Concept
The Bill of Rights and the States
Second Amendment
The Bill of Rights and the States
Heller invalidated a District of Columbia ordinance that prohibited private ownership or possession of handguns.1 The District is part of the federal government, so the Court had no occasion to ask whether the Second Amendment also binds state and local governments.2 Suppose a state enacts the same ban and a resident sues under the Second Amendment alone. Heller leaves that case open. McDonald v. City of Chicago closed the gap in 2010: by a vote of five to four, the Court held that the Second Amendment is incorporated and applies to state and local governments.3
That holding rests on a doctrine, because the Amendment’s text does not reach the states by its own force. Under the original understanding, announced in Barron v. Baltimore, the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government, and strictly speaking that remains the formal and literal rule.4 The Fourteenth Amendment supplies the exception. When the Court deems a Bill of Rights provision incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision binds the states. The Court took that step with the jury-trial right, finding that the Nation’s deep commitment to jury trial in serious criminal cases qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause and must therefore be respected by the States.5 Some Justices, notably Justice Black, argued for incorporating the entire Bill of Rights once and for all, but the decisional process has instead been selective, clause by clause and case by case.6 In Adamson v. California, a dissent objected that the Court’s approach let states breach particular provisions in part but not in other respects, according to the Court’s notions of “civilized standards,” “canons of decency,” and “fundamental justice.”7 The Second Amendment is the most recent addition to the list of incorporated guarantees.8
Incorporation has two consequences. First, an incorporated provision sets a constitutional floor below which state and local laws cannot descend, so states cannot use their legislative powers to diminish what the Bill of Rights guarantees.9 Second, the provision carries the same content and imposes the same limitations on the states that it imposes on the federal government, although a handful of Justices have argued for looser application against the states.10 A city’s handgun ban therefore meets the right that Heller recognized, not a weaker local version of it.
Barron and Slaughter-House
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Barron that whether the first eight Amendments limit the States was a question “of great importance” but “not of much difficulty.” In less than four pages, the Court rejected the proposition and held that those Amendments apply only to the Federal Government.11 The rule creates a need for some mechanism that imposes federal rights on the states. States are not required to put any particular right in their constitutions, and they do not guarantee the same rights and protections that the Bill of Rights provides under analogous provisions. Without such a mechanism, citizens would receive a patchwork of civil and criminal rights that might differ significantly from those the United States Constitution guarantees.12
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers two candidates for that mechanism. It provides, among other things, that a State may not abridge “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” or deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”13 One account of the Privileges or Immunities Clause treated it as the vehicle for the Bill of Rights. Whatever the privileges and immunities may be, the account observed, they “are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature,” and it added to them the personal rights secured by the first eight amendments, among them freedom of speech and of the press, the right to keep and bear arms, and the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures.14
The Court adopted a far narrower reading in the Slaughter-House Cases. Justice Miller’s opinion held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights “which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” Other fundamental rights, those that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that “the State governments were created to establish and secure,” fell outside the Clause.15 Two arguments supported that sharp line between federal and state citizenship. The first was textual: the Clause speaks of “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” while the Amendment’s first sentence and Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause refer to state citizenship. The second was structural: a broader reading would “radically chang[e] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people,” and the Court would not find such a change “in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.”16
Many legal scholars today dispute the correctness of that narrow reading.17 The Court has nonetheless left it standing. For many decades, it has analyzed the question of which rights the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state infringement under the Due Process Clause, not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.18
United States v. Cruikshank held that the Second Amendment, too, limits only the federal government. The Court vacated the convictions of members of a white mob who had deprived Black citizens of their right to keep and bear arms.19 The right, it reasoned, “is not a right granted by the Constitution” and is not “in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence,” and the Second Amendment “means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.”20 Heller later summarized the holding: the Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government, and the States were free to restrict or protect the right under their police powers.21 A right that does not depend on the Constitution for its existence sits uneasily with a Clause that protects only rights owing their existence to the federal government, and that tension left the arms right with no obvious route to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Presser v. Illinois (1886) reached the same result when it rejected a challenge to legislation forbidding bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law. The Court first found that the sections did not infringe the right, then gave what it called “a conclusive answer”: the Amendment “is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States.”22 Miller v. Texas (1894) reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.23 Heller itself pointed out the limits of this line of cases. Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States, and it did not conduct the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry that later cases require. Heller left Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation as a question that case did not present.24
Those decisions explain why McDonald was a harder case than Heller. Heller tested a federal enactment against the Amendment itself, because the District is part of the federal government.25 McDonald tested a city’s law, and the Seventh Circuit had concluded that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller doomed the petitioners’ claims. The petitioners therefore asked the Court to overrule those decisions and to hold that the right to keep and bear arms is among the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”26
The Court took a different path. The petitioners’ primary submission was that the arms right is a privilege or immunity of national citizenship and that Slaughter-House’s narrow reading should be rejected, with due process incorporation as their secondary argument.27 The Court noted that the petitioners could not identify the full scope of the Clause they invoked, saw no need to reconsider the Slaughter-House interpretation, and declined to disturb its holding.28 It had previously held that the Second Amendment was not part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and it now revisited that question.29 The test asked whether the right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or, in a related formulation, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”30 Applying that established standard, the Court held that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.31 One of the five Justices in the majority, Justice Thomas, would have grounded incorporation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead of the Due Process Clause, which leaves the reasoning slightly ambiguous but the holding clear.32