Concept
Heller’s Holding
Second Amendment
Heller’s Holding
From the Amendment’s ratification in 1791 until 2008, the Supreme Court never struck down a federal, state, or local gun regulation.1 Then, in District of Columbia v. Heller, it invalidated a District ordinance that prohibited private ownership or possession of handguns.2 The text had not forced that result. The prefatory clause supports the collective reading, the phrase “right of the people” supports the individual reading, and neither the constitutional text nor the state constitutions of the late eighteenth century conclusively settled the debate.3 Five Justices chose the individual reading.4
The District’s law had three working parts. It prohibited handguns in effect: carrying an unregistered firearm was a crime, and the registration of handguns was prohibited. Separately, no one could carry a handgun without a license, which the chief of police could issue for one-year periods. And residents had to keep their lawfully owned firearms, such as registered long guns, unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device, unless the firearm was in a place of business or in use for lawful recreational activities.5
The opinion works in two steps, and this section follows them. The first step defines the right: who holds it, what it protects, and for what purposes. The second step applies that definition to two features of the District’s law, the handgun ban and the lock requirement, and each feature fails for its own reason.
The decision also has a built-in limit on its reach. The District is governed by the federal government, so the Court had no need to decide whether the Second Amendment binds state and city gun laws.6 The majority flagged Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation as a question the case did not present.7 Cruikshank had held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government, and that States were free to restrict or protect the right under their police powers; its limited discussion of the Amendment supports, if anything, the individual-rights reading.8 The Court closed the gap in 2010, when McDonald v. City of Chicago held the Amendment applicable to state and local governments.9 Incorporation is also a different question from the one that arises under Article IV’s comity clause, which entitles the Citizens of each State to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States and treats “citizen” and “resident” as essentially interchangeable in most cases.10
The Individual Right
The Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use it for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-defense within the home.11 Its method was plain meaning: the Constitution’s words carry their normal and ordinary sense, not a technical one, because the document was written to be understood by the voters.12 Applying that method phrase by phrase, the majority concluded that the Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” a guarantee not confined by the prefatory clause’s stated purpose “to prevent elimination of the militia.”13
Five textual findings support that conclusion, one for each part of the Amendment’s wording:
- The phrase “the right of the people,” as in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, refers to individual rights, so the Court began with a strong presumption that the right belongs to all Americans and is not exercisable only through a corporate body such as a militia.14
- “Arms” covers weapons not specifically designed for military use and not employed in a military capacity, so the right reaches the ordinary firearms private people keep.15
- To “keep arms” means to have weapons.16
- To “bear” arms means to carry them. The phrase implies carrying a weapon for offensive or defensive action, and it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization.17
- The prefatory clause announces a purpose and neither limits nor expands the scope of the operative clause.18
The fifth finding answers the collective reading. Before turning to limits on the right, the majority tested the preface against its reading of the operative clause and found it “entirely sensible” that the preface announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.19 A statement of purpose is not a statement of the only purpose, though. The preface does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason the right, unlike some other English rights, was written into a Constitution.20 Heller held that individual self-defense is “the central component” of the right.21
The right has limits on both its purposes and its weapons. The majority said the right is not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech is not, and it does not read the Amendment to protect carrying arms for any sort of confrontation.22 Nor does the Amendment protect weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.23 Later sections develop both limits.
Both claimants lack militia membership, so that fact decides nothing, and the weapon and its use carry the analysis. Pruitt’s handgun is the arm the Court called “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family.”24 A student who opens an answer by asking whether the claimant belongs to a militia has started with the question the individual rights holding removed.
