Concept
Text and Purpose
Bills of Attainder
Bills of Attainder
Text and Purpose
Article I, section 9 lists the limits on Congress, and one of them is a flat command: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."1 The attainder ban stands beside the ban on ex post facto laws, and the last section of this chapter returns to how the two fit together. Standing alone, the attainder ban answers a specific danger: a legislature that decides for itself who is guilty and what the penalty will be.
Section 10 repeats the command for the states: "No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."2 The Constitution says it twice because the two sections address different governments. Barron v. Baltimore reads section 9 as a list, in the nature of a bill of rights, of limits on the general government. It reads section 10 as the separate list that operates on the state legislatures and applies to the states "by express words."3 In practice, Congress is bound through section 9 and every state legislature through section 10, so an attainder challenge never turns on whether the enacting body is federal or state.
Cummings v. Missouri supplies the working definition: a bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.4 English practice sorted such acts by severity. An act imposing death was a bill of attainder, and an act imposing something less than death was a bill of pains and penalties. The American clause covers both, so a legislature cannot escape the ban by sparing the target's life.5 Nor must the act name its targets one by one. These bills were generally directed against individuals by name, but they could reach a whole class. Henry VIII's bill against the Earl of Kildare also attainted of high treason all who had been the earl's "comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates, or adherents," and gave that attainder the same force as if each of them had been named.6
The first reason for the ban is structural. A legislature that attaints someone takes on a judge's office. It pronounces guilt without any of the forms or safeguards of trial, decides whether the proofs suffice (whether or not they conform to the rules of evidence), and fixes the punishment according to its own notions of how serious the offense is.7 The Court therefore treats the clause as an ingredient of the separation of powers. Just as Article III confines the judiciary to concrete cases and controversies, the clause reflects the Framers' belief that the legislative branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to rule on the blameworthiness of specific persons and to levy punishment on them.8
A second reason is that legislatures are exposed to passion. Fletcher v. Peck says the Framers viewed with apprehension the violent acts that might grow out of the feelings of the moment. It adds that the people, in adopting the Constitution, were determined to shield themselves from those sudden and strong passions, and that the restrictions on state legislative power rest on that sentiment.9 English experience bore out the fear. Justice Story observed that such bills were most usually passed in times of rebellion, gross subserviency to the crown, or violent political excitement, when even free nations are most liable to forget their duties and trample on the rights of others.10 The ex post facto prohibition that Calder v. Bull construed grew from the same experience with Parliament. Parliament's acts were legislative judgments that sometimes declared conduct treason when it was not treason when committed, sometimes bent the rules of evidence to supply missing proof, and sometimes inflicted punishments the law did not allow. The federal and state constitutions forbade attainders and ex post facto laws to prevent that injustice.11
A third reason is retroactivity: a legislature cannot impose sanctions on past behavior. The prohibition therefore rests partly on the problem of retroactivity and partly on the separation of powers, since the legislature does not hold the power to act as judge of cases.12
The cases show the clause at work. In United States v. Lovett, Congress forbade, subject to certain conditions, the further payment of salary to three named government employees, and the Court invalidated the statute as a bill of attainder. Its conclusion that the statute imposed punishment rested largely on the specific congressional history.13 In Brown, the Court reached the same result for a statute that focused on easily identifiable members of a class, members of the Communist Party, and imposed on them mandatory forfeiture of a job or office, a sanction long deemed punishment within the clause.14 The same reasoning condemns a statute, federal or state, that fines or imprisons any public official found guilty of misconduct in office by his superiors. Such a statute reaches an ascertainable group and inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.15
That contrast previews the three elements the next sections develop. A fuller formulation extends the definition to legislative acts, whatever their form, that apply to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.16 A challenger must therefore show three things:
- The legislative act applies to specified persons, whether named outright or identifiable as members of a group.
- The act punishes, a term that includes sanctions short of death, such as forfeiture of a job or office.17
- The act operates without a judicial proceeding, so that the legislature has substituted its own judgment for that of a court.18