Concept
Crawford's Lasting Standard
Right to Vote
Crawford's Lasting Standard
Six Justices voted in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board to uphold Indiana’s requirement that in-person voters show a free government-issued photo identification, and those six disagreed about why. The judgment rejected a facial challenge and left one statute in force on the record before the Court.1 The lead opinion found the burden “neither so serious nor so frequent as to raise any question about the [law’s] constitutionality.”2 The concurrence called the law’s universally applicable requirements “eminently reasonable,” because acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is no significant increase over the usual burdens of voting, and the State’s stated interests sufficed to sustain that minimal burden.3
The Justices treated Indiana’s law as a burden on voting to be weighed or classified, not as a disqualification. That places Crawford on the regulation side of the line, drawn earlier in this chapter, between regulating voting and excluding voters. A disqualification removes a person from eligibility, and the Constitution itself prescribes some, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 3 bar on serving in Congress for certain former officeholders who engaged in insurrection or rebellion.4
Because the six votes to affirm rest on different methods, Crawford is easy to cite inaccurately. The first subsection sorts the opinions by vote and by method. The second follows the lower courts as they have used the framework, including the as-applied route that the lead opinion left open.
Counting the Votes
Crawford’s vote count is 3-3-3. Justice Stevens announced the judgment and wrote the lead opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred in the judgment. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, and Justice Breyer dissented separately.5 Six votes upheld the law, three would have struck it down, and no opinion commanded a majority.6 The opinions sort as follows:
| Opinion | Justices | Vote on the judgment | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead opinion | Stevens, Roberts, Kennedy | Uphold | Weigh the burden on voters against the asserted state interests |
| Concurrence in the judgment | Scalia, Thomas, Alito | Uphold | Two tracks: strict scrutiny for severe burdens, deferential review for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory ones |
| Dissent | Souter, Ginsburg | Strike down | Weigh burden against interests, on a standard much like the lead opinion’s |
| Dissent | Breyer | Strike down | Weigh burden against interests, without expressly relying on Anderson and Burdick |
Because the six who voted to affirm used different methods, the statement that the Court upheld the law describes the statute and leaves the standard open. To read the case, ask what test each group would apply and which test drew more votes.7
The lead opinion balanced. In its account, the governing approach rejects any “litmus test” that would neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions: a court must identify and evaluate the interests the State puts forward to justify the burden its rule imposes, and then make the “hard judgment” that the adversary system demands.8 Justice Stevens concluded that the same sort of balancing applies to voter identification laws, although Anderson involved a restriction on candidate ballot access and Burdick a prohibition on write-in voting.9 He then found the burden on voters limited, observed that the challengers bore a “heavy burden of persuasion” because they sought to invalidate the law in all its applications, and suggested that as-applied challenges remained possible.10 The opinion also answered the concurrence directly. Burdick rejected strict scrutiny for every law that burdens the right to vote, but it put Anderson’s flexible standard in strict scrutiny’s place and did not create a novel deferential “important regulatory interests” standard.11
The concurrence applied two tracks. The lead opinion had assumed the challengers’ premise that the law may have imposed a special burden on some voters, and it held only that they had not assembled evidence showing the burden severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny. Justice Scalia, for the sake of “clarity and finality (as well as adherence to precedent),” would decide the case on the ground that the premise is irrelevant.12 In his view, what the challengers call the law’s light and heavy burdens are only the different impacts of the single burden the law imposes uniformly on every voter: to vote in person in Indiana, everyone must have and present a photo identification that can be obtained for free.13 A nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restriction draws a deferential “important regulatory interests” standard, and strict scrutiny is reserved for laws that severely restrict the right to vote.14 Individual impacts therefore do not count. The only question is whether the burden goes “beyond the merely inconvenient,” and Justice Scalia found Indiana’s law “eminently reasonable.”15
Both dissents balanced as well. Justice Souter’s description of the constitutional standard is very similar to the lead opinion’s, though the two Justices applied it to reach different conclusions.16 Justice Breyer did not expressly rely on Anderson and Burdick, but he too took a balancing approach, and he concluded that Indiana’s unusually restrictive law, particularly its burden on poor, elderly, and disabled voters, was not adequately justified by the state’s asserted interests.17
Two different majorities therefore sit inside one decision. Six Justices voted for the judgment: the three in the lead opinion and the three in the concurrence. Six Justices also stand behind the method of weighing burden against interest: the same three in the lead opinion and the three dissenters. Only the lead opinion’s Justices belong to both groups. A majority of the Justices thought courts should balance the asserted state interests against the burdens on voters even when those burdens are not severe, and the concurrence alone rejected balancing in favor of a two-track approach under which nonsevere burdens receive deferential review.18
