Concept
Elements of an Attainder
Bills of Attainder
Elements of an Attainder
Article I, section 9 forbids Congress to pass a bill of attainder, and section 10 extends the ban to the states, but neither provision says what a bill of attainder is.1 The Court supplied a definition in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and repeated it in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group: a bill of attainder is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.”2 The challengers in Selective Service argued that the statute satisfied none of the three requirements built into that definition: specification of the affected persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial.3
The three elements are cumulative, so a claim fails if any one is missing. A bill of attainder is a legislative act that (1) punishes (2) specified persons (3) without a judicial proceeding.4 Each element screens out a different kind of lawful legislation. A statute that specifies no one is a general rule, and the legislature has chosen no target. A statute that burdens identifiable persons without punishing them is ordinary regulation, since legislatures routinely affect named parties through licensing, spending, and eligibility rules. A statute that punishes specified persons only after a court has found guilt leaves guilt to the judiciary. Only when all three features coincide has the legislature itself accused, convicted, and sentenced, which is the concentration of power the clause exists to prevent. The ban rests partly on separation of powers, because the legislature does not hold the power to judge cases, and partly on retroactivity, because a legislature cannot impose sanctions on past behavior.5
This section takes the elements in the order a challenger would argue them: specification in its name and past-conduct forms, then punishment, then the absence of a trial.
Named Persons and Groups
Specification asks whom the statute burdens, and the answer is not limited to people the statute names. As Cummings v. Missouri recounted the history, bills of attainder were generally directed against individuals by name, but they could be directed against a whole class.6 The bill against the Earl of Kildare, passed in the reign of Henry VIII, shows how. It attainted of high treason the earl’s named associates together with everyone who was or had been a “comforter, abettor, partaker, confederate, or adherent” of the earl in his treasonous purposes, and it declared the attainder of that group as strong in law as if every member had been named by name and surname in the act.7 Parliament had decided that everyone in the described group was guilty and had fixed the punishment. Describing the class instead of listing it changed nothing about who was punished or by whom.
Cummings then applied that history to Missouri’s own constitution. Its clauses presumed the guilt of priests and clergymen and adjudged them deprived of the right to preach or teach unless an expurgatory oath removed the presumption. In the Court’s words, “they assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment conditionally,” and the difference between that scheme and an outright legislative declaration of guilt was “one of form only, and not of substance.”8 Because clergy are identified by their calling, the legislature needed no list of names to know whom it was condemning.
The modern cases confirm that names and classes count alike. In United States v. Lovett, Congress cut off the salaries of three named federal employees because the House believed them to be subversives, and the Court struck the measure down.9 In United States v. Brown, the statute named no one. Section 504 barred members of the Communist Party from serving as union officials, and the Court held that it worked an attainder by focusing on easily identifiable members of a class and imposing forfeiture of a job or office.10 Lovett is the name form of specification and Brown is the class form, and the Court uses a single formulation for both: legislative acts, “no matter what their form,” that apply “either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group” in a way that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.11
The reasons behind the clause apply equally to a name and to a description. Brown rested on the framers’ belief that the legislative branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to rule on the blameworthiness of specific persons and to levy punishment on them.12 A concurring opinion added that the Constitution normally requires Congress to proceed by general rulemaking instead of deciding individual cases.13 A rule limited to names would also be easy to evade, because a legislature could describe its target in terms that fit one person or a short list, as the Kildare bill did for the earl’s adherents.
Because those reasons track specificity, the narrower the class, the closer the statute comes to the paradigm attainder. An opinion in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, a case about retroactive legislation, put the point as a sliding scale: the narrower the class burdened, the greater the danger that the legislation has the characteristics of a bill of attainder.14 The concurrence offered a concrete pair. Congress may deprive Communist deportees, as a group, of their Social Security benefits, but depriving a single named person of the same benefit would surely be an attainder, because “the very specificity of the statute would mark it as punishment, for there is rarely any valid reason for such narrow legislation.”15
Specificity is nonetheless a warning sign, not a conclusion. The Act challenged in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services applied only to one former President,16 yet the Court said that even if the specificity element were satisfied, the clause would not automatically be implicated, because forbidden legislative punishment “is not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome consequences.”17 The Court also rejected the view that any person or group could invalidate adverse legislation by complaining that lawmakers should have defined the affected class at a higher level of generality. That view, it said, “would cripple the very process of legislating.”18 Whether a class of one can ever be legitimate is a question for the later discussion of valid legislation.
Specification alone does not make the first measure an attainder; it must also punish and operate without a trial. First, though, a closer look at one way legislatures specify persons without naming them: by what those persons have done.
Past Conduct as Designation
A statute can specify persons without naming them or listing a class, because a description of past conduct can do the work of a name. In Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the Court put the rule this way: singling out an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment “constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons.”20 When past activity serves as “a point of reference for the ascertainment of particular persons ineluctably designated by the legislature” for punishment, the Act may be an attainder.21 The word “ineluctably” means unavoidably, so a description designates persons when nothing they do now can take them out of the class.
