitted other groups as a humane response to a natural catastrophe or an international political situation. A rule that inhibits the flexibility of the political branches to meet changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution, and the reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review for decisions of Congress or the President on immigration and naturalization.10 The same posture appears when a court reviews an executive entry policy. The court asks whether the policy is plausibly related to the government’s stated objective of protecting the country and improving vetting, may consider the challengers’ extrinsic evidence, and upholds the policy if it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.11
Applied to the five-year line, that standard is forgiving. The Court assumed that five years was longer than necessary to protect the program’s fiscal integrity and that persons just short of qualifying suffered unnecessary hardship. It sustained the line anyway, because some line is essential, any line must produce some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences, and, most important, those who qualify may reasonably be presumed to have a greater affinity with the United States than those who do not.12 The classification was therefore not “wholly irrational.” The Court never explained why affinity matters to Medicare and never examined how well the line served that end, which shows how little means-ends scrutiny this setting invites.13
State classifications fare very differently. The Court’s decisions establish that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and receive close judicial scrutiny, and that noncitizens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and insular” minority.14 Graham v. Richardson applied that rule to state welfare laws. State statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident noncitizens, or to noncitizens who have not met a durational residence requirement, violate the Equal Protection Clause, and a State’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify restricting benefits to citizens and longtime resident noncitizens.15
Diaz and Graham both involve a durational residence requirement for benefits, and the opposite results follow from who imposed it. Congress’s five-year line survived the narrow standard, while the state requirement fell under close scrutiny. An answer that labels alienage suspect and stops there is right for the State and wrong for Congress.
The Diaz Court explained why Graham did not control. Graham’s equal protection analysis involved significantly different considerations because it concerned the relationship between noncitizens and the States, not between noncitizens and the federal government. Its second ground, that state laws encroach on the exclusive federal power over the entrance and residence of noncitizens, actually supports the holding in Diaz that regulating those conditions is the business of the political branches, not of the States or the federal courts.16 Justice Blackmun later stated the point directly in an opinion reaffirming that state alienage classifications are inherently suspect. The Court used relaxed scrutiny in Diaz, he wrote, because Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among noncitizens that the States do not share.17
Three features of the noncitizen’s position explain the close scrutiny of state lines. Noncitizens, as foreigners, are often the objects of prejudice. Alienage can change through naturalization, but only in one direction, so legislators are not restrained from burdening noncitizens by the prospect of landing in the same category. And noncitizens are totally excluded from the political process, because they cannot vote in state or national elections.18 A State may still allocate political power, including the opportunity to hold important government positions, to citizens; there the Court upholds the law whenever a majority of the Justices believe it is reasonably tailored to further a legitimate political end. Commentary on these cases notes that the Justices’ split over the judicial role leaves the area one of great theoretical confusion, and that an intermediate standard could reconcile the results.19
Deference follows the author of the classification, and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong shows that a federal agency does not automatically share it. A Civil Service Commission regulation disadvantaged noncitizens. Legitimate national interests could have been asserted for the rule, but only administrative convenience was within the Commission’s concern. Without specified reasons, the Court was unwilling to presume that the Commission was furthering national interests outside its responsibility, so the regulation deprived the plaintiffs of due process.20 The Court strongly suggested that the rule would not have been invalid had the President or Congress expressly adopted it, or had the agency adopted it with justifications within its scope of concern.21
What followed confirms the point. The Ninth Circuit later held a new Executive Order constitutional in Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Court of Appeals found the order within the President’s constitutional and statutory authority, and it found the national interest in creating an incentive for noncitizens to be naturalized sufficient to justify the rule.22 Who adopted the rule therefore mattered. An agency not concerned with the national interest it invokes must state justifications within its own concern, while the President’s national-interest justification sufficed.
State laws that burden noncitizens can draw a harder look than Diaz allowed Congress. In Plyler v. Doe, a Texas statute withheld state funds from local school districts for the education of children who were not “legally admitted” to the United States and authorized districts to deny them enrollment. Texas argued that the Equal Protection Clause protects only persons lawfully within the State.23 The Court held the statute invalid. The federal government might exclude or deport these children, but a State was not entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality for a law that imposed a “lifetime hardship” on children “not accountable for their disabling status.” Such a law receives some form of realistic judicial review and “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state.”24 Plyler sits against the background of the Warren Court’s fundamental-rights strand of equal protection, which suggested that States might owe an affirmative duty to equalize access to benefits and services such as welfare, education, housing, and medical care.25 Whether Plyler’s more demanding review reaches beyond its own facts is the question later presented in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.
The first step does the real work, because the same kind of durational residence condition on benefits receives opposite answers depending on whether a State or Congress imposed it. The fourth step catches the stem that describes a federal regulation with no statute or presidential order behind it. A State law that burdens children because of their immigration status calls for the more demanding review of Plyler, not Diaz-style deference.28
Prison Regulations and Turner
Turner v. Safley supplies a deferential test of a different kind from the equal protection review taught so far. It sorts no one into classes. It asks how far prison officials may restrict constitutional rights that inmates keep in custody, and it answers that a restriction is valid when it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, meaning the legitimate goals of a corrections system, such as security and rehabilitation.30
A class of inmates at the Renz Correctional Institution in Missouri attacked two rules of the state’s corrections division.31 One barred correspondence between inmates at different Missouri institutions; the other almost completely banned inmate marriage.32 The Court applied one standard, upheld the correspondence rule’s facial validity, and struck the marriage rule. That split shows what the standard asks of officials.33
Because Turner governs restrictions on rights, it should stay separate from the classification tests. The question resembles rational basis review, since both ask whether a rule connects sensibly to a legitimate end and both defer to the decisionmaker. One result still surprises students who have just studied fundamental rights. The petitioners conceded that the decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail and Loving v. Virginia, yet they argued that a reasonableness standard should govern in a prison, and the Court tested the marriage rule for a reasonable relation to penological objectives.34 The rule that a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny therefore does not carry over to rights restricted inside a prison.