The choice of method decides where the evidence matters. Under the concurrence’s two tracks, classification does most of the work: a burden that is nonsevere and nondiscriminatory draws deferential review, and the individual impacts a challenger proves do not change the classification. Under balancing, the same evidence stays relevant after the burden is classified, because it goes into the weighing. Balancing also leaves room to ask whether the State could reach its aim with a lighter rule. The Court asked a question of that kind in Dunn, where it acknowledged that states may require voters to be residents but held Tennessee’s one-year durational residency requirement unwarranted, because other means were available to determine bona fide residence.19
The third step does the real work. Reasoning from the six votes to affirm credits the Court with the concurrence’s method, and reasoning from the lead opinion alone credits the Court with an opinion only three Justices joined. The accurate statement has three parts: the Court upheld Indiana’s statute on a facial record, a majority of the Justices weighed burden against interest under Anderson and Burdick, and Justice Scalia’s two-track rule remained a minority position.24
Later Challenges
Crawford gave lower courts a framework without a controlling rationale, and the decisions since show how that plays out. Facial attacks on identification laws are hard to win. As-applied claims backed by evidence have succeeded at least in part. Courts differ on whether to keep weighing once a burden is nonsevere. And federal courts are cautioned against changing election rules close to an election.26
Facial attacks fail for a reason Crawford itself supplies. Plaintiffs who seek to have a law declared invalid in all its applications bear a “heavy burden of persuasion,” and facial challenges are disfavored. The lead opinion nonetheless suggested that the door remained open to future as-applied challenges to Indiana’s law and to similar laws in other states.27 Litigants have continued to press such challenges, contending that their states’ laws are more burdensome than Indiana’s or less justified by the state’s asserted interests.28 Balancing gives both contentions a place to land, because the weighing puts the burden on one side and the state’s interests on the other. A challenger can add that a lighter rule would serve the State just as well, the kind of argument that succeeded in Dunn, discussed above.29
Wisconsin’s litigation shows the sequence. The Seventh Circuit applied the balancing standard in Frank v. Walker and upheld Wisconsin’s strict photo identification law against a facial challenge. Later as-applied challenges, in a further Frank decision and in Luft v. Evers, succeeded in small part.30 The two results fit together. A facial attack asks a court to strike the law for everyone, and a law that works for the great bulk of voters resists that request. An as-applied claim presents the voters who could not in fact obtain qualifying identification and asks only for relief that reaches them. Relief sized to those voters leaves the statute in force for everyone else, which is why the successes were small.
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted (NEOCH) shows the weighing sorting claims within a single case. The Sixth Circuit reviewed Ohio’s rules for counting provisional ballots and divided the affected voters into two groups. Voters whose ballot affirmations omitted information that state law required were not likely to prevail, because their errors arose from a failure to follow simple instructions. Voters who cast ballots at the correct polling location but in the wrong precinct fared differently, because the court found a likely equal protection violation as to them.31 A defect the voter could have avoided by following plain directions did not carry the claim, and the wrong-precinct claim did.
Other courts have read Crawford more deferentially. In Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State, the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas’s procedures for verifying signatures on mail-in ballots after concluding that they did not severely burden the right to vote. Some federal courts appear to have moved from the balancing that a majority of the Justices endorsed toward the two-track approach of the concurrence.32 The shift matters because it moves the decisive work to the label. A nonsevere label draws deferential review early, and evidence about affected voters then has little left to do.33
Outcomes have diverged in other ways too. In the immediate aftermath of Shelby County v. Holder, a number of states passed restrictive new election laws. The Fourth Circuit struck down a North Carolina law widely described as one of the most restrictive in the nation, while a revised version of Texas’s voter identification law was allowed to take effect.34
A challenger who cannot win on burden may argue discrimination instead, and that argument calls for different proof. Equal protection decisions outside voting show the pattern. Courts have held that a law setting aside a portion of state contracts for minority- and women-owned businesses violates equal protection, and that a city ordinance giving minority groups preferential status in bidding is unconstitutional unless there is sufficient evidence of past intentional discrimination.35 Later sections of this chapter take up equal treatment in voting.
Timing can defeat a claim that is strong on the merits. In Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Court’s other voter identification decision, the Court did not rule on the merits. It suggested that lower courts be cautious in issuing injunctions against state election laws shortly before Election Day, pointing to the “voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” that late court orders can create.36 The concern is practical. A late order changes rules that voters and officials have been preparing to follow, and a voter unsure what the rule now is may decide to stay home. In the years since, the case has come to stand for an increasingly rigid prohibition against federal courts enjoining election laws or practices claimed to violate voting rights.37
Filed eight months before the election, the same claim leaves officials time to adjust. The timing concern fades, and the court can weigh the burden on those voters against the State’s interests. The caution governs the timing of relief. A court that withholds an injunction under it has not held the identification law valid.
The third step does the most work, because a strong record helps a plaintiff only in a court that weighs. The fifth step can defeat a claim that survives the first four, since a plaintiff with strong evidence may still lose a request for relief that comes too close to the election.