Concept
Date of the Offense
Ex Post Facto Laws
Date of the Offense
Every ex post facto claim turns on a comparison of two dates: when the offense occurred and when the challenged law took effect. Article I, § 9 provides that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and § 10 lays the same prohibition on the states.1 Both clauses bar only legislation applied after the date of the offense.2 When the crime is a single act, the two dates sit side by side and the answer is quick. The cases in this section are harder because the offense has parts, and a court must decide which part fixes the date before it can ask whether the new law came too late.
The date matters because the prohibition exists, first, to give fair warning of a law’s effect and to let people rely on the law as written until it is explicitly changed.3 Warning helps only a person who can still choose. Someone who has not yet finished everything the crime requires can read a new statute and stop; someone whose conduct is complete has no choice left. Each situation below applies that test.
The comparison also arises when a new law changes only the punishment. A law rescinding good-time credits that would have applied to a defendant’s sentence, for example, may violate the clauses, and the court looks to the statute’s effects, not the legislature’s intent.4 In every such case the first job is to date the offense, and three kinds of offense make that job hard: a crime whose result trails its conduct, a crime that continues over time, and a crime built from separate acts.
Conduct and Result
A homicide has two events in it: the fatal conduct, such as a blow, and the death, which may follow days or weeks later. When the legislature changes the homicide law in the gap between them, a court must say which event is the offense. The answer is the conduct. Suppose the defendant delivers the mortal blow on April 1, a new homicide statute becomes law on April 10, and the victim dies of his wounds on April 20. If the new statute disadvantages the defendant, it cannot constitutionally be applied to him, because for ex post facto purposes the date of the blow is the date of the offense.5
Fair warning produces that result.6 A person deciding whether to strike someone consults the law as it stands that day, and once the blow lands the defendant has done everything within his control. Whether the victim dies afterward is no longer his choice. A statute enacted on April 10 could not have been read before the only decision it would punish, so treating the death as the offense would hold the defendant to a law he had no chance to heed.
The rule also presupposes that the new statute leaves the defendant worse off, and courts can divide over that question as well as over the date. In a prosecution arising from an explosion, the majority deemed the critical date to be the date the building was completed, concluded that the new law was ex post facto, and affirmed the quashing of the indictment.7 One dissenting judge thought the duty to encase the pipes continued until the explosion, which would have made the ex post facto analysis irrelevant. Another dissent argued that the defendants would have been guilty of involuntary manslaughter under the old law and so benefitted from the change; the majority replied that the legislature enacted the new law because such convictions were hard to obtain in a case like this one.8 The first dissent anticipates the continuing-duty problem taken up next.
Continuing Offenses
Some offenses do not end in a moment. A conspiracy may run for years, a crime may consist of letting a condition persist, and a prosecution may rest on a failure to act. In each case the offense can begin before a new or harsher statute takes effect and go on afterward. A statute may then be applied without violating the prohibition if the conduct, condition, or failure to act continues after the enactment or amendment.10
The reason is notice. A person partway through a continuing offense when a harsher statute takes effect can read it and stop, so each later day of conduct is a choice made with the consequence already announced.11 The statute operates on an offense still in progress, not on one already finished.
The rule covers all three forms of continuing offense. A statute increasing the penalty for a conspiracy may be applied to a conspiracy that began before the statute but was carried on past its effective date.12 Likewise, if a condition existed before a statute made permitting it a crime, that history does not bar prosecution for letting the condition continue afterward.13 An omission takes one further question, because the court must determine whether the duty to act existed after the new statute took effect.14
The rule has a limit, and Turner’s case shows it. The offense must actually have continued past the effective date, and the prosecution cannot assume that it did. Turner’s sentencing range under the Guidelines in effect in 2001 was 21 to 27 months; under the later Guidelines the district court applied, it was 33 to 41 months.15 The government answered the ex post facto objection with the continuing-offense rule. It argued that the conspiracy continued through 2005, when Andrews lied to investigators to conceal her role and Turner’s, so that the base offense level when Turner committed the offense matched the level at sentencing in 2007.16 The district court agreed that the conspiracy continued through January 2006.17 The government’s premise states the rule correctly; the premise failed on its facts.
The court of appeals rejected the premise on the strength of the Supreme Court’s decisions on when a conspiracy ends. In Grunewald, the indictment charged that one term of the illegal agreement was that continuing efforts would be made to avoid detection and prosecution, yet the Supreme Court held that the conspirators’ acts of concealment after the central object had been accomplished did not extend the life of the conspiracy.18 The only way to find an agreement between Turner and Andrews to conceal their conspiracy was to infer it from Andrews’s encounter with the agents in 2005. That placed the case within the Krulewitch-Lutwak-Grunewald pattern and led to the conclusion that the conspiracy did not continue after 2001.19
The disparity between the two ranges made Turner’s case analogous to Miller v. Florida, in which the defendant’s presumptive sentence under the guidelines in effect when he committed the offense was lower than the sentence the revised guidelines produced.20 On the government’s account, a conspiracy that lasted through 2005 would have left no gap between the guideline in force when the offense ended and the one in force at sentencing. The outcome therefore turned on a single finding: when the conspiracy ended. The rule that concealment does not extend a conspiracy also fits the purpose of the clauses. If a later cover-up lengthened the offense, a conspiracy would last as long as its members stayed quiet, and the date of the offense would move at the prosecution’s convenience.
The contrast with the homicide rule is instructive. There, a later event outside the defendant’s control, the death, cannot move the date. Here, what continues must be the defendant’s own conduct, and the prosecution must show that it did.
Multi-Act Offenses
Some statutes require two specific acts that need not occur together, and the legislature acts between them: the defendant did act X before the statute took effect and does act Z after it. Nothing here continues, because each act is complete when done. Absent a determination that the legislature meant the statute to apply only when both acts follow its enactment, the question is whether applying the statute is an ex post facto violation. The courts have answered no, because the clauses “bar only legislation applied after the date of the offense, and the date of offense will always be the date on which the final element is satisfied.”22
The qualification is a matter of statutory meaning. If the statute is read to reach only a person who did both acts after enactment, it does not cover the defendant at all, and no constitutional question arises.
The rule also answers the fair-warning concern. A person who has done X but not yet Z is on notice, once the statute takes effect, that X combined with Z will expose him to criminal liability, and it is fully within his control to refrain from Z.23 The statute counts the earlier act as a fact, but what it punishes is a completed offense whose last step the defendant took with notice. A person who did X before enactment and never does Z faces no liability, so the earlier act is not what draws the penalty. A death that follows a blow differs from the second act in a two-act statute because the defendant takes no step to bring the death about. The second act is his own, and he can choose not to take it.24
The two defendants bought on the same date, so the difference between them lies entirely in when the final element was satisfied. The three situations in this section can be worked by one method.