Concept
The Afroyim Holding
Citizenship
The Afroyim Holding
In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court held that Congress has no power under the Constitution to divest a person of citizenship without that person’s assent, and it overruled Perez v. Brownell to say so.1 The holding struck down the statute under which Afroyim had lost his American citizenship. Afroyim, a naturalized citizen, had gone to Israel, become an Israeli citizen, and voted in a 1951 Israeli parliamentary election. When he later applied to renew his passport, the State Department refused on the ground that § 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 had taken his citizenship.2 The lower courts relied on Congress’s implied power to regulate foreign affairs and held that Congress may forcibly take citizenship for voting abroad. They therefore held Afroyim to have lost his citizenship “regardless of his intention not to give it up,” just as this Court had held in Perez.3
The Supreme Court answered with a question that comes before any individual-rights objection: does the Constitution give Congress this power at all? Its answer, no, rests on three steps. The Court first removes the foreign-affairs premise on which Perez rested. It then reads the Citizenship Clause as a limit on Congress. It finally states the result as a consent rule, which fixes who decides whether citizenship ends but leaves open what shows that the citizen has decided, a point taken up under proof of voluntary relinquishment.
Rejecting the Perez Theory
The Court began by taking apart Perez, whose reasoning it described as a chain of three links:4
- Congress has an implied power to deal with foreign affairs, an indispensable attribute of sovereignty.
- That implied power, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, empowers Congress to regulate voting by American citizens in foreign elections.
- Involuntary expatriation falls within the “ample scope” of “appropriate modes” that Congress can adopt to carry out its general regulatory power.
The Court cut the chain at its root. It rejected the idea, expressed in Perez, that apart from the Fourteenth Amendment Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen’s citizenship without his assent.5 Each link then fails for its own reason.
The first link argues from the wrong source of authority. A power to end citizenship cannot be sustained, the Court said, as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations, because other nations are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and the Court could draw no support from theirs. In this country the people are sovereign, and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.6
The second link fails because Congress holds only the legislative powers that the Constitution grants.7 The Constitution, the Court reminded, limits the Government to the powers specifically granted and those necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. It grants Congress no express power to strip people of citizenship, whether through the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or through any specifically granted power.8 The Necessary and Proper Clause can only help carry out a granted power, so it cannot reach citizenship unless some granted power does. The third link then has nothing to stand on, because asking whether expatriation is an appropriate means to a regulatory end presupposes that the end lies within a power over citizenship.
Congress’s own early record points the same way. On three occasions, in 1794, 1797, and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to enact laws describing certain conduct as resulting in expatriation. On each occasion the bills aimed at recognizing the right of voluntary expatriation and providing some means of exercising it.9 In 1794 and 1797 many members still adhered to the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance and doubted that a citizen could even renounce voluntarily. By 1818 almost no one doubted the right, but several judicial decisions had indicated that a citizen could not exercise it without the Federal Government’s consent in the form of enabling legislation. A bill was therefore introduced to let a person relinquish citizenship by declaring so in writing before a district court and then departing the country.10
Opponents of the 1818 bill argued that Congress had no constitutional authority, express or implied, under either the Naturalization Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, to provide that a certain act would constitute expatriation. They pointed to a proposed Thirteenth Amendment, never ratified, that would have provided for loss of citizenship by accepting an office or emolument from a foreign government, which made an amendment, not a statute, the proposed vehicle.11 Congressman Pindall objected to the very notion the Perez majority later accepted, that sovereignty gives Congress a right to expatriate citizens. Allegiance in this country, he said, “is not due to Congress, but to the people, with whom the sovereign power is found.”12 Chief Justice Marshall had written in Osborn v. Bank of the United States that a naturalized citizen stands “on the footing of a native,” that the Constitution “does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights,” and that the power to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization is exhausted by its exercise “so far as respects the individual.”13 These statements show views expressed in Congress and by this Court, even before the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Government had no power, even under its express naturalization power, to determine what conduct should result in loss of citizenship.14
The Court itself conceded that these legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive and must be read in their historical context. It rested its answer on the Fourteenth Amendment, whose unequivocal terms, it said, should have removed any doubt.15 That concession explains why the next part turns to the text of the Citizenship Clause.
With the Perez chain removed, a statute that attaches loss of nationality to conduct abroad has no congressional power to rest on. The Government’s position in Afroyim was that the statute could terminate citizenship without the citizen’s voluntary renunciation, and rejecting the Perez theory takes away the power that position needed.16
The pairing shows what the Court rejected: a power in Congress to decide for the citizen. It left the citizen’s own power to decide untouched, because the Court described the protected right as one to remain a citizen “unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”17
Text and Purpose of the Clause
With the foreign-affairs theory gone, the Court had to say where the limit on Congress comes from, and it found the limit in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. Any doubt about whether Congress could take citizenship from an unwilling person “should have been removed by the unequivocal terms of the Amendment itself,” which “provides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to control the status of citizenship.”19 The operative words declare that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States.”20 Those words state a present status, with no term of years, no condition of continued good conduct, and no reserved power of withdrawal. A court reading them as written has nothing from which to build a congressional power of cancellation, and the Court concluded that the Amendment “can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.”21
The guarantee binds every governmental actor. Once acquired, the Court said, Fourteenth Amendment citizenship “was not to be shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental unit.”22 A constitutional definition acts on every branch and level of government at once, so no body keeps a leftover power to dilute what the definition declares.
