Concept
Facial Challenges and Remedy
Right to Vote
Facial Challenges and Remedy
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board reached the Supreme Court as a facial challenge, and that posture shaped the result as much as the weighing of burdens and interests did. The challengers asked the courts to invalidate Indiana's photo identification statute, Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, in all of its applications.1 A facial challenge tests a law against every situation in which it operates. An as-applied challenge asks only whether the state may enforce the law against a particular plaintiff or an identified group of voters.
The earlier sections of this chapter measured the burden on voters and weighed the state's interests. This section adds two questions: what a challenger must prove to take a law away from every voter at once, and what a court makes of the charge that a law is a partisan product. The first question belongs to the facial posture. The second was a separate argument, and the lead opinion answered it separately.
A statute that governs every voter in a state is judged on its broad application. If it imposes only a limited burden on most voters and rests on weighty interests, hardship for a few voters does not by itself show that the law is invalid everywhere. Striking a law on its face removes it for everyone, including the many voters for whom compliance costs little, so a court wants proof that the law cannot validly operate before it takes that step. The lead opinion accordingly rested on gaps in the record. It could not quantify either the magnitude of the burden on the narrow class of voters who might bear a special burden or the portion of that burden that was fully justified.2
Because the judgment rested on the record before the Court, it leaves room for as-applied challenges. The lead opinion suggested that the door remained open to future as-applied challenges to Indiana's law and to similar laws in other states.3 The usual exam error is to read Crawford as making photo identification laws immune from challenge, when it rejected one facial attack on one record. The next subsection takes up the burden a facial challenger carries, and the discussion then turns to the challengers' second argument, that the statute's partisan origins should taint it.
Facial Challenge Burden
The petitioners advanced a broad attack on the statute and sought relief that would invalidate it in all its applications, so the lead opinion held that they bore a “heavy burden of persuasion.”4 It anchored that burden in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, decided only weeks earlier, where the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had failed to give appropriate weight to the magnitude of that burden when it sustained a preelection facial attack on a Washington primary statute. The lead opinion said that reasoning applies “with added force” to the Indiana petitioners.5
The burden is heavy because of what a facial ruling does. An order striking a statute on its face operates everywhere, including on the many voters for whom the rule is a modest errand. The lead opinion added a structural reason: when a court evaluates a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure, it must keep in mind, in a phrase quoted from Ayotte, that “a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”6 The opinion also noted, as the Court has in other cases, that facial challenges are disfavored.7
The heavy burden fits the way the Anderson-Burdick inquiry works. A court weighs the asserted injury to the right to vote against the precise interests the state puts forward, and no litmus test measures the severity of a burden in advance.8 A challenger who cannot measure the injury leaves the voters' side of the scale empty. That is what happened in Crawford: on the evidence in the record, it was not possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on the narrow class of voters or the portion of that burden that was fully justified.9 Even a showing that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, the lead opinion added, is by no means sufficient to establish a right to the relief the petitioners sought.10
The record failed in ways that matter on this posture. The record did not give the number of registered voters without photo identification, and the district court found the challengers' expert report “utterly incredible and unreliable.” Much of the argument about those numbers came from postjudgment studies outside the record, whose accuracy had never been tested in the trial court.11 From that record the lead opinion stated the controlling rule: a facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep.” Considering only the statute's broad application to all Indiana voters, it found that the law “imposes only a limited burden on voters' rights,” so the state's precise interests were enough to defeat the facial challenge.12
A plainly legitimate sweep means that the statute operates validly across the great bulk of the situations it governs. Indiana's cards were free, and for most voters who need one, a trip to the BMV, the gathering of documents, and a photograph did not amount to a substantial burden. Had Indiana charged a fee for the card, the fact that most voters already hold licenses would not have saved the statute under Harper.13 The lead opinion found the statute's application to the vast majority of Indiana voters amply justified by the interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.14 Where a law works that way for nearly everyone it governs, a handful of hard cases at the edges do not change the character of the statute as a whole, although they may support a narrower claim.
The lead opinion gave a further ground that would have defeated facial relief even if the first were set aside. The petitioners had not demonstrated that the proper remedy, even assuming an unjustified burden on some voters, would be to invalidate the entire statute.15 The caution about frustrating the intent of the elected representatives points toward relief no wider than the violation proved, and the open door to as-applied challenges shows where narrower relief can come from.16 Showing that some voters are unjustifiably burdened is therefore not the same as showing that the whole statute falls, because the remedy is a separate showing. Nor does the decision approve the law for every voter.
The two records differ in what they prove. The Indiana record offered a discredited estimate and untested postjudgment studies, which suggested that a problem might exist without establishing its size. The shelter's logs establish both the obstacle and its extent, and that difference explains why the same lead opinion that rejected the facial attack left room for a claim on facts like these.
Partisan Motive
The lead opinion also answers a charge that stands apart from the burden and interest analysis: that Indiana's photo identification law was a partisan measure. The petitioners pressed the point by noting that all of the Republicans in the General Assembly voted for SEA 483 and the Democrats were unanimous in opposing it.21 The roll calls bear that out. In the House, fifty-two Republicans voted in favor, forty-five Democrats voted against, and three Democrats were excused. In the Senate, thirty-three Republicans voted in favor and seventeen Democrats voted against.22 Judge Barker had observed that the litigation was a partisan dispute that had “spilled out of the state house into the courts,” and the lead opinion agreed that it is fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to enact the statute.23 That concession did not change the outcome, because the lead opinion went on to say what a mixed motive does to a law's justifications.
A nondiscriminatory law supported by valid neutral justifications keeps the benefit of those justifications even though partisan interests may have supplied one motivation for individual legislators' votes.24 In Indiana, the neutral interests examined in the preceding sections carried the statute: preventing voter fraud, modernizing election procedures and addressing the voter rolls, and protecting public confidence. The lead opinion called the interests identified as justifications both neutral and sufficiently strong to require rejection of the facial attack, and it found the statute's application to the vast majority of Indiana voters amply justified by the interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.25 The partisan-motive argument therefore needed more than a party-line roll call. It had to dislodge the neutral interests themselves, and on the record before the Court it did not.
The rule makes practical sense because legislators rarely act from a single motive, and a rule about registration, identification, or polling places will fall differently on different groups of voters. If any hint of partisan advantage voided a law that neutral reasons support, courts would have to unwind much of election legislation and sort out the private motives of dozens of legislators. A neutral justification is different because it appears in the statute and the record and can be tested the way the earlier subsections tested Indiana's interests. The inquiry asks whether a valid neutral justification exists, and it does not ask whether politics played a role.
The rule has a limit, and the lead opinion stated it in the same passage. If partisan considerations had provided the only justification for a photo identification requirement, the opinion said, the Court may also assume that the statute would suffer the same fate as the poll tax in Harper.26 That statement is a conditional assumption and not a holding, since Indiana's law had neutral support. It still shows where the line sits: a mixed motive is tolerated, and a sole partisan motive is not.
The usual exam error runs in two directions. One is to treat a party-line vote as proof that a voting law is invalid, when the lead opinion accepted the inference of partisan motive and still sustained the law. The other is to say that motive never matters, which ignores the statement that a law supported only by partisan considerations would fall like the poll tax. A complete answer asks whether the law is nondiscriminatory and whether valid neutral interests support it, and the interests taught in the preceding subsections supply that protection.