Concept
Presumptively Lawful Regulations
Second Amendment
Presumptively Lawful Regulations
Heller drew its own boundary in the opinion that recognized the individual right. The right is not, as McDonald quoted the point, “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”1 The majority then named the measures it meant to leave alone. Without undertaking “an exhaustive historical analysis,” it said that nothing in its opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, on laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or on laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.2 A footnote calls these “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” offers them “only as examples,” and says the list “does not purport to be exhaustive.”3
The same passage adds two limits. Most nineteenth-century courts to consider the question, the Court observed, upheld prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, and the weapons the Amendment protects are those “in common use at the time,” a limitation the Court tied to the historical tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons.”4 The footnote attaches its label to the first three measures, but one summary of Heller gathers all five under it, and this unit follows that grouping.5 The five sort by what a restriction turns on: who possesses the arm, where and how it is carried, and what is sold or carried. The subsections below take them in that order.
The word presumptively gives each measure a starting presumption of validity, and the opinion leaves open what could overcome it. The presumption is not rational-basis review, the weak, deferential standard associated with footnote four of Carolene Products, under which the government prevails by giving some adequate reason for its regulation.6 The listed measures draw their presumption from the Court’s description of them as longstanding.
A presumption of validity also keeps two questions apart: whether a law is wise and whether it is constitutional. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in a case about a Texas statute, yet wrote separately to call the statute “uncommonly silly” and to say that, as a legislator, he would vote to repeal it.7 A judge may think a law unwise and still be bound to uphold it.8
History does not settle the list. The majority disclaimed an exhaustive historical analysis, and a dissent attacked the sources the majority did rely on, arguing that the 17th-century English Bill of Rights, Blackstone, postenactment commentary, and post-Civil War legislative history “shed only indirect light on the question” and “offer little support” for the Court’s conclusion.9 Bruen later supplied the working method: when the Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects it, and the government must justify its regulation by showing that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.10 Because Heller’s list gives examples only, a measure outside the list succeeds by fitting that tradition, while a measure on the list begins with the Court’s assurance. For a later application of the method to a possession ban on a class of persons, see United States v. Rahimi.
State and local laws face the same categories. The pre-Heller rulings that the Second Amendment does not apply to the States were overturned soon after Heller,11 and the route runs through the Fourteenth Amendment: Bruen speaks of the “Second and Fourteenth Amendments.”12 Article IV’s privileges and immunities clause, which entitles “[t]he Citizens of each State” to “all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States,” is a different provision.13 When McDonald v. City of Chicago applied the right against a city, it repeated Heller’s assurances and answered the municipal respondents’ “doomsday proclamations” with the statement that “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”14 The next section takes up how the Bill of Rights came to bind the States.
Who May Possess
The first listed measure sorts people, not weapons. Heller said that nothing in its opinion should be taken to cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”15 The handgun ban that fell in Heller worked differently. It prohibited an entire class of arms, one “overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for lawful self-defense, and it extended to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”16 A court facing a possession law should first ask what the law sorts. A statute that disqualifies a class of people leaves ordinary arms available to everyone outside the class, while a ban on an arm takes it from law-abiding residents too.
The remedy in Heller shows the category at work. The Court ordered the District to let Heller register his handgun and to issue him a license to carry it in the home, but only “[a]ssuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights.”17 The qualifier presupposes that some people are disqualified, and the felon and mentally-ill prohibitions are the Court’s examples.
Militia service does not mark the line between the qualified and the disqualified. The operative clause gives the right to “the people,” while the colonial militia was only a subset of the people: males who were able-bodied and within a certain age range. Reading the Amendment to protect only a right to keep and bear arms in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the clause’s description of the holder.18 The disqualifications enter as exceptions to a right held broadly, and the Court describes them as longstanding prohibitions, not as consequences of militia status.
How the Court tests these measures is less clear than the fact that they stand. The handgun ban would fail “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,” so Heller never chose among them.19 For the felon and mentally-ill prohibitions the Court applied no test at all; it said only that its opinion casts no doubt on them.20 An answer should therefore call these measures presumptively lawful and should not say they survive a particular level of scrutiny.
McDonald shows the same sorting from the other direction. It repeated Heller’s assurances for state and local laws, and it noted that the municipal respondents could cite “precisely one case,” from the late twentieth century, sustaining a ban comparable to the handgun bans in Heller and McDonald.21 Possession limits aimed at a disqualified class therefore remain presumptively lawful after incorporation, while a ban on the favored home-defense arm for everyone has almost no judicial support.
Ruiz’s claim meets a presumption of validity. His statute is a longstanding prohibition of the kind the Court left undisturbed, and it disqualifies a class without removing the arm from everyone. Hargrove’s challenge matches the claim Heller sustained: the second statute prohibits an entire class of arms overwhelmingly chosen for self-defense, and it reaches the home, so it fails.22 The weapon, the place, and the purpose are the same in both challenges, and only the group the statute reaches differs. Identify that group before asking about scrutiny. If the statute disqualifies felons or the mentally ill, the Court’s assurance applies; if it disqualifies every law-abiding resident, the statute is not among the measures the Court left undisturbed.
Sensitive Places and Concealed Carry
Two of the Court’s examples govern carrying arms away from home. Heller left undisturbed “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” and it observed that most nineteenth-century courts to consider the question upheld prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons.24 McDonald repeated the first assurance when it applied the right to state and local governments.25 Both measures regulate where or how a person carries a firearm, and neither touches the interest at the center of Heller: keeping a handgun at home.