The Court read that text against its purpose. A statement from the debates over the Amendment, quoted in the opinion, described the Amendment as settling “the great question of citizenship” and as a way “to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens . . . under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power.”23 Citizenship protected only by ordinary legislation stays open to later legislation, so a constitutional definition was the way to make the status survive a change in majorities. From that purpose the Court drew its inference. The Amendment’s undeniable purpose of making the citizenship of Black Americans permanent and secure, it said, would be frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of citizenship without consent by acting under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other power generally granted. The framers were not particularly concerned with expatriation, but the Court found it undeniable from the language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy.24
The 1868 record points the same way. Two years after the Amendment was proposed, Congress specifically considered expatriation. Several bills to impose involuntary expatriation on citizens who committed certain acts were defeated with little discussion, while other bills, like the one proposed and defeated in 1818, offered only a means by which a citizen could voluntarily renounce. Representative Van Trump, who proposed one of the latter, vehemently denied that his measure would make the Government “a party to the act dissolving the tie between the citizen and his country . . . .”25
Precedent supplied a further link. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Court first held that Wong Kim Ark was a citizen within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. It then pointed out that, although he might “renounce this citizenship, and become a citizen of . . . any other country,” he had never done so.26 The official syllabus of Afroyim attributes the basic principle that the Government cannot strip a citizen of citizenship without voluntary renunciation to Wong Kim Ark and to Trop v. Dulles.27 Applying that principle, the Court reasoned that upholding the foreign-voting provision would be equivalent to holding that Congress may “abridge,” “affect,” “restrict the effect of,” and “take . . . away” citizenship, and the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from doing any of those things.28 The same passage shows where the protection stops. The Clause shields the citizen from a loss the Government imposes, not from a loss the citizen chooses.
The Court was open about how much weight the history could bear. It acknowledged that the earlier legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive.29 It described its holding as the only one that can stand in view of the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, one that fits the principles of liberty and equal justice the Amendment was adopted to guarantee better than Perez did.30 Text and purpose therefore carry the argument, and the history only confirms it. An attack on the history reaches only the confirming layer, and the dissent’s response is taken up in the next part of this chapter.
The Consent Rule
The Court put its holding in two sentences: “The Constitution does not grant Congress the power to take away citizenship,” and the power to grant citizenship “carries with it no power to revoke it without the citizen’s consent.”32 Stated as a rule, Congress may not strip a person of United States citizenship, native-born or naturalized, without the citizen’s assent.33 The rule has two halves. Its prohibition runs against Congress and reaches any statute that ends citizenship for a person who has not agreed to lose it. Its exception leaves every citizen free to give the status up by choice, and the Court described what the citizen holds as “a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”34
Applied to the statute before the Court, the rule decided everything. The provisions of § 349(a)(5) were beyond the power of Congress to enact, so Perez was overruled, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions to enter judgment that Afroyim is a citizen.35 Afroyim had voted in a foreign election and the statute treated that vote as ending his nationality, with no step of consent in between.36 The Court did not confine the protection to him. It held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects “every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race,” so a native-born citizen who cast the same vote would stand exactly where Afroyim stood.37
The Court spoke of the citizen’s “assent” and of “voluntary” relinquishment without saying what either requires. The dissent flagged the gap: voluntariness had been used to describe both a specific intent to renounce citizenship and the uncoerced commission of an act the law deems a relinquishment, and until the Court said with greater precision what it meant by “assent,” the opinion would cause “still greater confusion.”38 A later decision unanimously reaffirmed Afroyim’s basic holding. It required a showing of specific intent to relinquish citizenship voluntarily, in addition to proof that the expatriating act was itself voluntary, and it allowed that intent to be expressed in words or fairly inferred from proven conduct.39 The proof of that intent comes later in this chapter.
The Court supported the rule with three reasons that differ in how far they reach. The narrowest is the danger of statelessness: in some instances, loss of citizenship can leave a person “without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world—as a man without a country.”40 The Court said only “in some instances,” and Afroyim himself had become an Israeli citizen, so the holding does not depend on this danger.41
The second reason applies to every citizen. “Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a co-operative affair,” the Court said, and “[i]ts citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.”42 The citizens are the party from which the government draws its authority, and a power in the government to decide who belongs to that body would reverse the direction of authority. The same reason explains why the native-born and the naturalized are protected alike: each belongs to the same body.
The third reason concerns the temporary character of officeholders. “The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous,” the Court wrote, “to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”43 Officeholders hold power for a term, and a power to strip citizenship would let whichever majority happened to be in office decide that fellow citizens no longer belong. Only the first reason depends on a particular citizen’s circumstances. The other two explain why the Court made the protection categorical.
The rule has one limit, which the Court recorded in a footnote. As the Chief Justice had said in his Perez dissent, the Court noted, naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside, and it cited Knauer v. United States, Baumgartner v. United States, and Schneiderman v. United States.44 The footnote gives the proposition and its citations without elaboration, so the limit stays as narrow as its wording: it speaks only of naturalization unlawfully procured. The limit fits the logic of the rule, which protects citizenship lawfully held. A later section takes up the source of that authority and the procedure for exercising it.
The single fact that separates the two voters is whether the citizenship was lawfully acquired in the first place. A student who reads Afroyim as a bar on every government action against a naturalized citizen’s status will misapply it, and so will one who limits the rule to naturalized citizens or to people who would otherwise be stateless. The rule forbids Congress from taking lawfully held citizenship without the citizen’s assent, and it leaves open both the citizen’s own act of relinquishment and the setting aside of a naturalization that was never valid.