Concept
Where the Doctrine Stands
Regulation of commercial speech
Where the Doctrine Stands
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission remains the formal test for restrictions on commercial speech. The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. If it does, the regulation is valid only when the government’s interest is substantial, the regulation directly advances that interest, and the regulation is not more extensive than necessary, which means a reasonable fit between ends and means.1 The first step screens out speech that is false, illegal, or deceptive, because such a message has no informational value to protect.2 The third step has force because a regulation that is ineffective or remote in sustaining the government’s interest fails, although no mathematical measure tells a court when a regulation has become too remote.3
The Court calls its review under this test intermediate scrutiny, and the four parts are similar, if not identical, to the intermediate scrutiny applied to regulation of truthful advertising for legal activities.4 The label marks a middle position with a history behind it. Commercial advertising was once treated as wholly outside the First Amendment. Since 1976 it has been protected, but not fully, and it remains the lone formal exception to the two-level approach of Chaplinsky: unlike incitement, fighting words, malicious libel, obscenity, or child pornography, it enjoys First Amendment protection, though less than other speech.5 Bigelow had left a fragment of hope for the old exception, because the advertisement there carried factual material of clear public interest and concerned activity the state could not forbid.6 The prescription-drug price advertising at issue in Virginia Pharmacy had no comparable cover, and the Court protected it anyway.
The reason for that protection shapes everything that follows. Advertising, however tasteless, disseminates information about who is producing and selling what, for what reason, and at what price. Because a free enterprise economy allocates resources through countless private decisions, it is a matter of public interest that those decisions be intelligent and well informed.7 The protection runs to the communication, to its source, and to its recipients, so the consumers who sued in Virginia Pharmacy could assert a reciprocal right to receive the advertising.8 A rule that works only by keeping consumers uninformed therefore attacks the interest the doctrine exists to serve, and Virginia’s ban did exactly that. It touched professional standards only through the reactions the state assumed people would have to price information, and it did nothing to stop a pharmacist inclined to cut corners.9 What it did accomplish was to insulate pharmacists from price competition in a market where the price of tetracycline in a single area ranged from $1.20 to $9.00, a protection resting largely on public ignorance.10
Three developments define where the doctrine stands today. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. applied the anti-ignorance principle to a law that did not look like an advertising ban and pushed review toward the demanding end of intermediate scrutiny. Justices who wanted a different test have criticized Central Hudson for decades without assembling a majority for a replacement. And one setting runs against the trend: when government compels a speaker to add information instead of silencing it, review is deferential. The three subsections below take those developments in that order.
Sorrell and Heightened Scrutiny
Sorrell v. IMS Health shows what happens to intermediate review when a law aimed at commercial activity burdens information itself. Vermont forbade pharmacies to sell, or to disclose for marketing, records revealing individual doctors’ prescribing habits, and it forbade drug manufacturers to use those records for marketing, in each case without the prescriber’s consent. Research and educational uses of the same records stayed lawful. Justice Kennedy, writing for six Justices, held that speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing is protected expression, that the statute therefore required heightened judicial scrutiny, and that it could not satisfy that standard.
The way the statute was aimed explains the result. The speech at stake was detailing: manufacturers’ representatives visit doctors with samples and information about the company’s drugs, and a prescriber’s record lets a detailer tailor the pitch to that doctor’s habits. The statute barred that use of the records and few others. It thus singled out one kind of content, marketing, and one class of speakers, manufacturers and their detailers, while pharmacies could share the same records with almost anyone for almost any other purpose. In practice it also discriminated by viewpoint, because it hampered promotion of brand-name drugs and so favored the generics that state policy preferred. Selectivity of that kind draws suspicion for a reason that has nothing to do with the speakers being sellers. When government lets information flow to everyone except those who would use it to persuade one audience, the target of the rule is the persuasive effect of one side’s message.
Vermont answered that the law was ordinary commercial regulation, and the Court granted part of the premise. Economic regulation can burden speech incidentally without raising a First Amendment problem, as when a ban on race-based hiring requires an employer to take down a “White Applicants Only” sign. Vermont’s burden was not incidental, because the statute was directed at particular content and particular speakers. An economic motive does not change that, since the creation and dissemination of information are speech and much vital expression is produced for money.
