Concept
Lawful but Harmful Products
Regulation of commercial speech
Lawful but Harmful Products
A state that bans a product outright may also ban advertisements proposing the illegal sale. Alcohol, addictive drugs, prostitution, and gambling are the standard examples of goods that states heavily regulate or prohibit because they are thought immoral or likely to be abused by consumers.1 An advertisement for a banned transaction fails the first step of the Central Hudson test, which asks whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.2
The harder case arises when the legislature legalizes the product and then limits what sellers may say about it, either to reduce overall demand or to protect groups it considers especially vulnerable to exploitation.3 A truthful advertisement for a lawful product clears the first step, so the restriction survives only if it satisfies the other three: a substantial government interest, direct advancement of that interest, and a fit no more extensive than necessary.4
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy put the underlying question in its simplest form. May a state completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients? The Court answered no, reserving other questions.5 Two ideas from that decision still shape the doctrine. Where there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising.6 And the free flow of commercial information is indispensable, both to the intelligent private economic decisions on which a free-enterprise economy depends and to the formation of intelligent opinions about how that economy should be regulated.7 Since 1976, commercial speech has nonetheless been protected but not fully protected, a category of “lower value” speech. The Justices who would protect it like other speech unless it poses distinctively commercial harms, such as deception or overreaching, have not commanded a majority.8
Two arguments compete in the lawful-but-harmful cases. The first holds that the greater power includes the lesser. Legislatures treat risky products anywhere from complete prohibition to full legalization, a limit on advertising is an intermediate solution, and a legislature that may eliminate a market may also restrain the stimulation of demand.9 The second begins with what an advertising restriction must assume in order to work. It reduces consumption only if people who know less buy less, so it rests on the premise that people will be better off with less information, a premise at odds with the very core of the First Amendment.10 The Court rejected that premise unanimously when an ordinance banned “for sale” signs to promote stable, racially integrated housing. In an opinion by Justice Marshall, it held that the First Amendment disables the state from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful information, and it named the law’s primary infirmity: suppressing truthful information on the belief that people will be better off with less speech and knowledge.11
The paternalism argument still has force, because people sometimes respond irrationally to information; that is one reason juries are shielded from relevant but inflammatory evidence. For alcohol, gambling, and drugs, society appears to find the fear of irrational consumer responses great enough to justify a complete ban. The lesser-power argument asks why that fear cannot justify the smaller step of limiting advertisers’ ability to exploit the same weakness.12
The Court’s answer unfolded in three stages. Posadas accepted the lesser-power argument and applied Central Hudson deferentially. Later decisions repudiated that reasoning, and the Court has since pressed the third and fourth steps harder against restrictions on truthful advertising of lawful products. One point has held throughout: even state regulation of advertising for previously banned products must face full scrutiny under Central Hudson.13 Gambling has been the primary area in which the Court allowed restrictions on commercial speech to decrease the activity, and the sections below show how far that exception has narrowed.14 A product’s harmfulness therefore never removes its advertising from the four-step analysis. It changes only how the government argues the second, third, and fourth steps.
Posadas and the Vice Idea
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico made the lesser-power argument famous. Puerto Rico had legalized casino gambling and prohibited advertising of it to the Puerto Rican public, while permitting restricted advertising on media in the mainland United States.15 Justice Rehnquist, applying Central Hudson for the Court, held that the ban on advertising casino gambling to Puerto Rico residents did not violate the First Amendment.16 Later decisions repudiated the reasoning, so an exam answer should cite Posadas as the government’s argument, stated and then answered, never as settled authority.17
The Court worked through all four parts of the test and found each satisfied. The first part was clearly met, and the fourth, whether the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest, was satisfied “beyond peradventure.”18 The challengers argued that the First Amendment required Puerto Rico to reduce demand not by suppressing speech that might encourage gambling but by promulgating speech to discourage it, a less restrictive means. Justice Rehnquist answered that the legislature decides whether such counterspeech would be more effective.19 That answer is deference at the fourth step: the Court left to the legislature the comparison between the ban and the narrower option.
The passage that made the case famous concerned power rather than the four steps. Puerto Rico could have banned casino gambling by its residents entirely, and “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.” Justice Rehnquist added that it would be “a Pyrrhic victory” for casino owners to win a First Amendment right to advertise if the legislature could then ban casino gambling altogether.20 The Court called it “a strange constitutional doctrine” that would concede the power to ban a product but not the power to forbid stimulating demand through advertising by those who would profit, and it found little reason to rule out advertising restrictions as an intermediate response.21 The appeal comes from treating advertising as a mere accessory of the sale, so that cutting it back looks gentler than cutting off the sale itself.