Heller’s reasoning explains why the home stands apart. The Court stressed that the handgun ban extended to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”26 Carrying away from home, however, is not outside the right. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.27 A restriction on where or how a person carries therefore has to be justified, and Bruen states how: the government must show that the restriction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.28
Sensitive places are the first test of that method. Heller named schools and government buildings, said “such as,” and described its list as examples only.29 A newly claimed place has to be measured against those examples. A courthouse or a council chamber is a government building and sits comfortably inside the Court’s own example. A downtown street or park is neither a school nor a government building, and a city that labels it sensitive must justify the restriction under Bruen’s historical test.30
The first ordinance starts with a presumption of validity, because the council chamber and the courthouse are government buildings. The second reaches ordinary public space. Its only stated ground is that downtown is crowded, and it would have to be justified by the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, which the Court’s examples of schools and government buildings do not supply. The ordinances differ in kind: one protects a place of the sort the Court named, and the other restricts public carry across a district.
Concealed-carry prohibitions rest on nineteenth-century case law. Heller cited State v. Chandler and Nunn v. State for the point that most courts of that century upheld such bans.32 Nunn itself also struck down a ban on carrying pistols openly, grounding its decision in the “natural right of self-defence.”33 The pairing explains why a concealed-carry ban can stand. A law that bars concealing a weapon but leaves a person free to carry it openly regulates the manner of carrying, and the right to carry for self-defense remains. One summary of Heller lists prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons among the “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”34
The concealed-carry entry does not license a State to ration public carry. Bruen, decided in 2022, struck down a New York law that required a permit, based on cause, to have guns outside the home.35 The scheme had two tiers. An applicant for a license to possess a firearm at home had to convince a licensing officer that, among other things, he was of good moral character, had no history of crime or mental illness, and that “no good cause exists for the denial of the license.” To carry outside the home for self-defense, he needed an unrestricted license to “have and carry” a concealed “pistol or revolver,” and for that he had to prove that “proper cause exists.” An applicant who could not make that showing could receive only a “restricted” license for a limited purpose, such as hunting, target shooting, or employment.36 The first tier’s screen for criminal history and mental illness tracks the person-based measures discussed above.
The Court held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.37 In six States, New York among them, the government conditions a public-carry license on a showing of some additional special need, and that condition decided the case: because New York issued public-carry licenses only when an applicant demonstrated a special need for self-defense, its licensing regime violated the Constitution.38
Heller’s concealed-carry assurance and Bruen’s holding fit together because they regulate different things. A prohibition on concealment leaves open carry available, which is a rule about manner. New York’s scheme left a citizen without a special need with a license for hunting, target shooting, or employment, which does not allow carrying for self-defense; it withheld the activity the text protects.39 The first kind of law channels the right, and the second rations it.
The first state’s law regulates the manner of carrying and rests on the nineteenth-century concealed-carry cases, so it begins with a presumption of validity. The second state’s law removes public carry altogether, and the right the Court recognized covers carrying a handgun for self-defense outside the home. Sort a carry law by what it does. A rule on the place or manner of carry that history supports is presumptively lawful, and a law that rations or removes public carry must meet the history-based test without that presumption.
Weapons and Sales
The last two limits turn on what is sold and what is carried. Heller left undisturbed “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,” and it separately recognized that the weapons the Amendment protects are those “in common use at the time,” a limitation supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons.”42 The first limit governs how a person acquires an arm the Amendment protects. The second marks which arms fall outside the Amendment’s protection altogether.
A condition or qualification on commercial sale regulates the route to a firearm and leaves the arm on the market. That feature separates it from the handgun ban, which prohibited an entire class of arms overwhelmingly chosen for self-defense.43 McDonald repeated the assurance when it applied the right to the States, saying “We repeat those assurances here” and “incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”44 Because Heller offered its list as examples, the category has a settled core, conditions and qualifications on sale, and an edge the Court never mapped.45 The opinion does not say how heavy a condition may become before it operates as a prohibition, and an answer should claim no more than that.
Alvarez meets a condition. The check screens out the same groups the possession limits exclude, and he leaves the dealer with the handgun, so the state’s rules sit within the Court’s assurance. Keller meets a prohibition. The city offers no qualification a law-abiding buyer could satisfy, and its law matches the one Heller struck down, a ban on the arm Americans overwhelmingly choose for home defense that reaches the home.46 The buyer’s status and the weapon are the same in both scenes, and the only fact that moves the answer is whether a qualified buyer can obtain the arm.
The second limit begins with the militia link in the prefatory clause. The traditional militia was formed from men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful purposes like self-defense, and in the colonial and revolutionary era the weapons used by militiamen and the weapons used in defense of person and home were “one and the same.”48 Protection therefore follows the ordinary arms that law-abiding people keep. Heller read Miller “to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”49
Usefulness in warfare is not the measure. Reading Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” to protect only weapons useful in warfare would be a “startling reading,” the Court said, because it might make the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns unconstitutional.50 The prefatory clause does not change the test. The Court conceded that an effective modern militia might need sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large, but it held that the weakening fit between the prefatory clause and the right “cannot change our interpretation of the right.”51
Newness does not strip a weapon of protection either. The Court called the argument that only eighteenth-century arms are protected one “bordering on the frivolous” and said the Amendment “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”52 The test therefore asks about typical lawful possession, not about age or military usefulness. A weapon that law-abiding citizens do not typically possess for lawful purposes, such as the short-barreled shotgun, falls outside the Amendment, and a weapon they overwhelmingly choose for self-defense, such as the handgun, falls inside.53