The line between conduct and speech decides whether a commercial regulation triggers First Amendment review at all, and litigants press it even against laws aimed squarely at conduct; the respondents in the Indiana public indecency case, for example, claimed that a ban on public nudity violated the First Amendment.11 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman draws the line for prices. A typical price regulation, such as a law requiring every deli to charge ten dollars for a sandwich, controls the amount a seller may collect, so it regulates conduct and affects the menu only incidentally. New York’s no-surcharge law said nothing about the amount a merchant could collect from a cash or credit-card payer. It regulated how sellers communicate their prices, because a merchant could not post “$10, with a 3% credit card surcharge.” The Court held that a law regulating the communication of prices, rather than the prices themselves, regulates speech, and it remanded without deciding whether the law could survive as a regulation of commercial speech or as a disclosure requirement.
Having found a content- and speaker-based burden, the Court did not need to choose between two doctrinal routes. The outcome, it said, is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of scrutiny applies, so it left open whether all the burdened speech was commercial. On the commercial speech route the State carries the burden, and it must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest and is drawn to achieve that interest. Sorrell therefore treats the four steps of Central Hudson as a floor, not a ceiling.12 A content-based regulation of commercial speech must clear either that floor applied demandingly or a heightened scrutiny test, and Vermont’s law failed both.
Vermont’s privacy justification failed because the law was not drawn to serve it. Pharmacies could share the records with anyone for any reason except marketing, and the exceptions let others use them too, so the State might have protected confidentiality through a more coherent policy. A federal scheme that barred disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, while leaving brewers free to advertise it across much of the country, failed for the same kind of reason: the scheme was so irrational that it could not directly and materially advance its objective, and it was not sufficiently tailored.13
The public-health and cost justification failed for a deeper reason. Lower drug costs follow from the law only if detailing changes what doctors prescribe, and detailing changes what doctors prescribe only if doctors find it persuasive. The benefit Vermont claimed was therefore the suppression of persuasion, and it depended on the fear that doctors would decide badly when given truthful information. The Court refused to accept that premise. The speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented, and under the First Amendment “the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence.”14 The premise is the one the Court rejected in Virginia Pharmacy, and Sorrell applied it to a law that did not look like an advertising ban.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented. In his view the statute affected expression only by restricting the use of data that exists by virtue of government regulation, and it was part of a lawful effort to regulate a commercial enterprise. He would have applied ordinary economic-regulation review, under which the law survives, and he warned that strict review of ordinary regulation shifts the choice of means from legislatures to judges. The quarrel is about where regulation of commerce ends and regulation of speech begins, and the majority’s answer is the incidental-burden line that Expressions Hair later drew at the deli counter.
An exam answer should state the holding as heightened scrutiny with Central Hudson as the floor, and should never say that Sorrell overruled Central Hudson. The challenger’s strongest argument is the one the Court accepted: the law targets a message because of its persuasive effect.
Pressure on Central Hudson
Central Hudson drew criticism from the day the Court announced it, and three separate writings in that case show the criticism coming from different directions:
- Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and concurring in the judgment, objected to applying the test when the State is trying “to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly.”16
- Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, argued that the Court’s first definition of commercial speech was too broad, since a labor leader’s exhortation to strike or an economist’s dissertation on the money supply deserves no lesser protection because its subject is the audience’s economic interests.17 Because commercial speech receives less protection, he reasoned, the category must not be defined so broadly that speech deserving greater protection is suppressed by inadvertence.18
- Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the Court had failed to give due deference to the subordinate position of commercial speech and had returned to the era of Lochner v. New York by striking down a state economic regulation on the strength of its own notions of the best means.19
Blackmun’s objection outlasted the other two, and its structure explains why. It does not deny that commercial speech differs from other speech, and some of the differences carry real doctrinal consequences: because the danger of chilling hardy commercial speech is lesser, the overbreadth doctrine and the prior restraint doctrine do not apply to it.20 Blackmun’s point was that no such difference justifies suppressing commercial speech in order to influence public conduct by manipulating the availability of information.21 Permissible restraints, he observed, have been limited to measures protecting consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques, while measures that deprive consumers of information about legally offered products have consistently been invalidated.22 The reason is concealment. Suppressing information about a legal product’s availability and price is a covert attempt to manipulate citizens’ choices, “not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice.”23 The majority itself conceded the risk in a footnote. It reviews with special care any regulation that entirely suppresses commercial speech to pursue a nonspeech-related policy, because a ban on speech could screen the underlying policy from public view.24
