Concept
Temporary Moratoria
Takings
Temporary Moratoria
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency asked whether a moratorium on development, imposed while an agency devises a comprehensive land-use plan, is a per se taking that requires compensation.1 Justice Stevens, writing for six Justices, said no: temporary bans on development are not per se takings, and no earlier decision required such a rule.2 Claims like this one go to Penn Central balancing, which the Court thought better served the fairness and justice behind the Takings Clause.3
A moratorium restricts what an owner may do with land and appropriates nothing, so the claim sits on the regulatory side of the line between physical and regulatory takings. Penn Central and Lucas govern restrictions on use, while a direct physical appropriation is a per se taking requiring compensation.4 The live question was whether a freeze on use deserves a categorical rule of its own.
The Moratoria and How the Case Arrived
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) ordered two moratoria to maintain the status quo while it studied the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and designed a strategy for environmentally sound growth. Ordinance 81-5 ran from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983. The more restrictive Resolution 83-21 ran from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984.5 The District Court later found the resulting 32-month delay not unreasonable.6
The case reached the Supreme Court in a narrow posture. The District Court had found a categorical taking, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It reasoned that a regulation affecting only a portion of the parcel, whether limited by time, use, or space, does not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use.7 The owners had expressly disavowed any Penn Central argument, did not dispute that the restrictions were appropriate means to secure the Compact's purposes, and brought only a facial challenge. The question was therefore whether enacting the regulations, standing alone, was a categorical taking.8 They had also not appealed the District Court's conclusion against them under Penn Central, so Penn Central recovery was foreclosed.9 The Supreme Court decided only whether a categorical rule applies.
Why First English Does Not Decide the Question
The owners built their argument on First English and Lucas and invoked the principle that government should not force some people alone to bear public burdens that the public as a whole should bear.10 Neither precedent compelled the categorical rule they sought.11
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles settled a question about remedy. The California Court of Appeal had held that a landowner who claims a land-use regulation has taken his property may not recover damages for the time before it is finally determined that the regulation is a taking.12 The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that, in those circumstances, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require compensation for that period.13 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for six Justices; Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, dissented, and he is the Justice who later wrote Tahoe-Sierra.14
Tahoe-Sierra read First English as what it was. The decision was remedial and did not decide the antecedent merits question whether a temporary regulation is a taking.15 First English itself named two reasons a regulation that temporarily denies all use might not be a taking: the regulation might be insulated by the State's authority to enact safety regulations, and the case did not address normal delays in obtaining permits, changes in zoning, variances, and the like.16 The first reservation reflects an older distinction. As one opinion in the public-use cases put it, traditional exercises of the police power, such as abating a nuisance, required no compensation at all, while the takings power has always required it.17 A holding about what the government owes after a taking has been found cannot show that every freeze is one.
Why Lucas Does Not Decide It Either
Lucas announced a categorical rule requiring compensation when a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land.18 It held that a taking occurred when a permanent restriction on building development caused a total diminution in the value of real property.19 The case for treating such a ban as a taking draws on the practical equivalence, in that setting, of negative regulation and appropriation: many statutes use eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands that prevent development, or to acquire the lands outright.20 Lucas involved a permanent taking and was decided on that basis. The Court limited its rule to the extraordinary circumstance in which no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, and a 95% loss of value, rather than 100%, calls for Penn Central analysis.21
The owners tried to fit their case inside that rule by treating the 32 months as a separate temporal segment of their property. The Supreme Court reached the Ninth Circuit's result by way of the parcel-as-a-whole rule. An interest in real property is defined by its metes and bounds and by its term of years, and a court must consider both dimensions.22 A permanent deprivation of the entire area takes the parcel as a whole. A temporary restriction that reduces value does not, because the property recovers its value when the prohibition is lifted.23 Lucas was carved out for extraordinary permanent deprivations, and that is why the owners' categorical claim failed.
Why the Court Chose Penn Central Over a New Rule
With neither precedent controlling, the Court asked whether the fairness and justice underlying the Takings Clause justified a new rule.24 Review had not been granted on a rolling-moratoria theory, unchallenged findings foreclosed bad faith and insufficient state interest, and the owners had disavowed Penn Central recovery. The remaining choice was between categorical rules and Penn Central analysis as the governing approach.25 Three reasons pushed the Court toward Penn Central.
The first reason is the planning process. The interest in informed decisionmaking counsels against a per se rule that treats interim measures as takings regardless of the planners' good faith, the owners' reasonable expectations, or the moratorium's actual impact on property values.26 Compensating owners during a moratorium may force officials to rush the planning process or abandon the practice altogether.27 A categorical rule tied to the length of the deliberations would press decisionmakers to resolve land-use questions quickly, which would disadvantage landowners and interest groups less organized or less familiar with the planning process. TRPA, by contrast, had the benefit of comments and criticisms from interested parties.28 The rule would also create perverse incentives if landowners had to wait for their claims to ripen while remaining entitled to compensation for the delay. The decisional process matters most in regional planning, where moratoria enable input from interested parties.29
The second reason answers the fairness worry directly. With a temporary development ban, there is less risk that individual landowners will be singled out to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public as a whole.30 The Court also noted reciprocity of advantage.31
The third reason is that a fixed cutoff would be too crude. In some cases property values continue to increase despite a moratorium, so a one-year cutoff would be too blunt.32 Duration is still an important factor, and moratoria longer than one year may warrant special skepticism. But given the District Court's finding that the 32-month delay was not unreasonable, a per se rule could not be adopted.33
None of this makes a moratorium immune from a takings claim. Tahoe-Sierra rejected a categorical rule and left such claims to the fact-specific inquiry that is the default for regulatory takings.34 The Court's preference for situation-specific factual inquiries shows up elsewhere. In a 2012 flooding decision, the Court unanimously held that the mere fact that flooding caused by Army Corps of Engineers deviations from a flood control plan was temporary did not immunize the government from a takings claim, and it reaffirmed that preference.35
Applying the Rule
The first freeze resembles the one the Court examined, with a defined end, planning under way, and land that will regain its value. The second leaves little of that picture, which is why an exam answer should not stop at the word temporary. The label describes what the government announced, and the factors below test whether it describes what happened.
The first step does the most work on an exam, because it disposes of the argument that a stem's statement that the land had no use during the freeze automatically triggers Lucas. The other steps are where a moratorium claim is won or lost.
Compensation When a Freeze Is a Taking
If a freeze does amount to a taking, its limited duration will not bar relief. It is well established that temporary takings are as protected by the Constitution as permanent ones.41 The usual measure of just compensation is the property's market value at the time of the taking.42 A taking limited to a period calls for a different measure, and most courts compare the land's value with and without the regulation, then award a market rate of return on that differential. Suppose an ordinance holds land at $300,000 that would be worth $1,000,000 without it. At a reasonable 8% rate, the $700,000 differential yields $56,000 a year, or $224,000 over four years.43 Rental value can be theoretical for undeveloped land. Courts may instead award interest on a sum representing the diminution in the land's value for the period the regulation applied, use the land's option value, or project the loss of actual expected income during the period of impermissible regulation.44