The Court divided five to four. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; Justice Stevens wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and Justice Breyer filed a second dissent, taken up below.25 The principal dissent read the Amendment as a protection for the people of each State: it was adopted to protect their right to maintain a well-regulated militia, in response to concerns that Congress’s power to disarm state militias and create a national standing army threatened state sovereignty.26 In that dissent’s view, neither the text nor its proponents’ arguments showed the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms.27
Handgun Ban and Trigger Locks
Heller held two things about the District’s law: the ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, and so does the prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.29 The two holdings rest on different reasons, and keeping them apart is the key to this section. The ban fails because of what it removes from the home; the lock requirement fails because of what it leaves there unusable. The Court of Appeals had reached the same two conclusions, and the Supreme Court affirmed.30
Three features of the ban doomed it. Self-defense is central to the right. The ban prohibits an entire class of arms that American society overwhelmingly chooses for that lawful purpose. And the prohibition extends to the home, where the need to defend self, family, and property is most acute.31 A law that takes the favored arm out of the place where the need is greatest burdens the right at its core. On that showing, the Court said, banning “the most preferred firearm in the nation” from the home would fail under any of the standards of scrutiny applied to enumerated rights, so the Court did not choose among them.32 Later cases describe the handgun as “the quintessential self-defense weapon.”33
History pointed the same way. Few laws in the Nation’s history have come close to the severity of the District’s ban, and some of those few have been struck down: in Nunn v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated a prohibition on carrying pistols openly, although it upheld a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons.34 Justice Breyer’s dissent cited founding-era laws he thought comparable, and the majority answered that they did not remotely burden self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns. Some were gunpowder-storage laws, which he conceded did not clearly prohibit loaded weapons and required only that excess gunpowder be kept in a special container or on the top floor of the home.35 Others restricted the firing of guns within city limits. The New York law, for example, fined anyone 20 shillings for firing a gun in certain places, including houses, on New Year’s Eve and the first two days of January. The majority concluded that such laws provide no support for the severe restriction at issue.36
The lock requirement fails on a different footing. It banned no class of arms, but it required any lawful firearm in the home to be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, which rendered it inoperable.37 That made it impossible for citizens to use the firearm for the core lawful purpose of self-defense, and the requirement is therefore unconstitutional.38 The ban reasoning asks which weapons are gone; the lock reasoning asks whether any weapon that remains can do its job.
The District urged the Court to read the lock provision as containing an exception for self-defense, and the Court refused. It relied on the unequivocal text, on the presence of certain other enumerated exceptions (for a place of business and for lawful recreational purposes), and on the D.C. Court of Appeals’ statement that the statute forbids residents to use firearms to stop intruders.39 Justice Breyer saw nothing in the statute that precluded a background common-law self-defense exception, and he would have read one in to avoid the constitutional question.40 The holding therefore rests on a lock rule that, as the Court read it, admitted no use for immediate self-defense.
The second ordinance fits the majority’s own limit: its analysis does not suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.41 Two further points are not part of the holdings. The Court did not decide the licensing requirement, because the District said Heller could obtain a license once he registered a handgun, assuming he was not otherwise disqualified, and Heller conceded that he had no problem with licensing so long as it was not enforced in an arbitrary and capricious manner.42 The remedy was accordingly narrow: assuming Heller was not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District had to let him register his handgun and issue him a license to carry it in the home.43 And although the Court undertook no exhaustive historical analysis of the Amendment’s full scope, it said nothing in its opinion casts doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.44 The next section takes up that category of presumptively lawful measures.
The sharpest disagreement over method came from Justice Breyer’s dissent. It argued that the District’s law is consistent with the Amendment even if the Amendment protects a separate interest in individual self-defense, because the regulation focuses on handguns in high-crime urban areas and so is a permissible legislative response to a serious, life-threatening problem.45 The majority would not weigh the right that way. It would not apply an interest-balancing approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie, and it found the Second Amendment no different: like the First, it is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people, which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.46 Whatever else the Amendment leaves to future evaluation, the majority added, it elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.47
The majority did not deny the problem the dissent invoked. It acknowledged the problem of handgun violence and noted that the Constitution leaves the District a variety of tools for combating it, including some measures regulating handguns. But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table, among them the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home. Some may think the Amendment outmoded; that is perhaps debatable, the Court said, but it is not the Court’s role to pronounce the Amendment extinct.48 Whether a law is wise is a separate question from whether it is constitutional. A Justice who joined a dissent about a Texas statute, for instance, wrote separately that the law was “uncommonly silly” and that, as a legislator, he would vote to repeal it.49