The deferential strand of the doctrine peaked in Posadas, which upheld Puerto Rico’s ban on commercial speech encouraging casino gambling among its residents. The Court found the fourth part satisfied “beyond peradventure.” It also answered the challengers’ proposal that the legislature fight demand with counter-speech by saying that the legislature decides whether such a policy would be more effective.25 In a footnote that may overshadow the rest of its opinion, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island called the “greater includes lesser” argument mere dictum and rejected the claim that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech promoting socially harmful activities such as alcohol consumption.26 The logic echoes Blackmun. A ban on advertising a product is often a greater power, not a lesser one, because a complete ban carries an inner political check: Puerto Rico, to ban casinos outright, would have to give up tax revenue and tourist income, while an advertising ban lets it avoid that hard choice.27
The same case shows why no replacement test emerged. Rhode Island had banned advertising liquor prices anywhere but at the place of sale. The Court held that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify First Amendment protection and that the ban violated the First Amendment, though it was unanimous in result and badly split on rationale.28 Seven Justices agreed that the ban failed Central Hudson. Four thought “special care” was required when regulations are designed to prevent truthful information from reaching the public, including Justice Thomas, who argued that regulations designed to keep consumers ignorant are per se invalid. Four others believed the normal Central Hudson test applied, and Justice Scalia would have revisited the whole area by asking whether advertising was regulated when the First Amendment was adopted.29
That division explains why the intermediate test survived. Critics of the categorical approach, who would protect commercial speech like other speech unless it poses distinctively commercial harms, have not commanded a majority.30 With four Justices wanting special care, four content with the test as it stood, and one proposing a historical inquiry, no alternative drew five votes. Only Justice Thomas, in a separate concurrence, has called for overruling Central Hudson, the Court has not returned to the issue, and present indications are that the test will remain.31 What has changed is the rigor with which the Court applies it, as Sorrell shows, and the objection from the opposite direction has not faded: the Sorrell dissent repeated Rehnquist’s worry that heightened review of ordinary economic regulation substitutes judicial for legislative judgment.
The anti-paternalism argument behind Blackmun’s and Thomas’s positions has deep roots in the cases. Virginia Pharmacy conceded that the state’s desired results were desirable and still rejected the advertising ban as a paternalistic means of securing them, since the state was taking away the consumer’s ability to choose by depriving him of the information needed to choose intelligently, a pre-emption of individual decision-making that is objectionable in a free-market economy.32 The ordinance barring “for sale” signs fell for the same reason. The Court questioned whether there was sufficient evidence of likely panic selling, or that the ban would prevent it,33 but the primary infirmity was that government suppressed truthful information on the belief that people would be better off with less speech and knowledge, and the Court was unanimous.34 The argument is not free from difficulty, yet it resonates with other parts of First Amendment doctrine.35
Matal v. Tam gives the test a different job, as a floor beneath a classification question the Court did not need to answer. The case concerned the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act’s trademark registration scheme, and Justice Alito wrote that the Court need not resolve the debate over the proper standard because the clause “cannot withstand even Central Hudson review.”36 The clause also discriminated by viewpoint, because giving offense is a viewpoint.37
The two lines of authority call for different moves, and an answer should track the difference. When the commercial label is doubtful and the law targets a viewpoint, make the Tam move: say the classification is contestable, then show that the law fails even Central Hudson. When the speech is plainly advertising and the challenger argues that the Court has abandoned the intermediate test, make the Liquormart move: state the four steps, press hard on direct advancement and fit, and note that Blackmun and Thomas objected to suppressing truthful information as a policy tool without ever commanding five votes.
Required Disclosures
A rule that makes a seller add accurate information to its own advertisement moves information in the opposite direction from a ban, and the Court reviews it far more gently. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the lawyer-advertising decision discussed earlier in this chapter, upheld Ohio’s discipline of a lawyer for an incomplete disclosure.39 The lawyer’s Dalkon Shield newspaper advertisement offered representation on a contingent-fee basis and told readers that no legal fees would be owed if there was no recovery. It did not disclose that clients might still owe litigation costs, so it suggested that a losing case would cost them nothing. The Court did not apply the Central Hudson test. It asked only whether the disclosure requirement was reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing consumer deception, and it treated the danger of deception as self-evident, so the state did not have to survey the public.
