Concept
State Constitutional Tests
Unconstitutional Conditions
State Constitutional Tests
California courts have long refused to treat the state’s freedom to withhold a benefit as freedom to dispense it on any terms. The refusal begins with Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District. Justice Traynor, writing for the court, conceded that “[t]he state is under no duty to make school buildings available for public meetings,” but held that if the state opens them, it “cannot arbitrarily prevent any members of the public from holding such meetings” and “[n]or can it make the privilege of holding them dependent on conditions that would deprive any members of the public of their constitutional rights.”1 The principle he stated is general: “A state is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege even though the privilege is use of state property.”2
Later California decisions have applied the Danskin principles to public forums, public employment, welfare benefits, public housing, unemployment benefits, and the use of public property, and to the rights of free speech and privacy alike. In each setting the courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that because the state need not provide a general benefit, it may confer the benefit selectively and exclude recipients solely because they seek to exercise a constitutional right.3 Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers carried that line of cases into the right of privacy, testing Medi-Cal’s restrictions on funding abortions against a woman’s right of procreative choice.4
The test the Myers court applied comes from Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District. A nurse’s aide employed by the hospital district was discharged when she refused to stop pamphleting and circulating petitions, off duty, in support of a campaign to recall several of the district’s directors. The district defended the discharge with a Government Code section forbidding local-agency employees to take an active part in any campaign for or against a recall measure, and the California Supreme Court struck the statute down on constitutional grounds.5
Bagley stressed that the “government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity” for treating recipients unequally, and it set a three-part standard that the state must satisfy.6
Each requirement asks for something only the state is positioned to supply: how the condition serves the program, what it costs the people it reaches, and whether a gentler design would do. A claimant need not prove what alternatives an agency considered, because the burden falls on the state.
The court did not take its standard from the federal funding cases. It observed that for at least the past decade the federal decisions in this area, among them Wyman v. James and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, had not been a reliable barometer of governing California constitutional principles. It added that the majority in Harris v. McRae, in refusing to scrutinize the discriminatory Medicaid funding scheme closely, relied on factors that have no bearing on a court applying California law.10
Nor would the court confine Bagley to conditions that cut recipients off from many benefits. It held that the proffered distinction between broad disqualification and the withholding of a single benefit “does not conform to California precedent.” Danskin itself did not disqualify subversive elements from a wide range of benefits; it withheld one benefit, the use of public schools as a forum, from people who wanted to use the facilities to exercise rights the state did not wish to subsidize. By the same logic, a state could not escape Bagley by providing free marriages to poor intraracial couples while declining that “single benefit” to poor interracial couples.11
A stem about a condition attached to a public benefit first requires you to identify the governing constitution. Under the federal Constitution, apply the federal tests covered earlier in this chapter. Under the California Constitution, apply Bagley: the state must justify the condition on all three requirements, and a federal decision on similar facts is not a reliable guide to the result.
Relation to Program Purpose
The first Bagley requirement asks whether the condition connects to the benefit it burdens. The state “must establish that the imposed conditions relate to the purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege.”12 The burden rests on the state from the first step, and the comparison runs between the condition and the legislation that creates the program.
Justice Frankfurter’s observation, which the Bagley court quoted with approval, explains why: “Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life, but if it affords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or exact surrender of freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities.”13 A condition unrelated to the program’s purpose does nothing for the program, so it exacts the surrender of a freedom for no reason the program supplies.
In Bagley and Parrish the conditions at least bore a relation to the program’s purpose. The restrictions on First Amendment activity by public employees were apparently intended to curtail activities thought able to interfere with the effective performance of the employee’s job. The restrictions on welfare recipients’ privacy related to the elimination of fraud in the welfare system, and so could be said to further the aims of the program.14 A condition that clears this step must still satisfy the second and third requirements.
Housing Authority v. Cordova supplies the contrast. The housing act’s purpose was to eradicate slums and provide housing for persons of low income, and the Cordova court found that excluding otherwise qualified persons solely because of membership in organizations designated as subversive “has no tendency whatever to further such purpose.”15
The Medi-Cal restrictions in Myers failed this step. They “directly impede” the program’s fundamental purpose of providing necessary health care to indigents. Even when abortion is the appropriate medical treatment for a poor pregnant woman, the statute virtually bars payment, which subjects her to significant health hazards and in some cases to death.16
The state could show a relationship between the Budget Act limitations and Medi-Cal’s purpose only by claiming that the program seeks not merely to provide necessary health care to indigents but also to protect the life and health of the fetus. The court rejected that move: reconciling the limitations with Medi-Cal’s objectives on the theory that they protect the fetus impermissibly denigrates the woman’s right of choice. At least before viability, both California and federal authorities establish that the state may not subordinate a woman’s own medical interests or her right of procreative choice to the interests of the fetus.17 Were it otherwise, a state could satisfy the first requirement by adding the burden on the right to the program’s stated goals. The court therefore turned to the second part of the test.
A stem on this requirement supplies a program, a statute that states or implies its purpose, and a condition that costs recipients the exercise of a right. Start from the legislation and ask whether the condition furthers the program’s purpose, has no tendency to further it, or impedes it. Two errors recur. The first is to stop once some plausible link appears, when a link only carries the claim to the second requirement. The second is to accept a statement of purpose that can be met only by subordinating the right to an interest the state may not pursue against it, as in the fetal-protection theory Myers rejected.
