Concept
Text and Purpose
Contracts Clause
The Contracts Clause
Text and Purpose
The Contracts Clause is one item on a list of things Article I, Section 10 forbids a State to do: “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”1 The same sentence bars the States from emitting bills of credit and from making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.2 The tender ban beside the clause concerns the payment of debts directly, which is a clue to what the clause was for. The history confirms the clue.
The framers drafted the clause to stop the States from passing debtor relief laws.3 The statutes they had in mind took several forms. The most common made paper currency legal tender for the payment of debts. Installment laws let overdue obligations be paid in installments over months or even years instead of in the lump sum the contract required. Stay laws postponed the payment of private debts or temporarily closed the courts. Commodity payment laws permitted payment in listed goods at a fraction of their actual value, often three-fourths or four-fifths.4
The lasting harm of these laws was lost confidence. In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell the Court described legislative interferences so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was threatened. It quoted The Federalist for the conviction of “the sober people of America” that a “thorough reform” was needed to “inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.”5 A lender's reasoning shows why this mattered. Anyone deciding whether to extend credit must price in the chance that the legislature will rewrite the repayment terms after the loan is made, and the more often legislatures do so, the less credit anyone is willing to extend. The remedy was to interpose the restraining power of a central authority in order to secure the foundations even of “private faith.”6
What the clause protects is an “obligation,” and the Court's account of a contract shows how much that word covers. A contract is an agreement in which a competent party undertakes to do, or not to do, a particular thing. The agreement seldom specifies on its face the full extent of its terms, so many things are necessarily implied and are governed by the existing law when the contract is made or is to be executed. An agreement to pay money with interest, for example, carries a rate fixed by a standard outside the agreement, and the law presumes the parties meant the common rate of the place of performance. That standard does not clear up an ambiguity; it ascertains the extent of the obligation.7 The obligation, then, includes the terms the surrounding law supplies, not only the words the parties wrote.
Timing decides most contracts clause questions, and a hypothetical shows why. In March a dealer sells a tractor to a farmer on an installment plan, payable monthly for two years. In June the legislature bans installment sales beginning the following January. The ban raises no contracts clause issue, because it forbids only future uses of installment contracts and rewrites no bargain already made.8 Now suppose the legislature instead declares that everyone who bought on an installment plan before the ban owes nothing further. That statute relieves buyers of debts they contracted before it was passed, which is what a State may not do under the clause.9 The line between laws that govern future agreements and laws that rewrite existing ones runs through the whole history of the clause.
Under Chief Justice Marshall the clause received an expansive reading. In the Marshall Court's decisions, among them Sturges v. Crowninshield and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Court used the provision to invalidate statutes that retrospectively impaired almost any contractual obligation of private parties. It never used the clause to void a law that modified obligations only prospectively. Until the late nineteenth century the clause was the principal provision the Court used to strike legislation that infringed on private property rights.10
Then the clause lost its central role. In the late nineteenth century the Court followed the lead of state courts that read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the liberty of private contracting and the sanctity of private property. Two of those state judges, David Brewer and Rufus Peckham, were later appointed to the Supreme Court.11 During the Lochner era, from about 1897 until 1937, due process protection of freedom of contract limited government regulation of both future and existing contracts. The Contracts Clause reaches only existing contracts, so due process swallowed its content and left the clause superfluous.12 Since then the Court has rarely relied on the clause to invalidate state legislation that retroactively affected contractual rights or obligations.13
What survives is a limited check, and the text explains why it is limited. Blaisdell examined the course of judicial decisions applying the clause, among them Justice Johnson's opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, and found it beyond question that the prohibition is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula.14 The neighboring bans show the contrast. Some constitutional provisions are so specific that they admit no construction, and not even an emergency would let a State coin money or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The contract clause is a general clause, and general clauses need construction to fill in their details, a need that the clause's placement beside more specific prohibitions does not remove.15 The Court has likewise called it well settled that, unlike the other provisions in the section, this one is not to be read literally. Its primary focus, the Court has said, was legislation designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy.16
Read literally, the ban would reach nearly every regulation, since almost any health, safety, or economic rule shifts someone's contractual position. The Court has therefore generally let States regulate private contractual obligations when the regulation is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.17 Recognizing the occasion and general purposes of the clause does not by itself fix its precise scope,18 and the sections that follow show how courts sort the laws it forbids from the regulation it tolerates.