Concept
The Indiana Voter ID Case
Right to Vote
The Indiana Voter ID Case
A state may require in-person voters to present government-issued photo identification when the requirement applies evenhandedly, the card costs nothing, and weighty interests in deterring voter fraud and preserving public confidence justify it. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board so held, and it is the Court's leading decision on photo identification laws: the Anderson-Burdick weighing applied to a concrete statute.1 The judgment is fractured, though. A three-Justice lead opinion announced it, no opinion commanded a majority, and a correct reading depends on knowing which Justices reasoned in which way. This section covers the statute, the line on money the Court would not cross, and the division on the Court; the sections that follow take apart the burden and the interests.
The case sits on a line that earlier voting decisions had already drawn. A state may set qualifications that bear some relation to casting an informed ballot. Lassiter sustained a literacy test because the ability to read and write has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot, though the Court warned that the result would differ if a test fair on its face were used to discriminate against a class.2 Harper placed wealth on the other side: to treat wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor, since the state's interest in voting is limited to the power to fix qualifications.3 Residence requirements show both sides at once. A state may demand that voters be residents, but Dunn invalidated Tennessee's one-year durational requirement because other means were available to determine bona fide residence.4
Indiana's law, Senate Enrolled Act 483, asked one thing of every in-person voter: to have and present a photo identification that could be obtained for free.5 It drew no line around any class of voters. It told each person how to prove identity, and that places it on the regulation side of the exclusion-versus-regulation divide drawn earlier in this chapter. Three features of the law mattered when the lead opinion measured the burden:
- The State issued photo identification cards free through its Bureau of Motor Vehicles, so a voter without one had to make a trip, gather the required documents, and pose for a photograph, but did not have to pay.6
- A voter who owned identification but could not present it on election day could cast a provisional ballot, which is set aside on election day and counted only if the voter completes a later step. This ballot counted if the voter brought the identification to the circuit court clerk's office within ten days.
- A voter without photo identification could cast a provisional ballot that counted if the voter executed the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk's office.7
The free card therefore carries the most weight in Crawford. Harper treats fee-paying as a condition of obtaining a ballot as an invidious discrimination and holds the degree of the discrimination irrelevant,8 so a photo identification rule that charged for the card would collide with it however sensible the state's reasons. The lead opinion said as much: that most voters already hold a driver's license would not save the statute under Harper if the State required voters to pay a fee for a new photo identification.9 Because Indiana's cards are free, the trip to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the gathering of documents, and the photograph amounted to inconvenience, not a price on the ballot. For most voters they were no substantial burden and no significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.10 The Court has shown similar wariness of payment barriers in family cases: it held that a paternity defendant was entitled to free blood tests, and it considered the case of a mother who could not pay the filing fee to appeal the termination of her custody.11
One identification rule thus lands on opposite sides of Harper depending on whether the card costs money. A free card lets the state defend the rule as a regulation of how eligible voters prove identity; a priced card turns it into a wealth condition on the franchise.
Justice Stevens announced the judgment and wrote the lead opinion for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy.13 That opinion measured the burden and found it limited. For most voters, the free card made the trip to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles an inconvenience, not a substantial burden. For a smaller group, such as elderly persons born out of state who may struggle to obtain a birth certificate, the burden was heavier, but the provisional ballot mitigated it. Because the statute applied broadly to every Indiana voter and imposed only a limited burden, the State's "precise interests" sufficed to defeat the facial challenge, an attack that asks a court to invalidate a statute in all its applications and that fails where the statute has a "plainly legitimate sweep."14
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred in the judgment, but he would not have measured the effect on particular voters at all. In his view, the different ways the law touches different voters are only different impacts of one burden imposed uniformly on everyone: to vote in person, have and present a photo identification obtainable for free. A generally applicable, nondiscriminatory rule of that kind is judged under Burdick's deferential "important regulatory interests" standard, and strict scrutiny is reserved for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.15 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, and Justice Breyer dissented in a separate opinion.16 Both dissents weighed burden against interest and found the burden on voters without identification too heavy. Justice Souter likened the law to a poll tax; Justice Breyer, writing alone, accepted photo identification requirements in general but found Indiana's burden disproportionate. Because the lead opinion and both dissents balanced, six Justices used the weighing approach, which is why this chapter reads the lead opinion as its base text.
Crawford does not approve every photo identification law, and it does not demand strict scrutiny of any. It sustained one statute, with a free card and a provisional-ballot path, against a facial attack, and none of the Justices who voted to uphold the law required the State to show a compelling interest. Other claims raise other questions. An as-applied challenge, which targets a law's effect on particular voters, differs from the facial attack decided here. A statutory claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting, rests on that section's ban on any "standard, practice, or procedure" that results in a denial or abridgement of a citizen's right to vote.17