Concept
The Direct-Imposition Predicate
Unconstitutional Conditions
The Direct-Imposition Predicate
Before a court asks how hard a condition squeezes the recipient, it asks a simpler question: could the government have ordered the thing outright? Koontz named that inquiry a predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim. The claimant must show that the government could not have constitutionally commanded what it pressured the claimant into doing.1 The logic is direct. The doctrine blocks conditions that obtain indirectly what the government could not demand, so a claimant whom the government could have commanded gives up nothing the Constitution protected by accepting the condition, and the first screen ends the claim.
The test comes out of the land-use cases on which Koontz rests. In Nollan and Dolan, the Court began by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought through the permitting process, it would have committed a per se taking.2 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. describes the same feature. Both cases involved dedications so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings, and both apply the doctrine under which the government “may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.”3 The chain is easy to trace. An owner holds a right to compensation when the government takes an easement, and the government could not order the owner to hand one over without paying. A permit conditioned on handing one over therefore pressures the owner to give up that right, and Nollan and Dolan supply the test for the pressure. The same logic reaches access requirements: because the government could not directly mandate the access, which would be a physical intrusion, it may make access a condition of a project only when the condition is germane to the development as a whole. The Court applies that requirement with unusual vigor, for reasons it has never fully explained.4
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights shows the predicate ending a claim. The Solomon Amendment conditioned federal funds on an access requirement for military recruiters, and the Court held that it placed no unconstitutional condition on those funds. A funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly, and the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the amendment’s access requirement.5 Choosing a funding condition over a mandate did not change the result. Congress’s decision to proceed indirectly does not reduce the deference it receives in military affairs, and a funding condition deserves at least as deferential treatment as a mandate on universities would.6
United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. came out the other way on the predicate. Recipients of Leadership Act funds had to agree explicitly with the government’s policy of opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, and the Court concluded that the same requirement, enacted as a direct regulation of speech, would plainly violate the First Amendment. The predicate was therefore met, and the remaining question was whether the government may nonetheless impose the requirement as a condition on funds, a question the funding section takes up. The pattern is an old one. In Speiser, a State limited a tax exemption to those who affirmed their loyalty to it. The State owed no one the exemption, yet the condition deterred the exercise of First Amendment rights and threatened to “produce a result which the State could not command directly.”7 What separates Rumsfeld from Alliance is the demand itself. The First Amendment would not stop Congress from requiring equal campus access, but it would stop Congress from requiring a person to affirm a government position, and the predicate sorts the two claims on that difference.
A stem that describes a university, a grantee, or a permit applicant facing a condition invites two detours: asking whether the claimant is entitled to the benefit, and asking how valuable the benefit is. The prior section showed that entitlement answers nothing, and the predicate ignores value as well, because it looks only to the demand. A claimant who loses on that question has no right to point to, however valuable the benefit. The screen is easiest to run as a short sequence.
The predicate also screens out ordinary use restrictions that only resemble conditions. In California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose, the principal requirement was that a developer sell 15 percent of its on-site for-sale units at an affordable housing price. The California Supreme Court held that the ordinance imposed no exaction, because it demanded neither a dedication of property nor a payment of money and only restricted how the developer could use its property.8 The reasoning tracks the predicate. The doctrine comes into play only when the government requires the owner to convey some identifiable property interest, a dedication of property or the payment of money, as a condition of approval, and that requirement is what makes a demand an exaction. The Court has likewise not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions.9 Municipalities may limit building height, impose setbacks, cap density by lot size and units per lot, set bedroom requirements, and adopt a variety of other use restrictions.10 A restriction of that kind would not be a taking if imposed on any owner directly, so it asks the applicant to surrender no right to compensation. Compare a condition requiring the same developer to deed a strip of land for a public path. A direct seizure of that land would be a taking, so the predicate is met and Nollan and Dolan govern.
The predicate has contested edges, and Koontz tested one of them: a demand for money instead of land. The California court read Koontz as reaching the payment of money as well as a dedication of property.11 The Koontz Court also rejected an argument that would have let permitting officials evade Nollan and Dolan, since an authority wishing to exact an easement could simply offer the owner a choice between surrendering the easement and paying a sum equal to its value.12 It added a counterweight. So long as a permitting authority offers the landowner at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has not been subjected to an unconstitutional condition. The Court refused, however, to treat an offer to let the owner build on one acre as an alternative to offsite mitigation, because that suggestion misapprehended the governmental benefit.13 The land-use section below takes up monetary demands in detail.
The predicate reaches well beyond speech and property. In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, the Court rejected the argument that inter partes review is an unconstitutional condition on the benefit of a patent. Even assuming a patent is such a benefit, the doctrine prevents the government from using conditions “to produce a result which it could not command directly,” and inter partes review, being consistent with Article III and within Congress’s Article I authority, is something Congress can command directly.14 The Court never asked how valuable a patent is. It asked what Congress could require.