The Court chose reasonableness because of who must make prison decisions and how. Prison administrators, not courts, are to make the difficult judgments about institutional operations. An inflexible strict scrutiny standard would hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and adopt innovative solutions. It would also distort decisionmaking, because every administrative judgment would risk a court somewhere finding a less restrictive way to solve the problem, and courts would become the primary arbiters of the best solution to every administrative problem.35 In Overton v. Bazzetta, a unanimous Court restated the rule: the test is whether prison regulations are rationally related to legitimate penological objectives, and courts must give substantial deference to the professional judgment of administrators, who bear significant responsibility for defining a corrections system’s goals and the best means to reach them.36 The reason is institutional competence in a closed environment, where almost any change to one inmate’s liberty affects other inmates, guards, and scarce prison resources.37
Deference has a floor, and the floor separates a lenient standard from no review at all. A regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the rule and the asserted goal is so remote as to make the policy arbitrary or irrational, and the governmental objective must be legitimate and neutral.38 That requirement matches the means-ends element of rational basis review. The Court named several factors that decide whether a regulation clears the floor.
The fourth factor is easy to overread. It is not a least restrictive alternative test, and officials need not set up and then defeat every conceivable alternative. An alternative counts against the regulation only when it fully accommodates the right at a very small cost to the prison’s legitimate goals.40
The correspondence rule shows the factors pointing toward validity. Officials testified that mail between institutions can carry escape plans and arrange assaults and other violent acts, that Missouri had a growing problem with prison gangs, and that Renz’s use as a protective custody facility could be compromised by correspondence with inmates elsewhere.41 The rule did not turn on the content of the letters. It barred communication only with a limited class of people about whom officials had particular cause for concern, inmates at other Missouri institutions. The only alternative the inmates offered, monitoring every letter, would have cost far more than a minimal amount: officials could not read every piece of mail, and inmates could write in jargon or code, so dangerous messages would slip through.42 The Court upheld the rule’s facial validity and remanded the separate claim that officials applied it arbitrarily.43
The marriage rule was defended in the same vocabulary of security and rehabilitation, and it failed on the same factors. The security concern emphasized in the petitioners’ brief was the creation of love triangles, but nothing in the record suggested that officials viewed the rule as preventing them, and common sense suggests that inmate rivalries develop as easily without a formal ceremony as with one. Obvious, easy alternatives would accommodate the right to marry at a de minimis burden on security, and no official testified that those alternatives would fail to satisfy security concerns. The Court called the rule an exaggerated response.44 The rehabilitation rationale did no better. Officials generally had no objection to inmate-civilian marriages, and the rehabilitation concern centered almost exclusively on female inmates marrying other inmates or ex-felons, so it did not account for the ban on inmate-civilian marriages. The almost complete ban was not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives and was facially invalid.45
The two rules came from one prison system, faced one standard, and were defended on security grounds, so neither the standard nor the security label separated them. Testimony tied the correspondence rule to concrete dangers, and the rule’s reach matched those dangers. The marriage rule rested on justifications that the record did not support and that explained only part of what the rule forbade. Even the marriage ruling left officials room: legitimate security concerns may justify reasonable restrictions on an inmate’s right to marry, including a requirement of the superintendent’s approval, and officials may regulate the time and circumstances of the ceremony.46 Missouri could not ban nearly all marriages on a theory that did not explain the ban. Lenient review still demands a genuine connection between a restriction and its stated purpose.
Johnson v. California marks the boundary of Turner on the equal protection side. The Court had applied the Turner test only to rights that are inconsistent with proper incarceration, and the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination is not one that necessarily must be limited to accommodate proper prison administration.47 California’s corrections department argued that its segregation policy should be exempt from strict scrutiny because it was “neutral,” segregating all prisoners equally. The Court answered that racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally, and it noted that it had rejected the notion that separate can ever be equal, or “neutral,” fifty years earlier.48 A claim of a different kind arose in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, where a prisoners’ union denied privileges that other inmate groups received lost its equal protection claim.
On an exam, first decide what kind of claim the inmate is making. A policy that sorts inmates by race draws strict scrutiny despite the prison setting. A rule that restricts a right inmates keep in custody, such as correspondence, association, or marriage, is tested under Turner for a reasonable relation to legitimate penological interests. A claim that officials treated one inmate group differently from another, like the union’s, is a different claim from a challenge to a racial classification. Two errors recur. One is to apply strict scrutiny because the right at stake, like marriage, would be fundamental outside prison. The other is to treat deference as automatic approval, which overlooks that the marriage ban fell for want of a connection to its asserted goals and because easy alternatives existed.