Concept
Text and Reach of the Clauses
Ex Post Facto Laws
Retroactive Criminal Legislation
Text and Reach of the Clauses
The Constitution forbids retroactive penal legislation twice, once against Congress and once against the states. Article I, § 9 provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,"1 and Article I, § 10 forbids any State to "pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."2 The first provision binds the federal government and the second binds the states. Both limit legislatures that enact penal laws with retrospective effect, so this chapter treats them together as the Clause.3
A violation requires four features. The measure must be a legislative act,4 it must impose criminal liability on conduct completed before enactment,5 it must be penal, and it must leave the offender worse off.6 The clearest case is a new crime applied to conduct that was lawful when done.7
Legislatures seldom attempt anything so blatant. The same result follows, however, when a legislature deletes an element of the offense after the conduct occurred, such as dropping "knowingly" from a statutory crime, or removes a defense that was then available, such as self-defense in a battery prosecution.8 In each case the legislature changes the rules after the conduct, and the accused pays for the change.
The Clause limits when a penal law may be applied, not what conduct a legislature may make criminal. The legislature in Joe's case remains free to punish smoking in the building from June 10 forward, and a conviction reversed on ex post facto grounds leaves the statute intact and available for prospective use.9
Read literally, "ex post facto" covers any law passed after the fact, which would sweep in nearly every statute. The Court has long held instead that the prohibition applies only to penal statutes that disadvantage the offender, because "ex post facto law" was a term of art with an established meaning when the Constitution was framed.10 Early in its history the Court read the clauses to reach only criminal or penal measures with retroactive effect.11 Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull remains the familiar statement of the legislative acts at the Clause's core, and later sections of this chapter take up those categories.12
Calder itself shows where the line falls. The legislature there had passed a resolution granting a new trial, and one opinion reasoned that even if the resolution was a legislative act, the prohibition "extends to criminal, not to civil cases."13 The reason lies in history. Europe offered many instances of tyranny under pretext of penal legislation, with rival factions using attainders and proscription as instruments of vengeance, and the American Constitutions answered by denying legislatures the power to enact retrospective penal laws that punish actions innocent when done or increase punishments for past offenses.14
Another opinion makes the division of labor explicit: the prohibition was not inserted to secure private rights of property or contract, which other constitutional prohibitions address.15 Section 10's own text bears this out, for it lists ex post facto laws beside bills of attainder and then separately forbids laws impairing the obligation of contracts.16
Those sources yield three limits, and an exam answer that stops at the word "retroactive" will miss each of them:
- The Clause reaches only penal measures, so a retroactive civil statute falls outside it, although it may be attacked on another ground, usually as a taking of property without due process.17
- The Clause restrains legislative acts, not judicial decisions, so a court's decision is tested under other doctrines that a later section covers.18
- The Clause reaches only changes that disadvantage the accused, so a retroactive change that helps the accused is not barred.19
The third limit follows from the evil the Clause targets, which is a disadvantage imposed after the fact. A legislature that lowers a penalty after the crime, for example from death to life imprisonment, imposes no such disadvantage, and the lower penalty may be applied to the earlier offense.20 Unless the legislature adds a saving clause, a change favorable to the defendant is presumed to apply retroactively.21 The analysis therefore asks three questions in order: whether the law is penal, whether it is applied to conduct completed before enactment, and whether it leaves the accused worse off than the law in force when the conduct occurred.