Concept
The Modern Framework
Free exercise
The Modern Framework
Free exercise doctrine after Employment Division v. Smith runs as a short sequence of questions, and each answer either ends the case or shifts the burden to the government. The sequence enforces the command that Congress make no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.1 Its default rule is older than Smith. In Reynolds v. United States (1878), the Court held that an individual could not be excused from complying with a generally applicable criminal law that was otherwise religiously neutral. Later free exercise law tried, to some extent, to modify that holding, and in 1990 the Court returned to it.2
The Court's clearest recent statement of the sequence comes in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. A plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.”3 A plaintiff who makes that showing wins unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny by demonstrating that its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.4 As a flow chart, the statement starts with a burdened sincere religious practice, asks whether the policy is neutral and then whether it is generally applicable, and ends in one of two places: strict scrutiny if either test fails, and the Smith rule if both are met.
The two tests probe the nondiscrimination that Smith's general rule emphasizes.5 General applicability fails when a policy “prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way,” or when it provides “a mechanism for individualized exemptions.”6 Suppose a city bans a congregation's beach bonfire to prevent fires, yet allows secular bonfires that raise the same risk. The ban fails the first branch, because its fire-safety rationale cannot explain why only the religious fire is forbidden.
Neutrality fails when the government's object is to restrict a religious practice. In Kennedy the District admitted that it “sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy's actions at least in part because of their religious character,” and prohibiting a religious practice was therefore its unquestioned “object.”7 The same facts often prove both failures. The District explained that it could not allow an on-duty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct, and that one explanation revealed both a religious object and a secular comparator.8 A plaintiff need prove only one failure, because failing either test is enough to trigger strict scrutiny.9
The fork matters most for the claimant who stops after the first step. A heavy burden on a sincere religious practice does not by itself send a case to strict scrutiny, and an exam fact pattern that dwells on a central ritual under pressure invites the wrong answer. Smith itself shows why. Persons dismissed for using peyote in religious ceremonies lost their claim to unemployment benefits, because the drug's use was criminally prohibited by a general law and the Clause requires no special religious exemption from such laws absent targeting of religion.10 Under that doctrine, the Clause as a general rule offers no relief from burdens that do not formally or deliberately discriminate against religious conduct.11
Kennedy ran the whole sequence and stopped at strict scrutiny. The District's letters prohibited “any overt actions on Mr. Kennedy's part, appearing to a reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-initiated prayer,” and said it could not allow “an employee, while still on duty, to engage in religious conduct.”12 The District conceded below that its policies were “not neutral” toward religion.13
General applicability failed as well. The District allowed other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct, and it did not apply any postgame supervisory requirement evenhandedly, although its evaluation advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy in part because he “failed to supervise student-athletes after games.”14 The District thus conceded that its policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable.15 At that point the burden shifted to it.16 Set beside Smith, the difference lies in how each rule treated religion. The peyote ban was a general criminal prohibition that did not target religion, while the District's policy aimed at a religious practice and tolerated comparable secular conduct.
A policy can also fall outside Smith through the second branch of general applicability alone. In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Court explained that creating a formal mechanism for granting individualized, discretionary exceptions invites the government to weigh reasons for compliance and therefore undercuts general applicability, whether or not the mechanism has ever been used. That the Commissioner had not granted an exception in the past did not eliminate the constitutional problem.17
Once either test fails, the government carries the burden. It must show that its restrictions serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end.18 The standard is exacting. A policy survives only if it advances “interests of the highest order” and is narrowly tailored to achieve them, and so long as the government can achieve its interests in a manner that does not burden religion, it must do so.19
Neutrality and general applicability are the main routes to strict scrutiny, not the only ones. The Court's own formulation says a plaintiff may prove a violation “in various ways, including” these showings.20 The Court has also permitted claims alleging discriminatory religious animus in the adjudication process, and it has protected the institutional autonomy of religious organizations even from laws that are neutral and generally applicable. It has further held a law not generally applicable if it includes even a single secular exemption or exclusion that the Court deems relevant.21 Smith itself left open exceptions for hybrid claims and for laws that impair the autonomy of religious institutions, although the hybrid-claim exception has had little impact.22
The sections that follow take the framework's elements in order: neutrality, then general applicability, then strict scrutiny itself. They then return to Kennedy and close with government benefits and religious schools.