Three features of a disclosure requirement explain the gentler standard. A disclosure silences no one: the lawyer stayed free to say whatever he wished and had to add only information, so the public ends up better informed than before. The advertiser’s own stake is slight, because commercial speech is protected for the value of its information to consumers, and the lawyer’s constitutionally protected interest in withholding a particular fact from his advertising is therefore minimal. And the compelled-speech objection loses force, because Ohio had not tried to prescribe what should be orthodox in politics but had “attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.”40 Verifiability points the same way, since a seller knows its own fees and terms better than any regulator does, and supplying the missing fact costs the seller almost nothing.
Once a rule qualifies as a disclosure requirement, review asks three questions. Is the requirement reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing consumer deception? Is it vague? Is it unjustified or unduly burdensome? The state need not show that the disclosure is the least restrictive means, and the rule is not invalid merely because it leaves other facets of the problem untouched.
The burden condition keeps that deference from becoming a blank check. A disclosure large enough to crowd out the advertiser’s own message restricts speech indirectly and recreates the harm of a ban. Lawyer advertising shows how it happens. After the Court recognized the right of lawyers to advertise, many states imposed stringent and lengthy disclaimers, and the space those disclaimers required confined even basic communication to traditional forms of advertisement. A firm’s name could not appear on the uniforms of a youth baseball team it sponsored, or beside a contribution to a civic charity, because the demanded disclaimers would not fit.41
The limit on deference runs deeper than commercial speech. At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence, and government action requiring the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government contravenes that essential right. In the case from which that principle is quoted, the must-carry rules escaped it only because they were content-neutral, imposing burdens and conferring benefits without reference to the content of speech.42 Government remains free to say what it likes in its own voice, because the check on government speech is democratic.43 A required disclosure differs because the government’s words appear in a private speaker’s advertisement, which is why the Court polices their length and their connection to deception.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States applied the Zauderer standard to a federal requirement that debt relief agencies, a category that includes lawyers who help consumers with bankruptcy, state in their advertisements their status and the nature of the assistance they provide. The requirement survived because it was reasonably related to preventing consumer deception and did not unduly burden the advertiser. A short statement of who the advertiser is and what it offers supplies facts the advertiser knows best, costs a few words, and leaves the rest of the advertisement as written.
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra marks the edge of that deference. California’s FACT Act divided pregnancy-related clinics into two groups. Clinics providing medical services had to notify women that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give a telephone number to call, in service of the law’s stated purpose that state residents know their rights and what health care services are available to them.44 Unlicensed clinics had to state that California had not licensed them to provide medical services. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, acknowledged that more deferential review applies to some laws requiring professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial speech, but he found that line of precedent not implicated by the licensed notice. It was a government-drafted script about state-sponsored services, one of which was abortion, the very practice the challengers opposed, and it said nothing about the clinics’ own services.
The notice for unlicensed facilities shows the burden condition at work. It was a government-scripted, speaker-based requirement, wholly disconnected from California’s informational interest, and its application to advertisements showed how heavy it was. As California conceded, a billboard saying “Choose Life” would have to surround those two words with a 29-word government statement in as many as 13 languages, which drowns out the facility’s own message. The Court left open the validity of a similar requirement that is better supported or less burdensome.
Set beside Zauderer and Milavetz, the pairing shows which facts move the answer. The lawyer’s disclosure was one factual correction to the advertiser’s own statement about its fees, aimed at an omission that made the statement misleading, and the advertisement otherwise stood as written. The California notices were government-scripted messages unconnected to any deception in the clinics’ own speech, and one was large enough to swamp what the speaker wanted to say. In one situation the state adds a few words to prevent a false impression. In the other it adds a message of its own and displaces the speaker’s.
The two standards can meet in a single problem. A challenger to a total ban may argue that a disclosure would have served the state’s interest, which presses the fourth Central Hudson step, and the disclosure itself is then measured against the lighter standard.