Past conduct designates because it is a closed set. Once an event has happened, everyone who took part in it is fixed, so a statute reaching “everyone who did X” compiles a roster that no one can join or leave. A rule keyed to present conduct works differently: it tells each person what to do to avoid the burden, and anyone can comply, so the legislature has set a standard and chosen no one. A rule keyed to something already done cannot change anyone’s behavior, so its only real effect is to impose a consequence on those who did it, which is what a sentence does. The question to ask is whether a person can escape the disability by changing present conduct or is locked in by what has already been done.
The Confederate test-oath cases show the pattern. Cummings v. Missouri reached an oath in a state constitution, and Ex parte Garland, decided right after it, reached an oath imposed by Congress on attorneys. In both, the persons disqualified were “defined entirely by irreversible acts committed by them.”22 The Garland oath operated “as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion” from the practice of law, because past affiliation with the Confederacy kept attorneys from taking it without perjuring themselves.23 Garland also explains why such an oath is not a mere qualification. A legislature may prescribe qualifications for an office or a calling, but a condition counts as a qualification only if it “must be attainable, in theory at least, by every one.” A condition that the past conduct of the party puts out of reach “does not fall within the definition of the term,” and for all who cannot meet it, it is a disqualification that operates as a perpetual bar.24 The question, then, is not whether the legislature may set qualifications but whether it used that power “as a means for the infliction of punishment.” Because the same prohibition binds Congress, the argument made against the Missouri oath applied equally to the federal one.25
The Missouri oath was broader than any list of overt acts. It reached “words, desires, and sympathies,” and it drew no line between acts springing from malignant enmity and acts prompted by charity, affection, or relationship, so a person who had expressed sympathy for a relative drawn into the Rebellion was “as unable to subscribe to the oath as the most active and the most cruel of the rebels.”26 Making the enjoyment of a right depend on an impossible condition, the Court said, “is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition, and such denial, enforced for a past act, is nothing less than punishment imposed for that act.”27 The oath looked like a condition open to all, but for those whose past it covered it was a closed door. The Missouri constitution did not name the persons or groups who had to take the oath, yet the Court concluded that, in creating a qualification with no possible relation to fitness for their chosen professions, it was meant “to reach the person, not the calling.”28
The draft-registration aid statute lies on the other side of the line. Brown’s union bar resembled the oaths, since it kept former Communists out of union office for five years after they resigned, so leaving the party did not end the disability.29 The district court in the draft-registration case read the statutory bar to apply to students who registered late, and on that reading it found that the statute “clearly singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct.”30 The Supreme Court saw the requirements differently. Far from irreversible, they “can be met readily by either timely or late filing,” so ineligibility “is made to turn upon continuingly contemporaneous fact” that a student who wants public assistance can correct.31 The two readings differ in one variable: whether the person can cure the default.
Past conduct is not always a designation for punishment. Whenever a law identifies persons by what they did, a court must ask whether it simply names individuals for punishment or promotes a nonpunitive goal through reasonable criteria over which the individual has some control.32 A rule barring every doctor who ever worked at one named hospital measures nothing about competence and looks like the first kind of law. A rule barring doctors previously convicted of malpractice looks more like the second, because the past conduct bears on fitness to practice. Irreversibility therefore shows only that persons have been designated; whether the designation punishes is the inquiry the next sections take up.
Meaning of Punishment
Naming or describing persons is only the first step, because the statute must also punish them, and the clauses do not define punishment. Cummings supplied the definition. Missouri’s counsel argued that punishment is confined to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The Court held instead that punishment also embraces the deprivation or suspension of political or civil rights, so the disabilities in the state constitution were in effect punishment.34 The narrower reading would have made the clause easy to evade. A legislature could skip the death sentence and the prison term, strip a person of a livelihood or a civil right, and call the result a civil disability, and the protection would depend on the label the legislature chose.
The cases now recognize sanctions in three layers:
- Life and property. At common law, bills of attainder often imposed death, while bills of pains and penalties imposed lesser punishments, commonly imprisonment, banishment, and punitive confiscation of property. A bill may affect a person’s life, confiscate the person’s property, or do both, and the Constitution proscribes the lesser penalties as well as death.35
- Civil and political rights. “The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment.”36
- Employment and professions. American cases extended the list to legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions.37
The last two layers came from the cases. Cummings and Garland struck down statutes that kept defined categories of people from practicing their professions, a priest in one case and a lawyer in the other, and they established that punishment is not limited to criminal sanctions.38 In Lovett the only sanction was the loss of a government salary, an indirect punishment for the employees’ supposed bad associations, and it was enough.39 Most attainder cases therefore involve punishment in a sense much broader than the criminal law’s, and it does not matter whether the legislature meant to punish past conduct or to discourage future conduct it dislikes.40
A legislature rarely says it is avenging anything, so a forward-looking justification cannot take a deprivation outside the clause. In United States v. Brown, Congress barred Communist Party members from union office, and the Court rejected the argument that the ban was preventive instead of retributive: “It would be archaic to limit the definition of ‘punishment’ to ‘retribution.’ Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent—and preventive.”41 Selective Service restated the point. Punishment “is not limited solely to retribution for past events, but may involve deprivations inflicted to deter future misconduct,” and legislative intent to encourage compliance with the law does not establish that a statute is merely legitimate regulation.42 If a preventive rationale ended the inquiry, any attainder could be redrafted in preventive terms.