Utility Versus Impairment
The second Bagley requirement moves from relation to cost. The state must demonstrate that “the utility of imposing the conditions ... manifestly outweigh[s] any resulting impairment of constitutional rights.”19 In the weighing, a court must realistically assess the importance of the state interest and the degree to which the restrictions actually serve it. It must also evaluate the importance of the constitutional right and the extent to which, as a practical matter, the specific restrictions threaten or impair a person’s ability to exercise it.20
The word “utility” can mislead. A footnote in Myers explains that the cases applying the test require the state to establish that the conditions actually serve a legitimate state interest.21 An interest the state merely asserts therefore counts only to the extent the condition actually advances it.
The state’s interest in protecting the fetus carried little weight. Before viability, the state may not subordinate a woman’s own medical interests or her right of procreative choice to the interests of the fetus.22 Even if the state could assert a compelling interest in protecting a nonviable fetus, the court had grave doubts that it could pursue that interest as it had here. The state had not undertaken to protect the potential life of all fetuses by promoting their interests over the constitutional rights of all women. By acting through Medi-Cal funding restrictions rather than broader legislation, it singled out poor women and subordinated only their right of procreative choice.23
Any claim that the restrictions save money fares no better. Medi-Cal paid for approximately 80,000 abortions in 1978, the last year it funded all legal abortions, and for only 22 in 1979, the first year the restrictions applied. The record does not show how many of the women denied funding carried to term, but it is clear that the state will incur significant additional expenses as a result of the restrictions.24
The impairment side weighed heavily. The court called the right of procreative choice fundamental and intimate and found the impairment the restrictions would cause in practice severe.25 The drop from 80,000 funded abortions to 22 shows how the restrictions operated for women who depend on Medi-Cal, and declarations in the record illustrate the figures. One describes a woman who suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after her child was born. Another describes a 32-year-old woman with multiple sclerosis whose physician advised that a full-term pregnancy would seriously endanger her health. The restrictions prevented her from obtaining a Medi-Cal funded abortion, and after the birth she suffered a severe relapse that left her nearly totally paralyzed. Other declarations describe the medical risks facing women with diabetes or kidney disease, or with a prior caesarean delivery.26
The restrictions also fell on the poor alone, and that selectivity weighed against the state. Earlier cases had generally considered the factor under equal protection, but Professor O’Neil identified its relevance to unconstitutional conditions: limitations on governmental benefits that apply to rich and poor alike are “obviously less invidious” than conditions, like those in Myers, in which the state effectively tells a poor woman that because she is poor she “must restrict [her exercise of constitutional rights] in ways that the government does not ask self-sufficient people to do.”27
The court concluded that the benefits flowing from the restrictions in no sense “manifestly outweigh” the resulting impairment. The state was hard-pressed to show that the restrictions further any constitutionally legitimate interest at all, while the restrictions effectively nullify the poor woman’s fundamental right to retain personal control over her own body and her own destiny. The scheme therefore failed the second part of Bagley.28
Utility that outweighs impairment does not make a condition the least offensive way to reach the state’s aim, and the third requirement tests that separately.
Least Offensive Alternative
The third Bagley requirement asks whether the state had a gentler way to reach its goal. The state must “establish the unavailability of less offensive alternatives and [to] demonstrate that the conditions are drawn with narrow specificity, restricting the exercise of constitutional rights only to the extent necessary to maintain the integrity of the program which confers the benefits.”30 In effect, the requirement obliges the state to adopt the “least offensive alternative” adequate to achieve any legitimate state interest.31
The requirement has two parts. The first compares the chosen condition with other designs that could reach the same end, and the state must show that none exists. The second looks at the condition by itself and asks whether its reach stops where the program’s integrity stops. The earlier requirements do neither job. A condition can relate to the program’s purpose and have utility that outweighs its cost, yet still burden the right more than the program needs.
One possible defense of the Medi-Cal restrictions is that they aid poor women who wish to have children. The court held that this argument fails the “least restrictive alternative” test, because the state could readily meet the needs of indigent women without burdening their right of procreative choice simply by funding impartially the expenses of childbirth and abortion.32
The reasoning is easy to follow. Paying childbirth expenses accomplishes the aim in full. Paying abortion expenses as well takes nothing from it, because a woman who wants to bear a child gets the same help either way. What the exclusion of abortion adds is pressure on the choice between the two. A design whose only marginal effect is that pressure is not the least offensive means, since an impartial design was available. “Quite clearly,” the court concluded, “this legislation cannot be defended as aiding poor women who wish to have children by the means least offensive to the constitutional rights of other women.”33
A stem on this requirement usually supplies a state purpose that sounds benign, such as helping a favored group, saving money, or protecting a program from abuse. The legitimacy of the purpose only brings the analysis to the third requirement. The question is whether the same purpose could be served by a design that leaves the right untouched, and if one exists, the condition fails. The requirement belongs to the California standard, so a stem governed by federal law calls for the federal tests covered earlier in this chapter.