Justice Brennan charged that Justice Rehnquist had not been faithful to the Central Hudson test he professed to use: in Rehnquist’s hands the test, arguably an intermediate standard of review, had become a de facto rationality standard.22 The dissent also noted that the Puerto Rican legislature had never “actually asserted” that advertising aimed at residents would cause serious harmful effects.23 A structural point reinforces the objection. A partial ban, or a ban on speech advertising a product, is often not a lesser power but a greater one, because it lets the state avoid the hard choices of a complete ban. A complete ban carries an inner political check against the excesses of state power: to ban casinos outright, Puerto Rico would have had to give up the tax revenue and tourist income that legalized casino gambling brings.24 An advertising ban lets the legislature keep the revenue and still shape what residents decide.
From a more speech-protective perspective, the ban fares badly at the third and fourth steps. The relationship between the government’s aims and the advertising ban is “remote” at best. No one can know whether the ban will affect the amount of resident casino gambling, much less prevent the crimes associated with it, and because casino gambling will be promoted and developed for the tourist trade, the ban may be completely ineffective. Less speech-restrictive ways of advancing Puerto Rico’s goals also exist, among them an outright ban on casino gambling by residents.25
Gambling advertising is the one area where the Court has allowed restrictions aimed at decreasing the activity itself, and United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. belongs to that line.26
Liquormart Rejects Posadas
Posadas did not last long as a majority position. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, a liquor retailer challenged a Rhode Island ban on advertising retail liquor sales except at the place of sale. The Court held that the Twenty-first Amendment, which gives the states authority to regulate alcoholic beverages within their borders, did not qualify First Amendment protection, and that the ban on advertising liquor prices anywhere but at the point of sale violated the First Amendment.28 The Justices agreed on the result and split badly on the rationale.29
Four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, thought Posadas wrong, and Justice O’Connor declined either to follow it or to overrule it.30 Justice Stevens would have repudiated Posadas and its greater-includes-the-lesser rationale. The text of the First Amendment itself, he reasoned, shows that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct, so a ban on speech is not automatically the smaller step. He also rejected the argument that a ban on price advertising of liquor was defensible because it regulated a vice, since a vice exception to First Amendment protection would be difficult, if not impossible, to define.31 A majority of the Court disapproved the Posadas analysis in two separate opinions.32
Other decisions point the same way. In a footnote that may overshadow the rest of its opinion, the Court acknowledged Posadas, found the “greater includes lesser” argument to be mere dictum, and rejected the government’s claim that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech promoting socially harmful activities, such as alcohol consumption, than they have to regulate other types of speech.33 The Court then went further and specifically rejected the “greater includes the lesser” argument even in the commercial speech context, even when the government regulates advertising of harmful but lawful products.34 In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., for example, the Court declared unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting statements of alcohol content on beer labels, although it accepted that the government had a substantial interest in preventing strength wars among malt beverage products.35 The product’s harmfulness supplied the substantial interest at the second step, and the law still failed.
These holdings share a premise. A ban on truthful price information works only if consumers who know less buy less, which returns the Court to the idea it rejected in the “for sale” sign case: the government may not suppress truthful information on the belief that people will be better off with less speech and knowledge. Justice Thomas, concurring, rejected the notion that government may restrict commercial speech on that assumption,36 and at least some Justices seem attracted to a broader per se rule against “paternalistic” regulations designed to keep consumers from making well-informed but unwise choices.37
Central Hudson survived all of this. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate concurrence, called for overruling it, the Court has not returned to the issue, and present indications are that the test will remain applicable despite the dissatisfaction of some Justices.38 The Court has said expressly that it engages in “intermediate” scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech.39 The next subsection shows how that test operates once deference to the legislature is gone.
Stricter Application After Liquormart
The Court’s later casino-advertising decision shows how the four steps work without Posadas’s deference. In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, the Court endorsed reasoning similar to the speech-protective critique of Posadas above.41 Two interests were said to meet the substantiality prong: the federal broadcast advertising ban reduced the social costs of gambling and aided enforcement of state antigambling policies. But Section 1304 did not satisfy the third and fourth prongs, because federal law was riddled with exceptions to its antigambling policy.42 Exceptions defeat the claim of direct advancement because the harm still reaches the audience through the exempt channels, and they cast doubt on the stated goal because the government tolerates the advertising it says it cannot accept.
The Court added that even assuming state antigambling policy was more coherent than its federal counterpart, the amount of truthful speech sacrificed by the ban, compared with any reasonably expected benefits, was intolerable. The speaker and the audience, rather than the government, should be the ultimate arbiters of truthful and nonmisleading information about legal activity.43
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly applied the same scrutiny to tobacco. Massachusetts banned outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco or cigars within 1,000 feet of schools or playgrounds, and it banned indoor point-of-sale advertising of those products unless the advertising was set more than five feet above the floor. The regulations aimed to keep children from seeing the advertising, and the tobacco companies challenged them under the First Amendment.44 The Court struck the regulations down.45 A protective purpose aimed at children did not save them. The same stricter look reaches drug advertising: in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court struck down a federal restriction on advertising compounded drugs.