The Court has also marked a limit. The severity of a sanction does not decide whether it is punishment, and a burden is not punishment merely because federal authority placed it on citizens.43 Nixon explained the stakes: anyone burdened by legislation may feel unfairly punished, and a rule built on that feeling would cripple legislating.44 Every tax, licensing rule, and eligibility condition burdens someone, and if each burden were punishment, each such law would demand a judicial trial that no legislature can supply.
Consider what separates the priest in Cummings from the students in the draft-registration case. The priest lost the right to preach and teach unless he took an oath that those who had aided the rebellion could not take, and the Court treated the loss of a right he had previously enjoyed as punishment.45 The students lost federal educational aid under section 12(f), and the Court found that the sanction was “the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit,” with no affirmative disability or restraint and “nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.”46 Both losses are real, and the amount of hardship does not tell them apart. How courts do tell a punitive deprivation from an ordinary burden is the subject of the next section, which develops three tests.
No Judicial Trial
The third element asks a structural question: who decided guilt, and who chose the penalty? Cummings described what a legislature does when it attaints. Beyond its legitimate functions, it takes on the office of judge. It “pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial”; it “determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise”; and it “fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offence.”48 When the answer to the opening question is the legislature itself, the vice the framers feared is present, and that makes this element the structural core of the doctrine.
Lovett shows the failure in practice. Congress cut off the pay of three named federal employees because the House believed them to be subversives,49 and a House Report expressly characterized them as “subversive” and “unfit . . . to continue in Government employment.”50 The body that condemned the employees also imposed the sanction, so no neutral decisionmaker stood between accusation and penalty. A court would have supplied one, along with what Lovett listed as the safeguards of a trial: an impartial jury, counsel, clear notice of the charge, a law passed before the act, confrontation of witnesses, protection against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and a bar on cruel and unusual punishment.51
Courtesy in the legislative process does not change who decides. Dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, Justice Black wrote that the Constitution proscribes all bills of attainder, “not merely those which lack counsel or courtesy,” because the Founders believed punishment too serious a matter to entrust to anyone but an independent judiciary and a jury acting on previously passed, unambiguous laws with the full set of trial safeguards.52 That is a dissent, not a holding, but it states the policy behind Cummings’s description of a legislature that assumes the judicial office.
The expurgatory oath shows how a legislature can skip the trial while appearing to offer a choice. Cummings called the Missouri scheme a presumption of guilt with a conditional penalty: the clauses “presume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and adjudge the deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the presumption be first removed by their expurgatory oath.”53 The burden runs backward. In a trial the government carries its burden before any penalty falls, and under the oath the penalty stands against everyone who cannot truthfully swear. The Court tested the oath against what the state could not do directly. Counsel’s own example, a man tried for treason and acquitted, or convicted and pardoned, who must still swear he never committed the acts or be shut out of every office and avocation, shows the problem, and a state could have extended the exclusion to every avocation. Such enactments “impose the same penalty, without the formality of a judicial trial and conviction,” because for those unable to swear the oath is “an impossible condition.” Since the state would have failed had it attempted the same thing directly, “any other mode producing the same result must equally fail.”54
Garland drew the contrast from the federal side. An attorney holds office during good behavior and can be deprived of it only for misconduct “ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court, after opportunity to be heard has been afforded.”55 A court’s route to disbarment runs through a hearing and a judgment, and the oath route runs through neither.
The element has a limit that keeps it from swallowing every disqualification statute. When a disability follows a judicial determination of culpability, the legislature has not decided guilt itself. In De Veau v. Braisted, a state law kept convicted felons from holding positions with longshoremen’s unions, and the Court sustained it because the prohibition rested on a judicial determination of culpability and created no further implication of the felon’s guilt.56 The legislature imposed a penalty on an ascertainable class only after a court had established guilt.
Union office supplies a clean pair. In Brown, Congress barred Communist Party members from union office, and the Court held the bar an attainder because it focused on easily identifiable members of a class and imposed forfeiture of a job or office.57 The Court rested that holding on the framers’ belief that the legislative branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to rule on the blameworthiness of specific persons and to levy punishment on them.58 Party membership is not a judicial finding of culpability, so Congress itself had made the judgment. De Veau involved the same kind of office and the opposite result, because a court had found culpability first. What separates the two statutes is whether a judicial finding came before the disability attached.
The Nixon Act supplies a third reference point, because it left the judicial process in place. It assured district court jurisdiction and judicial review over all the former President’s legal claims, with priority on the docket, and the Court said it “preserves for appellant all of the protections that inhere in a judicial proceeding.”59 The Court also contrasted the Act with the statute in Lovett, where a House Report expressly branded the individuals subversive and unfit.60 A legislature that leaves a person’s legal claims to the courts has not assumed the judicial office, while one that fixes guilt and penalty and offers no court has.