Concept
Moment of Silence Laws
Establishment
Moment of Silence Laws
A moment of silence seems to ask nothing of anyone, which is why Wallace v. Jaffree is the case that shows how far the purpose criterion reaches. The state-sponsored prayer decisions turned on the government's sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise. They left a student who did not share the exercise's beliefs to choose between participating, and compromising those beliefs, or withdrawing, and calling attention to the difference.1 A silent minute scripts nothing for the student to say or hear, so those decisions do not settle whether a legislature may set one aside and name prayer as a use of it. In Wallace the Court held that Alabama could not do so on the record before it: a statute authorizing a one-minute period of silence in public schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer” violated the First Amendment.2
Alabama enacted three statutes in succession, and the sequence is the key to the case. The 1978 statute, § 16-1-20, authorized a silent minute of meditation and contained nothing that kept any student from praying during it. The 1981 statute, § 16-1-20.1, differed from it in only one significant way: it added the words “or voluntary prayer.”3 A 1982 sequel followed, and the District Court found that the 1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular purpose.4 Justice Powell, concurring, described the three enactments as Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored prayer in the public schools.5 The question was therefore narrow: whether a legislature that already provides a silent minute may add a reference to prayer.
The Court answered on the secular-purpose criterion. The First Amendment requires a court to invalidate a statute that is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.6 The record pointed that way. The Court relied on the testimony of the bill's sponsor, Senator Holmes, that the statute's sole purpose was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools, and the relationship among the three statutes confirmed that testimony.7
The comparison with the 1978 statute carried the argument without depending on any one legislator's words. That statute already protected a student's freedom to pray silently, and the appellants identified no secular purpose it had left unserved. Only two conclusions fit the text of the 1981 statute: the legislature meant to convey state endorsement and promotion of prayer, or it meant nothing at all.8 Compare Stone v. Graham, where Kentucky tried to supply a secular purpose for its posted Ten Commandments by requiring a small-print notation at the bottom of each display that called them the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.9 Alabama had no comparable rationale to offer. The second possibility fails because a statute with no purpose has no secular purpose, and because the common-sense presumption is that statutes are enacted to change existing law.10 What remains is endorsement, which cannot be squared with the principle that government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.11
Accommodation could not rescue the amendment either. When the 1981 statute was enacted, it was undisputed that no governmental practice kept students from praying silently for a minute. There was therefore no general requirement from which anyone needed an exemption under the Free Exercise cases.12 Accommodation presupposes a burden to lift, and an amendment that lifts none adds only the state's message that prayer is a favored practice.13 Permission is not the vice. In a later case about Washington's scholarship program, it was beyond doubt that the state could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit scholarship recipients to pursue a degree in devotional theology.14 What condemned Alabama's amendment was that, set beside the earlier statute, it did nothing else.
The holding is narrower than the label “moment of silence” suggests. The Court distinguished a legislative intent to return prayer to the schools from merely protecting every student's right to pray voluntarily during an appropriate moment of silence.15 Justice Powell, who agreed fully with Justice O'Connor that some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, noted that the Court's opinion sets forth the same suggestion.16
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, supplied the working test. By mandating a moment of silence, a state does not necessarily endorse any activity that may occur during it. The crucial question is whether the state has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that children should use the moment for prayer. That question cannot be answered in the abstract; courts examine the history, language, and administration of the particular statute.17 Because the inquiry reaches administration as well as text and history, what officials do in carrying out the statute counts alongside what the statute says.
The test leaves most silent-minute laws standing. Twenty-five states then permitted or required a moment of silence, and the typical statute let students meditate, pray, or reflect on the day's activities; a few limited the minute to meditation alone. Federal trial courts had divided over such laws.18 Courts of appeals have since upheld statutes of the typical kind. The Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia statute under which students could meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity in Brown v. Gilmore, and the Seventh Circuit upheld an Illinois statute providing a brief period of silence for silent prayer or silent reflection in Sherman v. Koch.19
Alabama's statute named prayer too, so the mere mention of prayer cannot be what separated it from those laws. The difference was history: the reference to prayer entered a statute that already allowed silent prayer, and the record showed no purpose for adding it other than returning prayer to the schools. On an exam, a moment-of-silence fact pattern should therefore send you to the statute's history before its wording. A statute enacted in one step, with a record of aims such as calming the classroom, likely survives even if it lists prayer among several permitted uses. An amendment that inserts prayer into an existing meditation statute for the stated purpose of returning prayer to school fails as Alabama's did. A cosmetic repair is not assured, because adding a phrase such as “or meditation” to a prayer statute might run afoul of the admonition in McCreary County that transparent efforts to circumvent the secular-purpose requirement cannot trump the inquiry, which must take into account all probative evidence of purpose, including the original purpose.20
Three Justices dissented, on different grounds. Chief Justice Burger objected that the statute does nothing more than permit a moment of silence: it does not require anyone to pray, does not prescribe any prayer, and merely allows students who wish to pray to do so.21 Another dissent complained that the Court neglected to mention that no trial had been held on the constitutionality of the Alabama statutes, because the District Court had held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the states. The missing trial mattered, that dissent said, because the answer filed by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not make the same admissions that the Governor's answer made.22
The concurrences answer part of the evidentiary attack. Justice Powell agreed that a single legislator's statement, particularly one made after enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose, but he found the religious purpose in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three statutes.23 Justice O'Connor would give such testimony little, if any, weight, yet she found that the text of the statute in light of its official legislative history left little doubt about its purpose.24
Justice White's dissent presses on the thinnest part of the decision. As he read the opinions, a majority would approve statutes that provide for a moment of silence without mentioning prayer, yet if a student asked whether he could pray during that moment, it is hard to believe the teacher could not say yes. He would therefore not invalidate a statute that gave the legislative answer to “May I pray?” at the outset, even if Alabama's peculiar legislative history made the statute infirm, which he did not believe it did.25 The majority's reply rests on the history: the 1981 statute amended a statute that already let students pray, and the record offered no purpose for the amendment except returning prayer to the schools.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent went to the foundations. He urged a return to the language and intent of the drafters. In his reading, the evil to be aimed at was the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the preference of one sect over another, but the Clause was not concerned with whether government might aid all religions evenhandedly. It did not command neutrality between religion and irreligion, much less create a wall of separation, and he called for repudiating the Lemon test.26 On that nonpreferentialist view, government is free to promote religion generally so long as it creates no preference for a particular religion or religious institution.27 The final section of this chapter returns to that critique. Until then, the rule to apply is the majority's, as limited by the concurrences.